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SUMMARY 
In Chile health insurance is mandatory for formal sector workers, so that they can be insured 
against the risks of health care costs. Health coverage is provided by both public (National Health 
Fund –FONASA) and private sector insurers (Previsional Health Care Institutions – ISAPREs). 
Workers pay a mandatory contribution of seven percent of their income to ensure coverage with a 
maximum mandatory monthly contribution of US$ 152. If individuals choose the public sector, 
their coverage is pre-established, comprehensive and does not vary in time. If instead they choose 
the private sector, they must also choose how much coverage to purchase and thus the monthly 
contribution may exceed the mandatory seven percent depending on the benefits of these plans 
and the health risks of the individuals. In fact, premiums in the private sector have been 
increasing and in December 2007 it reached an average of 10.7% of income.  
Any person has, in theory, the choice to insure with FONASA or with an ISAPRE. They may 
also change periodically between ISAPREs and FONASA. Both are responsible for directly 
providing medical care through their own providers or by contracting with third-party providers. 
The government partially subsidises the public system‟s health care expenditure. FONASA 
classifies its beneficiaries into four income groups, denoted by the letters A (low income) to D 
(high income within FONASA). With the exception of those insured in group A, all other 
FONASA affiliates, theoretically, have the option to select public or private providers that hold 
agreements with FONASA. 
The public health care system is decentralized into 28 regional units that cover the entire 
territory. The National Health Services System manages its population through its hospital 
network and manages the provision of health goods for the public sector with a historical global 
budget as their main source of financing. Private provision, on the other hand, operates in a 
traditional market environment and receives fee-for-service payments. 
In 2007, about two-thirds of the population was insured with FONASA (70% or approximately 
11.7 million people), 17% with ISAPREs (approximately 2.8 million people) and 13% had other 
coverage (Armed Forces) or no insurance.  
 v 
Chile has significant inequities in the health financing between the public and private sectors, and 
between the high- and low-income groups of the population. The institutional arrangement 
separates the financing of FONASA and each ISAPRE. On the other hand, there are high co-
payments and out-of-pocket expenditures of the population. 
It is well known that risk selection leads to inefficiency since it can exclude some people –
generally high-risk and low-income people− from the market, leaving them without the desired 
coverage. It can also generate that certain groups‟ preferences –for example, high risks− not be 
considered or that they receive poor quality services or no services at all in an attempt to motivate 
their exit; and it can eliminate the incentive to reduce costs to the extent that cream skimming is 
more profitable. 
Risk selection can be the result of informational failures as well as regulations. Informational 
failures result in adverse selection problems, where individuals can hide information about their 
health status preventing insurers to distinguish and set premiums according to their level of risk, 
which is a condition for achieving efficiency. Therefore, insurers will use their scarce information 
to select those with lower risk. On the other hand, if regulation dictates that insurers charge the 
same rate to all insurees, this also provides incentives for insurers to select the less costly.  
In a competitive health insurance market, without proper regulation, the risk premium will be 
high for the elderly, the sick, women in fertile age, and large families and the risk premium will 
be low for the young, single, and small families. This is what we currently see in the case of 
ISAPREs in Chile. 
In Chile, as in other countries, risk selection generates many types of inefficiencies. First, 
ISAPREs do not have the incentive to respond adequately to the needs of high risk affiliates. 
Second, ISAPREs‟ success in attracting low-risk individuals generates a segmented market, 
where low premiums are charged to low-risk individuals and high premiums are charged to high-
risk individuals, and no private health insurance plan is designed for consumers with income 
levels below a certain threshold. This generates a solidarity problem for the social security 
system. Furthermore, individuals who cannot afford ISAPREs‟ high premiums end up switching 
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to FONASA and this generates a financial deficit covered with public funds, which leads to an 
equity problem.  
In this context, selection is more profitable for ISAPREs than improving efficiency in the 
production of health care services. In fact, the more efficient insurance companies, which do less 
risk selection, run the risk of losing market share. Although a single ISAPRE may gain from 
selection, it is still a loss for society and hence a total welfare loss. Due to selection problems in 
the insurance system, the young and rich population and relatively few women are privately 
insured; the elderly, handicapped or chronically ill, families with more dependents and low-
income individuals are insured with FONASA. Of course the mobility between ISAPREs is low 
and it is limited by age and the existence of pre-existing conditions.  
Similar international experience, especially in Europe, focused on the risk selection concern, the 
removal of beneficiaries, and the inequities that they generate. Europe has taken strong steps 
towards finding solutions to these problems, beginning with a systematic diagnosis of the 
situation. We use these tools and relevant concepts to simulate their implementation in the 
Chilean case. 
One way to reduce risk selection is to create premium cross-subsidies from low-risk groups to 
high-risk groups. This policy makes solidarity subsidies effective, without hindering the 
competition within the insurance system. This may be done through a risk adjustment model that 
uses the available information to estimate expected health costs for an individual or group, based 
on utilization and observed costs, to establish the subsidy for the high-risk group. Risk 
adjustment is expected to neutralize incentives for risk selection to the extent that insurers 
become indifferent to who becomes a beneficiary, by compensating for their affiliates costs or 
risks. Risk adjusted premiums need to cover each individual expected health care expenses in 
order to eliminate insurer incentives to prefer low-risk individuals. If done correctly, health 
insurers receive less money for low-risk people and more money for high risk. Nevertheless, the 
model does not need to predict exactly each individual‟s probability of being sick with its 
associated costs, but it has to do it better than insurers. Thus, the costs of cream skimming 
become larger than its benefits.  
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We review several risk adjustment models, considering that FONASA is expected to subsidize 
the poor. We begin by reviewing the model implemented in the reform, which is a cell-model for 
ISAPREs only and limited to the GES basic package. We then apply the model but include 
FONASA (this was the original proposal for the reform). In the later simulations we increase the 
complexity of the model by presenting a regression model that in the first stage uses demographic 
adjustment and then incorporates diagnoses (morbidity). 
Our results show that the model incorporating morbidity is a much better predictor than the 
previous alternatives. This model recognizes the current and expected morbidity present in 
FONASA, which has been the recipient of the “bad risks”, and therefore redistributes more in 
favour of FONASA. 
So, first, we use the risk adjustment method applied to the Solidarity Compensation Fund only for 
ISAPREs between 2005 and 2007. We consider all 56 GES health problems and we compute the 
value of the solidarity contribution as the expected costs by age and sex risk groups of the Fund‟s 
beneficiary population and the premium subsidies for each risk group. The results are: four 
ISAPREs are contributors and the five are recipients of resources, representing 35% and 65% of 
the beneficiaries, respectively; out of the resources that the Fund collected in 2007, only 1.8%, is 
redistributed, i.e., 1.8% of the GES average premium and redistribution is quite moderate, at an 
average annual rate of US$ 0.44 per beneficiary, which represents and 0.076% of the operational 
income of the private system. Moreover, there is redistribution towards the elderly and children 
under one, whose expected costs are significantly above average, and towards ISAPREs whose 
enrolees have relatively high incomes. The latter happens because some ISAPREs have 
specialized in older, healthy and high-income individuals. 
It is important to note that the incentives that come with risk adjustment depend on the amounts 
involved. As such, the effect the Fund and risk adjustment would have is directly related to the 
number, utilization and price of the problems incorporated in GES. The most important problem 
of this system is that this Fund cannot adequately correct the risk selection problems because it 
does not include FONASA. Basically ISAPREs can still select the good risks and send the bad 
risks to FONASA, which means that FONASA subsidizes the private system.  
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In the second model, we use a cell-demographic-model with FONASA under the assumption that 
the sum of premium contributions of FONASA is US$ 1.07 billion (with an annual solidarity 
contribution of US$93.56 per capita, more than three times the last model). Of this, US$ 52.8 
million is redistributed from the ISAPREs as a result of the greater risk index of FONASA. This 
transfer is equivalent to 4% of the Fund‟s resources. 
Finally, we basically compare two concurrent risk adjustment regression models based on their 
ability to predict the current health care costs: the demographic model that predicts costs based 
only on sex and age; and the diagnosis-based model, which incorporates health conditions 
grouped as the Hierarchical Condition Category of the Diagnosis Cost Group Classification 
System (DxCG/HCC). We predict expenditures at the individual level using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression estimates. Based on adjusted-R
2
, the demographic model explains only 
2.6% of the variance in total actual expenditure. When the model uses morbidity and has an 
adjusted-R
2
 of 36.1%. The predictive performance of this model performs 14 times better than 
the demographic model. Mean absolute prediction error provided equal ranking, where the 
recalibrated DxCG/HCC model (with morbidity) was 23% more than the demographic model. 
The relative rankings of the models remained unchanged when their concurrent predictive 
performances for groups of enrolees with relatively high, medium and low expenditure were 
evaluated. The predictive ratio results for enrolees grouped by quintiles of actual expenditure 
shows that the demographic model is grossly underpaying the lowest expenditure quintile. The 
demographic model with a dummy variable for hospitalisation and the diagnosis based model 
overpay the lowest expenditure quintile and underpay the highest expenditure quintile. The 
recalibrated DxCG/HCCs model performs even better, though there is still overpayment for the 
lowest expenditure group of insured and underpayment for the high expenditure groups. 
In conclusion, the introduction of risk adjustment is necessary in Chile. The current age/sex based 
risk adjustment model is inadequate because it considers too few relevant patient characteristics. 
Additionally, we show that only a small part of the variation in individual resource use is 
explained. When the model is used for payment, it could encourage favourable selection and 
causes access problems. Instead the diagnoses-based risk adjustment model can distinguish 
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differences in expected costs concurrently and explain more and better the variation observed in 
health spending across individuals. In sum, in a scenario with many market failures, as is the case 
with the health care sector, there is a trade off between equity and efficiency, which is a key 
challenge faced by governments and technical regulatory institutions. The redistribution of risks 
from the young to the elderly, and from the healthy to the sick, may improve both equity and 
efficiency in the system. Furthermore, as our results show, the higher the quality of the risk 
adjustment model, the smaller the trade off between equity and efficiency. Finally, we offer 
policy recommendations that address the problems identified directly as well as complementary 
policies. The suggested policies include maintaining the seven percent of income contribution but 
making it cover a benefits package that is equivalent to this contribution (i.e. more 
comprehensive than GES). These income-based contributions would go into a single national 
fund which to be redistributed through a diagnoses-based risk adjustment model in capitated 
payments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Chile‟s mixed health insurance system with private and public insurers is inefficient and 
inequitable, as has been shown in several studies reviewed in this research. In general terms, 
individuals pay a fixed health premium to public or private insurers based on income. Public 
insurers have open enrolment, meaning anyone can join.  Private insurers do not have open 
enrolment, giving them incentives to select affiliates by risk. This practice has created an 
inequitable and inefficient system that overburdens the public sector with high risk individuals. 
The international experience has shown that risk selection can be addressed by using risk 
adjustment methods for financing in order to improve both efficiency and equity. The main goal 
of this research is to assess these problems in Chile, identify their causes, and simulate financing 
risk adjustment. 
We begin this introduction by describing the Chilean health sector and the most recent health 
reform (July 2005 to date). Then, we present a brief overview and the structure of this document. 
 
1. The Chilean health care system 
In Chile health insurance is mandatory for formal sector workers, so that they can be insured 
against the risks of health care costs. Health coverage is provided by both the public and private 
sectors.  Formal sector workers pay a mandatory contribution of seven percent of his or her 
income (up to US$ 2,175) to ensure coverage, making the maximum monthly contribution for 
health insurance US$ 152.
1
 If individuals choose the public sector, their coverage is pre-
established, broad and does not vary in time. If instead they choose the private sector, they must 
also choose how much coverage to purchase and thus the monthly contribution may exceed 7% 
depending on the benefits of these plans and the health risks of the individuals. Furthermore, 
premiums for private health insurance have been increasing.  In 2002 the average contribution by 
                                                          
1
 As of December 2007. 
 2 
those with private health insurance was 9.2% of the income of contributors.  In 2004 it was 9.4%, 
9.8% in 2005 (Superintendence of Health, 2007) and in December 2007 it was 10.7%.
2
 
Therefore, ISAPREs have an income- and risk-related premium that amounts to 7% or more of 
income, while FONASA only uses an income-related premium which is 7% of income. 
Any person has, in theory, the choice to insure with the public insurer (National Health Fund –
FONASA) or with one of the fourteen
3
 private insurance companies
4
 (Private Health Care 
Institutions – ISAPREs). They may also change periodically between private insurers and 
FONASA. Both ISAPREs and FONASA are responsible for directly providing medical care 
through their own providers or contracting with third-party providers to provide care to their 
beneficiaries. 
In 2007, about two-thirds of the population was insured with FONASA (70% or approximately 
11.7 million people), 17% with one of the ISAPREs (approximately 2.8 million people) and 13% 
had other coverage (Armed Forces) or no insurance.
5
 Due to selection problems in the insurance 
system, the young and rich population and relatively few women are privately insured; the 
elderly, handicapped or chronically ill, families with more dependents
6
 and low income 
individuals are generally insured with FONASA. 
The government partially subsidises the public system‟s health care expenditure. FONASA 
classifies its beneficiaries by income groups, denoted by the letters A (poorest) to D (richest). 
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 Source: Author calculations with Superintendence of Health data. 
3
 There are two types of ISAPREs: open ISAPREs and closed ISAPREs. Open ISAPREs are open for all, while closed ISAPREs 
are associated with personnel of a company or of a specific production sector. For example, workers of the national copper 
industry have their exclusive ISAPRE (ISAPRE Fusat). This distinction is an important one because, by law, risk adjustment 
includes only the open private insurers. In April 2008, there were 14 ISAPREs, 8 of which were open and 6 were closed 
(Superintendence of Health, April 2008). But in July of 2005, there were 16 ISAPREs, of which 8 were open and 8 were closed.  
4
 We show that the unregulated system creates a series of problems that limit the freedom of choice. Among the more relevant 
problems is the cream skimming in the private sector that overburdens the public system. 
5
 This information is for 2005, MINSAL (Ministry of Health), FONASA and Superintendence of Health. Sources: 
http://www.fonasa.cl; http://www.supersalud.cl. 
6
 Dependents are family members or others related to the contributor that are not contributing directly but that depend on the 
contributor. 
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With the exception of those insured in group A, who are exempt from the payroll tax and all co-
payments,
7
 all other FONASA affiliates, theoretically, have the option to select public or private 
providers that hold agreements with FONASA. The public provision includes services rendered 
by primary health care facilities and public hospitals. 
Figure 1: The Chilean health care system 
Premium
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Source: Author’s analysis, 2008. 
In Chile, public and private health care providers are very different. The public health care 
system is decentralized into 28 regional units that cover the entire territory. The National Health 
Services System manages an assigned population through its hospital network and manages the 
provision of health goods for the public sector. Notwithstanding that primary health care is public 
and to a large extent dependent on municipal governments, it is the National Health Service‟s 
technical relation and health objectives that prevail. Throughout the country, primary care is 
provided by municipal health care centres following strategies based both on health care teams 
and family care. Private provision, on the other hand, functions in a traditional market 
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environment. Most inpatient care is provided by the public sector, whereas ambulatory care is 
provided by both systems, except primary care which is provided only by the public sector. 
It has been shown that within the Chilean health care system there are deep rooted inequities and 
a lack of solidarity. These differences can be clearly seen by comparing the public and private 
system, as well as comparing community groups (age, sex, income, education level, region, 
county, ethnic background, etc.). Differences also resonate in per capita resource availability, 
access, opportunity and health care quality, family income, and environmental circumstances, 
among others. These disparities contribute to the health status inequalities seen in the Chilean 
population, observed in national indicators, such as general and infant mortality, Disability 
Adjusted Life Years (DALY‟s) and life expectancy, among others. These indicators are also 
closely linked to levels of education, income and employment (Vega, 2001; Vega et al., 2003; 
Subramanian et al., 2003; Jadue et al., 2004; MINSAL 2002; MINSAL 2005; Olivares, 2006; Cid 
et al., 2006; MINSAL, 1997). 
 
2. The health care reform 
In June 2002 the Government of Chile presented to Congress the legal framework for a health 
reform. We present the main characteristics of the reform proposal in this section (Ministry of 
Health, 2002).
8
 
2.1. Values and principles that motivated the reform 
The following values and principles motivated the reform in Chile: 
i. The right to health: should be understood as the legitimate right of any person residing 
within the national territory to have access to health care when needed. This implies the 
establishment of explicit access, opportunity, quality, and financial protection guarantees, 
in addition to the generation of resources for effective implementation.  
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Parliament, Santiago, May 22nd of 2002. 
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ii. Equal health as a moral imperative: relates to reducing avoidable and unfair inequities, 
granting improved levels of social protection and access to universal care;  
iii. Solidarity in health: should be understood as the intent of society to provide solidarity to 
the underprivileged and equal guarantees available to the privileged and underprivileged.  
This implies that the healthy conform to the ill, men to women, the young to the elderly 
and the rich to the poor; 
iv. Efficient use of resources: should be understood as a necessary condition to materialize 
values such as equality and solidarity in health, and a programmed investment increase in 
the health care sector. This should result in increased quality and quantity of care, 
improved medical care and customer service, and implies an effort on behalf of society 
and service providers; and, 
v. Social participation in health: to conceive initiatives and evaluate policies and programs. 
2.2. The reform proposals considered in this work 
The following components of the reform proposals are key for our research. We describe the 
most important aspects of the reform proposals below. 
First, the mandatory and universal standard benefits package currently known as “Garantías 
Explícitas en Salud,” (Explicit Health Guarantees or GES) was established. 9 GES guarantees 
predetermined levels of access, opportunity and financial coverage for ambulatory care, inpatient 
care and emergency care, for 56 prioritised health conditions. Second, the proposal included the 
creation of a Solidarity Compensation Fund (Fund hereon after) among public and private 
insurers
10
. This Fund would finance the benefits package, in order to spread risk, reduce selection 
incentives (cream-skimming, in particular) and introduce more solidarity into the system. Finally 
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 GES was originally known as “Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas” (Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees or 
AUGE), but was later renamed GES. 
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 This part of the proposal, the Solidarity Compensation Fund, which pooled ISAPREs and FONASA, did not pass congress and 
was modified to include only ISAPREs 
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it increases regulation of the private health system and gives more authority to the regulatory and 
enforcement agency, the Superintendence of Health. 
A key instrument of the reform was the Fund. The purpose of the Fund was to compensate health 
insurers, public and private, for the enrolment of high-risk individuals, based on a model of risk-
adjusted premium subsidies that included, at least, age and sex as adjusters.  
The Reform Commission of the Ministry of Health (2002) decided in 2003 that the Fund would 
be established for GES‟s financing. In principle, the Fund would: 1) cover all beneficiaries with 
the mandatory health insurance (with both FONASA and ISAPREs), including contributors, 
dependents or indigents; 2) receive a flat rate community premium or solidarity contribution 
(called “universal premium”) from all beneficiaries, computed as the medium cost of the GES 
package in the public sector; 3) determine the distribution of resources according to the risk 
profile of beneficiaries of each insurer; and 4) be administered by the new Superintendence of 
Health. 
The Legal proposal established guidelines for the operation of the Fund. For example, the 
Government would contribute a fixed amount of funding to FONASA, equivalent to the flat rate 
solidarity contribution, for each indigent person registered in the system
11
 (Group “A” 
beneficiaries of FONASA). Each insurer would pay the Fund a Universal Premium, a fixed 
amount per beneficiary, established by competent authorities, regardless of individual income or 
health risk. The Fund would be distributed among insurers in accordance with the health risk 
structure of their beneficiaries, and every month, insurers would make transfers indicated by the 
Fund‟s administrator. Hence, insurers would have to provide the administrator with this 
information. The regulation that determines the procedures to establish the Health Guarantees 
Regime considered the use of actuarial calculations in order to set the cost −known as the 
Universal Premium (solidarity contribution)− and the risk compensation table (of expected costs 
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for each beneficiary. For those “lacking resources” or “indigent”, the government will provide a subsidy directly to FONASA, 
until the medium cost is reached.  
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by age and sex). The authority would entrust the above-mentioned calculations to competent 
entities.  
Figure 2: Cash and information flows of the proposed Solidarity Compensation Fund 
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Note: In 2003 the ISAPRE system had 16 ISAPREs, and in 2007 there were 14 ISAPREs. 
Source: Author’s analysis based on the Law Proposal Guidelines (2003) 
The Government‟s proposal with regard to the Fund faced strong opposition from interest groups 
in the private insurance industry and the political right wing, and was not approved in the 
parliament. What actually became law differs significantly from this proposal. 
The Fund that became law only includes open private insurance companies
12
 (open ISAPREs) 
and it excludes FONASA (Figure 3). The Fund does not actually make or receive monetary 
transfers, but rather the Superintendence determines net transfers and then notifies “contributing 
ISAPREs” to compensate “receiving ISAPREs.” The Fund is tied to the GES, in the sense that 
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each time the GES is expanded to include additional health problems, the Fund also incorporates 
the additional health problems when calculating the transfers between ISAPREs.
13
 So, between 
July 2005and June
 
2006, 25 health problems were included in the GES package; between July 
2006 and June 2007 another 15 health problems were included; and finally, by July 2007 there 
were a total of 56 health problems in GES. 
Figure 3: Cash and information flows in the approved Solidarity Compensation Fund among ISAPREs 
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* From July 2005, when the Inter-ISAPRE risk adjustment system was implemented, to December 2007, one open ISAPRE exited the market. 
Source: Author’s analysis based on MINSAL, 2005. 
In summary, the reform included a basic benefits package to be offered by all ISAPREs at a 
single price to all its beneficiaries. Also, this is another reason to risk adjust the cost of the 
benefits package. This was done to reduce risk selection incentives.  
All ISAPREs established a health provider network for their beneficiaries to receive GES 
guarantees (GES network) through signed agreements with health providers. ISAPREs have to 
                                                          
13
 One of president Bachelet‟s promises included increasing the number of health problems to 80 before 2010. 
 9 
inform their beneficiaries whether health problems are included in GES and with which health 
providers they can seek care under GES. The beneficiary has the choice of seeking care at his/her 
ISAPRE‟s GES network or at the other providers included in his/her health plan, although he/she 
would lose GES‟s guarantees, in particular, the financial protection guarantee, if using a non-
GES network provider. 
This is a general overview of the reform‟s characteristics that we use in this study. Further 
clarifications are presented as needed below. 
 
3. An overview and thesis’ structure 
Our main goal is to study the inefficiencies and inequities in the system and to propose a feasible 
solution to these problems. To achieve greater solidarity in the Chilean health care system we 
propose the implementation of risk-adjusted premium subsidies or risk equalization across risk 
groups, along with adequate regulation. We show that the financial gains of the insurers − 
achieved through risk selection− represent a social loss for the system. Our results show that if 
the capitation payment system adjusts using refined adjusters to make them as accurate as 
possible in predicting medical expenditures, these gains for insurers can be reduced and 
incentives for risk selection can be lessened significantly. Furthermore, past experience has 
shown that it is not enough to use demographic variables to determine risk adjustment since it can 
result in inefficiency and inequity; hence, a more sophisticated model has to be proposed.  
We simulate models with two types of Solidarity Compensation Funds: the Fund as approved by 
the Chilean Parliament (Inter-ISAPREs); and a universal Fund as proposed by the government 
(which includes FONASA). We compare these two types of set-ups and simulate the 
demographic risk adjustment proposed by the government with the one that was finally approved 
by law. Then we simulate an alternative model, that incorporates health status adjusters and 
econometric analysis, which is the model we propose as more suitable for Chile. 
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The second chapter is a review of the relevant theoretical framework of risk adjustment for Chile 
in the light of international experience, mainly in Europe. The international examples presented 
here reflect the experience until 2007, so more recent developments are not captured. 
The third chapter contains an evaluation of the current social health insurance system in Chile. 
We review both the public and private sectors. We show that private insurers perform risk 
selection that generates inefficiencies and inequities, and considerable social loss. 
Chapter IV contains a detailed description of two risk adjustment models: the model currently 
being used and the model as originally proposed by the government. The first model is a cell 
model with demographic risk adjustment and with a Fund only for ISAPREs, as specified by law, 
which is identical to the one operating in Chile since mid-2005. The second risk adjustment 
model is also a cell model with demographic risk adjustment but with a Fund for both ISAPREs 
and FONASA. 
In Chapter V, we describe and assess the data and methods for the regression models. Note that 
risk adjustment models can be prospective or concurrent and the computations may be made 
using cell or regression methods. Prospective regression methods use only diagnostic information 
from a past period or periods, to then apply it to the next year. Retrospective methods use 
diagnostic information from the current period, to then apply it to the current year.
14
 The main 
criterion for judging the value of both models is the amount of variance in spending they are able 
to explain. A retrospective adjuster will explain more variance in actual spending than a 
prospective adjuster because it also explains some random variation (Newhouse, 1999). Given 
the characteristics of the available data set for Chile, we use a concurrent model. 
Table 1 shows a summary of the models presented in Chapters IV and V. 
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Table 1: Risk adjustment models simulated 
Cell models 
Risk adjusters Health insurers 
Age and sex ISAPREs 
Age and sex ISAPREs and FONASA 
Regression models 
Risk adjusters Health insurers 
Age and sex ISAPREs and FONASA 
Age, sex, and hospitalisation ISAPREs and FONASA 
Age, sex, and morbidity ISAPREs and FONASA 
Source: Authors. 
Chapter VI presents the results of the concurrent regression model which incorporates clinical 
diagnosis for the entire health social security system (public and private) in risk adjustment. We 
compare this model with the demographic regression model. The demographic model predicts 
costs based only on sex and age. The diagnosis-based model incorporates health conditions, 
grouped according to the Hierarchical Condition Category of Diagnosis Cost Group classification 
System (DxCG/HCC). We compare them based on their ability to predict current costs. 
We estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to predict expenditures at the individual 
level and to combine the expenses associated with diagnostic groupings (HCCs) and age/sex 
cohorts. The risk weight reflects an estimate of the marginal cost for a given medical condition 
relative to the base cost for individuals with no medical conditions. We measure the individual-
level predictive performance using individual R-squared (R
2
) and the mean absolute prediction 
error (MAPE). We assess group-level predictive performance using predictive ratios (PR) of 
expenditure quintiles.  
Finally, Chapter VII presents conclusions and discussion. The conclusion of the comparison 
between the diagnoses-based model and the demographic model is that the diagnoses-based 
model is feasible and significantly better than the demographic model. It results in greater equity 
and efficiency improvements.  
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We also show that the incentives for risk selection within insurers can be reduced through 
adjusted capitation payment systems. In fact, the more refined the adjusters are, the more accurate 
the predictions of medical expenditures, which generates less incentives for risk selection. 
Furthermore, we also study the feasibility of the application of diagnoses-based risk adjustment 
models in Chile. We conclude that with political will this type of risk adjustment may be 
implemented in Chile in the near future. 
In sum, this study proposes a feasible risk adjustment model for the Chilean health care system 
using information that is already available. The model predicts health care costs of individuals 
from the public and private insurance systems, based on the utilization and observed costs in a 
fixed time interval, and then adjusts by risk to establish premium subsidies for high-risk groups, 
to improve efficiency and equity. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF RISK ADJUSTMENT AND THE CHILEAN 
CASE 
1. Theoretical framework 
Health care goods or services are characterized by two fundamental features that distinguish them 
from other goods. On one hand, the demand for health care goods is, to a great extent, a random 
phenomenon and, on the other hand, it changes immensely depending on the type of individual 
−or group of individuals− demanding them. There is consensus in the literature that insurance 
systems are best in this scenario: insurance systems pool resources which in turn can diminish 
financial risk and improve efficiency and social justice among individuals with health care needs 
(Arrow, 1963). However, there is also consensus that insurance models, if not properly regulated, 
do not generate the desired outcomes, particularly in terms of efficiency (Rothschild and Stiglitz 
1976). The market fails because the consumer is unable to make rational decisions about his or 
her demand for health services. The market also fails because health goods exhibit collective 
good properties which give rise to externalities and the “free rider” problem (Arrow, 1963; 
Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). 
Moreover, risk of illness is heterogeneous and not observable to the insurer, causing adverse 
selection. In a competitive insurance market we expect implicit premium cross-subsidies −from 
low risks to high risks.
15
 This cross-subsidy is not sustainable in the case of health insurance 
because competition minimizes the predictable earnings in every contract (van de Ven et al., 
2001). Health insurers have to break even through premium differentiation or risk selection. 
Insurers adjust premiums by expected risk to avoid losses and to break even, known as premium 
differentiation. Alternatively, insurers may adjust the acceptable expected risk of the premium, 
which is reported in the literature as risk selection (van de Ven et al., 2001; Newhouse, 1999). 
Therefore, risk selection is a set of actions by insurers to exploit unpriced risk heterogeneity and 
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to break pooling arrangements. In Chile, ISAPREs determine the level of insurance offered to 
each individual depending on the premium received by the insurer, which is equal to the income- 
and risk-related premium contribution (7%) plus an additional risk-adjusted premium (Puig, 
1999). 
In a scenario with different risk groups and no basic benefits package (insurance schemes or 
health plans), competitive markets result in many risk-adjusted premiums and an array of 
different benefits packages offered by insurers. This occurred in the ISAPRE system in Chile 
from 1981 until December 2007. As the number of insurance schemes increases it becomes more 
difficult for the consumer to choose a scheme. The prices of these premiums also vary depending 
on the insurer‟s ability to identify risks. The extreme case would be an individual-specific 
premium (perfect price discrimination). An example of this phenomenon is the 2005 Chilean 
ISAPRE system, where ISAPREs offered at least 40,000 different health plans (Superintendence 
of Health, 2005 and 2007). This is equivalent to a rate of 32 insurance schemes per 1,000 
contributors.
16
 
Under competitive markets, health insurance premiums differ according to risk. Hence, premiums 
are higher for the elderly, sick, women of fertile age and large families; and lower for young men, 
unmarried men and small families. However, society can legitimately decide that this situation is 
not acceptable or desirable. Examples of these arguments include: equity in health and health 
care, redistribution, social solidarity, etc. As such, it would make sense to introduce a compulsory 
insurance with a regulated premium. The regulated premium could be the same for all and be 
independent of individuals‟ health status, the number of persons in the family (dependents), 
income and risks of becoming ill. In fact, this was the main argument used in Chile to set 
premiums at 7% of income, as in many other countries with compulsory social health insurance 
systems. 
However, restricting premiums by linking them to income −with the intent of achieving 
progressive premiums− generates incentives for risk selection. 
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Income-based premiums make it harder for the insurer to know enrolees‟ (or groups of enrolees) 
expected costs. Insurers have the incentive to select their enrolees based on their risk, preferring 
low- over high-risk individuals. In Chile, insurers are allowed to risk select and to differentiate 
premiums for individuals to fit their expected risk. 
Risk selection has several inefficiencies. For example, insurers can risk select by not responding 
to the high-risk individuals‟ preferences. ISAPREs may provide poor service to the chronically ill 
and choose not to contract with providers who have the best reputations for treating chronic 
illnesses as a means to discourage their affiliation. This, in turn, can discourage physicians and 
hospitals from acquiring such a reputation. In sum, as a result of risk selection, high-risk patients 
may either receive poor care or poor services. 
The insurers‟ success in attracting low-risk beneficiaries leads to a segmented market, where low-
risk individuals use one system and high-risk individuals use another system. Insurers charge low 
premiums to these low-risk members and high premiums to high-risk individuals. This generates 
not only an efficiency problem but also a lack of social solidarity in a social health insurance 
system (van de Ven & Ellis, 2000). Finally, risk selection increases transaction costs as a result of 
the efforts to attract good risks. 
In Chile, important groups –poor, elderly, women and newborns− are affected by risk selection 
and cream skimming.
17
 Those unable to pay the high premiums in the private system go to the 
public system, which has lower premiums; as such, FONASA ends up having a greater 
proportion of elderly and poor relative to ISAPREs. The final economic effect for FONASA is a 
funding deficit. FONASA receives less funding from contributions and spends more on health 
care. FONASA may cover this deficit with its pool of premium payments or with general tax 
transfers, which implies an equity problem. Old FONASA beneficiaries see the resources 
available for them diminished by the affiliation of high-risk individuals. Yet, ISAPRE 
beneficiaries who have higher incomes and pay more taxes than FONASA beneficiaries (with 
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lower incomes) subsidize FONASA beneficiaries through general taxes. But, Chile‟s tax structure 
is regressive (ECLAC, 2008).
18
 Furthermore, only approximately 50% of FONASA‟s budget is 
financed through general taxes (FONASA, 2005).  
Third, when selection is generalized in the system and is beneficial for insurers, it becomes more 
profitable to select than to improve the efficiency in the production of health care (Wasem, 2002). 
In the short term, insurers prefer investing available resources on improving risk selection and not 
on reducing costs, and therefore, they do not improve efficiency. The most efficient insurers that 
do less risk selection may lose market share with respect to the most inefficient insurers. This 
results in a loss of resources for society. Risk selection plays against efficiency and, although 
individual insurance companies may obtain some benefits from risk selection, society as a whole 
loses.  
In this context, it becomes socially desirable to avoid risk selection and to increase solidarity. 
One mechanism to increase solidarity is risk adjusted premium subsidies. These are subsidies 
from low- to high-risk individuals (Ellis et al., 2002). This requires a solidarity fund between 
insurers and a risk adjustment model which uses actual expenditures −based on utilization and 
observed costs during a fixed period of time− to estimate expected costs in health care of 
individuals or groups of individuals and then to establish subsidies for high risk groups of 
individuals (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). Because risk adjustment pays insurers more for high-
risk individuals and less for low-risk individuals, it reduces the risk selection incentives in the 
market. 
There are a number of other mechanisms that reduce risk selection incentives, of which the most 
important is open enrolment. Open enrolment allows individuals to switch insurers and each 
insurer is in turn obliged to accept all applicants, subject to the usual conditions –for example, 
geographical working area, minimum contract period with the current health insurance, prior 
notification period and others procedural issues (van de Ven, et al., 2001). Although open 
enrolment by itself does not control risk selection, it is a very important complementary policy 
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and its inclusion helps prevent insurers from discriminating on the basis of health status. 
Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland have open enrolment policies (van de Ven et 
al., 2001, van de Ven et al., 2007). In Chile, only FONASA has open enrolment, which is 
sustainable only because the government provides a supply subsidy to public health providers 
through FONASA. Without the existence of open enrolment for ISAPREs, risk adjustment 
becomes even more critical.  
In imperfect markets, as is the case with health care, there is a complex trade-off between equity 
and efficiency. For example, Chile set its mandatory premium payment unrelated to health status 
(reflecting an equity concern), but this resulted in risk selection (efficiency loss). Risk adjustment 
in financing reduces this trade-off. The redistribution from low- to high-risk groups, from young 
to old and from the healthy to the ill improves equity and even efficiency (van de Ven et al., 
2001). 
 
2. Risk adjustment models19 
Risk adjustment models are based on three key elements:  
a) Estimation of community premium or solidarity contribution; 
b) Expected costs by risks groups; and 
c) Premium subsidies to calculate the capitated payments for each individual. 
The risk pooling mechanism is commonly known as Equalization Risk Fund or Solidarity Fund. 
The following sections describe these and other characteristics of risk adjustment models. 
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2.1. Financial flows organization: “external” and “internal” systems 
Risk adjustment models may have either “external” or “internal” financial flows. The internal 
system is when users pay their premiums to insurers and then the insurer pays the community 
premium to the Solidarity Fund (Figure 4). In the external system users pay premiums directly to 
the Solidarity Fund (Figure 5) (van de Ven et al., 2001). 
Figure 4: Internal organization of cash flows 
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Source: Adapted from Wasem and Gre, 2005. 
In Chile, the ISAPREs‟ risk adjustment is an internal system as in Germany (until December 
2007) and Switzerland (van de Ven et al., 2001). The internal system implies lower transaction 
costs because it uses an existing structure of financial flows and financing. Also, Chile already 
has a mandatory health contribution and there are norms that prohibit the Superintendence from 
accumulating resources (Superintendence of Health, 2006), which would be required in an 
external system. 
 19 
Countries like the Netherlands (Lamers et al., 2003), Belgium (Schokkaert et al., 2003) and some 
Eastern European countries (Ellis, 2003) use the external model. This model separates the 
solidarity contribution to the Solidarity Fund from the premium paid to insurers. By making the 
solidarity contribution income-related, these countries avoid the distortions generated in 
competitive markets. The Solidarity Fund then pays insurers the risk adjusted premium subsidies. 
For example, in the Netherlands the costs of health insurance are covered by consumers through 
nominal and income-related premiums.
20
 Insurers may set their own nominal premiums but they 
must be the same for everyone who chooses the same insurance agreement (“in kind” or 
“reimbursement”). Besides nominal premiums, health insurance is also financed by levying an 
income-related premium payable by person. These contributions cover 50% of the macro 
premium burden. The income-related premiums and the amounts provided by the Government 
are paid into a fund called the Health Insurance Fund (The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 
2005). 
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Figure 5: External organization of cash flows 
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Source: J. Wasem, S. Gre, 2005. 
In any case, it is important to bear in mind that these are operational differences do not alter the 
main functioning of any risk adjustment model. 
2.2. Community premium in the risk adjustment mechanism 
The community premium (also referred to as the solidarity contribution) to the Solidarity Fund 
may be determined in different ways. The essential requirement is that it be independent of the 
enrolees‟ health risks. We discuss two methods below: the income-related and the flat rate. 
2.2.1 Income-related contribution 
An income-related community premium is simply a percentage of income. The percentage of 
income is computed such that the average premium paid is equivalent to the average cost of the 
benefits package. For example, Germany uses an income-based risk adjustment model (Buchner 
and Wasem, 2001, 2003). 
 21 
This is usually a progressive alternative, although the progressiveness of the adjustment depends 
on how progressive its financing is. For example, if the fund is financed externally from public 
revenues and the tax system is progressive, then the income-related premium will be even more 
progressive. In fact, Wagstaff (2007) suggests that each resource collection mechanism must also 
take into account its impact on the labour market (tax or social contributions or combinations of 
these). For example, first, Social Health Insurance (SHI) does not necessarily deliver good 
quality care at a low cost. Second, the cost of collecting revenues may be substantial for the 
formal sector. Third, SHI may have a negative impact on the labour market, including formal 
sector workers moving into the informal sector. Finally, poor households covered at the 
taxpayers‟ expense may be caught in a poverty trap. 
2.2.2 Flat rate community premium  
The flat rate or per capita community premium is an equal, fixed amount for every individual. 
The flat rate is computed as the average expected cost of the benefits package to be offered to the 
entire population. Chile uses the flat rate in its risk adjustment model for open ISAPREs. The 
community premium is equivalent to the actuarial expected per capita cost from the set of health 
problems included in the basic guarantees package (GES). This revenue is expected to cover the 
Solidarity Equalization Fund inter-ISAPREs. Besides, it is expected that the net effect of the 
model is progressive in risks.
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Combinations of both mechanisms, that is, of the income-related premium and the flat rate, are 
also used. This is the case of the community premiums for each of the sickness funds in Belgium 
and the Netherlands (Schokkaert and van de Ven, 2003; Lamers et al., 2003). In fact, in external 
subsidy systems −as in the Netherlands‟, Belgium‟s and Israel‟s risk adjustment systems− 
consumers pay two contributions: a premium contribution to the sickness fund of their choice; 
and a solidarity contribution, income-related, that goes directly to a Solidarity Fund. In Israel the 
premium contribution is zero, so this is not a concern (van de Ven et al., 2001). 
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 A flat rate is income-regressive by definition. When health risks are associated to the population‟s income, risk adjustment 
provokes two effects: risk-progressive effects and income-progressive effects. 
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In the internal subsidy systems −as in Germany‟s and Switzerland‟s risk adjustment models− 
each consumer pays the complete premium to his or her sickness fund, without an explicit 
community premium going directly to a solidarity fund. In this context, Switzerland imposes 
community rating per sickness fund, differentiated by region, and the government gives direct 
subsidies to the poor (Beck et al., 2003). In Germany, premium contributions are proportional to 
income with a single rate per sickness fund. This could be interpreted as the existence of a 
premium contribution with a sum of a flat rate premium contribution and a kind of income-
related community premium (Schokkaert et al., 2007). 
In any case, the basic rationale of risk adjustment does not depend on this choice. Evidently, the 
impacts are different enough and depend on the degree and type of solidarity that is intended to 
be introduced. Namely there are two alternatives: (1) risk solidarity and (2) income solidarity. 
Both may be achieved through the Solidarity Fund.  
The external system makes it possible to incorporate any financing equity goal into the system. If 
there is no explicit income-related solidarity contribution going directly to a solidarity fund, it is 
less straightforward to implement a specific concept of financing equity (Schokkaert et al., 2007). 
Therefore, models with income-related premiums and internal risk adjustment (as in Germany 
and Switzerland) have to take income into account as a risk adjuster, whereas this is not 
necessary in an external model and of course also not necessary in models with flat rate premium 
contributions. 
2.3. Premium subsidy and risk adjusters  
Once the decision to apply a risk adjustment model is made, it is important that the variables 
chosen as adjusters be relevant to the goals set. That is to say, that the information used allows an 
important degree of prediction of the health care costs for the group of problems chosen to be 
covered universally. 
2.3.1 Demographic risk adjustment  
About 30 countries use risk adjustment models with demographic variables like age and sex 
(Ellis, 2003) as risk adjusters. In some cases they also include some other relevant characteristics 
 23 
such as sickness subsidies (sickness benefits) and disability (Germany), or mortality (Belgium) 
(van de Ven et al., 2001; van de Ven et al., 2007). 
These are usually cell models. Risk factors are assigned by age groups and sex based on the 
standardised expected cost of each age group-sex cell. Currently, the Chilean risk adjustment 
model for ISAPREs is based on 36 sex and age groups, as the relevant variables to predict the 
costs of the risks groups (Superintendence of Health, 2006 and 2007). 
2.3.2 Socioeconomic risk adjusters 
From the international experience it is clear that the existing risk adjustment models have 
gradually incorporated more variables for the calculations of the premium subsidies. First, they 
included age and sex as adjusters, or only age as in Israel (Shmueli et al., 2003), and later they 
included variables that improve the prediction of the expected health care costs. For example, 
they included socioeconomic indicators and health status variables. 
Socioeconomic variables are added (to demographic variables) to improve the prediction of 
health care cost variability. Socioeconomic variables are determinants of health status and, to 
some degree, of its costs. Socioeconomic variables used include: unemployment status, 
urbanization, geographical region and income. For example, the Belgium model used age, sex, 
urbanization, disability, income, status of employment and mortality in an aggregated regression 
model (Schokkaer and van de Voorde, 2000 and van de Ven et al., 2003). USA (Medicare) and 
Germany also use socioeconomic variables in their risk adjustment models. 
2.3.3 Health status risk adjustment 
The most sophisticated risk adjustment models use health status variables as adjusters which 
increases the accuracy of the predicted costs. The health status variables include individual 
clinical diagnoses (ambulatory and/or inpatient diagnoses) and/or pharmaceutical prescriptions 
that identify ambulatory diagnoses (van de Ven et al., 2007). In the USA these variables are used 
in the programs for the elderly and the poor (Medicare and Medicaid). The Netherlands began to 
use these variables in 2004 (Prinsze and van Vliet, 2007). First, in 2002, they began using 
pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs). In 2004, they applied inpatient diagnostic information 
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(diagnostic cost groups or DCGs) jointly with a socioeconomic variable indicating if the 
individual was an independent worker (self-employed) (Prinsze and van Vliet, 2007; Wasem and 
Gre, 2005). Belgium‟s demographic risk adjustment model was replaced with the DxCG family 
model from 2006. Germany, following the reform program, will begin to use this type of model 
in 2009 (Wasem and Gre, 2005; Ellis, 2007). 
Germany included in 2003 a limited group of chronic or catastrophic diseases in their risk 
adjustment model, together with a program to manage them, called Disease Management 
Programs (DMP). The following DMP are included: diabetes, breast cancer and coronary disease 
(Wasem, 2005). 
Another alternative is to combine the adjusters described above. For example, in the case of 
Medicare in the USA, the model uses demographic variables, some socioeconomic characteristics 
–linked to the area of residence and the occupation– and also diagnoses, as proxy of the health 
status of the beneficiaries (Pope et al., 2000). 
It is worth mentioning that these models are known because they have achieved a much higher 
level of prediction of health care costs until now.  
Risk adjustment models that incorporate diagnoses to predict the health costs at the individual 
level improve the predictability of the expenditures‟ variance at the individual level in 
comparison to those that only incorporate demographic adjusters. In statistical terms 
demographic models can only predict approximately 3% of the variance of the individual costs 
(Adjusted-R
2
=0.03) (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). Models that incorporate other variables, for 
example, geographical location and institutional status (as in USA), predict 10% of the variance 
of the individual health expenses (Newhouse, 1989) and models that incorporate diagnoses 
predict approximately 30% or more (Adjusted-R
2
=0.30) of the variance of individual health 
expenditures (Pope et al., 2000). 
The prospective pharmacy-based cost groups risk adjustment model in the Netherlands had a R
2
 
of 11.5% in 2002 and the model‟s R2 reached 22.8% in 2004, when inpatient diagnostic 
information was added (with DCGs) (Prinsze and van Vliet, 2007). The DCG concurrent model 
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reviewed for Germany reported an adjusted-R
2
 of 37.3% and 12% in the prospective model with 
only inpatient diagnosis (Wasem, et al, 2004; Behrend et al., 2004). 
2.3.4 Normative and empirical variables 
Finally, there are two other types of variables that can be included in a risk adjustment model: 
normative and empirical variables. 
Normative variables are those that become relevant for political reasons, even when they do not 
present relevant information for the actual estimation of health care costs. In this case, a specific 
mathematical or statistical treatment of these normative variables is necessary. 
For example, in Belgium, the central fund allocates the funds to each sickness fund. These 
sickness funds use a health budget which is divided into “normative expenditures” and the 
“actual expenditures”. Moreover the selection of risk adjusters was difficult, because everyone 
agreed that it did not make sense to include variables that had no significant effect on 
expenditures. There was some disagreement regarding whether all significant explanatory 
variables should be taken up in the definition of the “normative expenditures.” The discussion 
focused mainly over the medical supply variables. They turned out to be very significant in the 
regressions, but it was later decided to not include them. However, the exclusion of the medical 
supply variables was only applied to the “normative expenditures” method. In the “actual 
expenditures” method, with the risk sharing mechanism, expenditures include all variables −so 
there are no excluded variables (Schokkaert and van de Voorde, 2000). 
In several Latin American and the Caribbean countries, ethnic groups may be considered a 
normative variable for risk adjustment, even when it has been shown that observed health care 
costs within different ethnic groups are irrelevant.  Nevertheless, it may be the case that some 
ethnic groups are not accessing the formal health care system and governments want to improve 
their access. In this case, including ethnicity with an adjusted political and technical formula may 
provide incentives for the health insurance system to incorporate these ethnic groups and also 
their health status. Therefore, although empirically, for example in a regression model, these 
variables would have negative coefficients (as these groups use health care at a less than average 
rate) they are given positive coefficients based on a political decision. 
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The empirical variables are those that explain observed health care expenditures, for example: 
age, sex, socioeconomic variables and health status. 
Table 2 shows the risk adjusters used in a selected sample of high-income countries and in Chile. 
Both social health insurance systems and tax-financed systems use risk adjustment to reallocate 
resources. Some countries −like the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium− introduced risk 
adjusters in stages. 
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Table 2: Risk adjusters in capitation formulas in some high income countries and Chile 
Social Health Insurance Systems 
Country 
Year of 
implementation Risk adjusters 
Austria None  
Belgium 1995 Age, sex, social insurance status, employment status, mortality, urbanization, income 
2006 Age, sex, social insurance status, employment status, mortality, urbanization, income, 
diagnostic and pharmaceutical cost groups 
France None  
Germany 1994/1995 Age, sex, disability pension status 
2002 Age, sex, disability pension status, participation in disease management program 
Japan None  
Korea None  
Luxembourg None  
Netherlands 1993 Age, sex 
1996 Age, sex, region, disability status 
1999 Age, sex, social security/employment status, region of residence 
2002 Age, sex, social security/employment status, region of residence, diagnostic and 
pharmaceutical cost groups 
Switzerland (within canton) 1994 Age, sex 
Chile (ISAPREs) 2005/2006 Age, sex 
Tax Financed Health Systems 
Country 
Year of 
implementation Risk adjusters 
Australia  Age, gender, ethnic group, homelessness, mortality, education level, rurality 
Canada  Age, gender, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, remoteness 
Denmark  
Age, number of children in single parent families, number of rented flats, unemployment, 
education, immigration status, social status, single elderly people 
England  
Age, mortality, morbidity, unemployment, elderly people living alone, ethnic origin, 
socioeconomic status 
Finland  Age, disability, morbidity, archipelago, remoteness 
Iceland  None 
Ireland  Not applicable 
Italy  Age, gender, mortality, morbidity, utilization 
New Zealand  Age, gender, welfare status, ethnicity, rurality 
Norway  Age, gender, mortality, elderly living alone, marital status 
Portugal  
Mainly based on historical precedent; age, relative burden of illness (diabetes, 
hypertension, tuberculosis, AIDS) 
Spain  Percentage of population >65, "insularity" (region=islands) 
Sweden  Age, gender, marital status, employment status, occupation, housing tenure, high user 
Source: Adapted from Busse et al., 2007. 
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2.3.5 Ex-ante and ex-post risk adjustment models 
Risk adjustment models may be ex-ante (prospective) or ex-post (retrospective) in terms of the 
time periods required for the analysis. The ex-ante or prospective system uses information from 
the previous periods (for example, last year) to compute or estimate the standardized 
expenditures and community premium subsidies reflected in the risk adjusted premiums or 
premium subsidies. Therefore, the payments are independent from the real costs of the 
compensated period. These models give efficiency incentives, because health insurers face a 
higher financial risk. Despite this increase in financial risk, health insurers usually tend to prefer 
them, because it allows them to manage a known budget for every period. 
Table 3: Expenditure information in ex-ante (or prospective) and ex-post (or retrospective) risk 
adjustment models 
 
Year 
 
Models 
t-2 t-1 t t+1 
Ex-post Models 
Using expenditure 
information for preliminary 
payments 
Alternative, using  
expenditure information 
for preliminary payments 
Risk adjustment period 
 
Preliminary payments 
Final payments using the 
real data from t period 
Ex–ante Models 
Using expenditure 
information for final 
payments 
Alternative, using 
expenditure information 
for final payments 
Risk adjustment period 
 
Final payments 
No adjustment or adjusting 
only for changes in the 
enrolees number and 
structure 
Source: Author’s analysis from Wasem, 2003. 
For example, in Germany, at the end of each calendar year, they compute the standardized 
expenditures, while during the year they use a preliminary monthly risk adjustment scheme based 
on a mixture of last year‟s and the current year‟s information (Buchner and Wasem, 2001, 
2003).
22
 
                                                          
22
 In 2009 Germany started with a partly prospective model: diagnoses from 2008 and costs in each health status group from 2009 
are used (Wasem, 2008).  
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Belgium, Israel, the Netherlands and the USA (Medicare), are examples of ex-ante risk 
adjustment models, while Germany and Switzerland use ex-post models (van de Ven et al., 2001; 
Pope et al., 2000; and Wasem, 2003). 
The inter-ISAPRE risk adjustment model in Chile is an ex-ante model with final adjustments for 
changes in the number and distribution of the insured among ISAPREs (Superintendence of 
Health, 2006). It combines ex-ante and ex-post population information. First, it uses the previous 
year‟s expenditures to compute a normalized risk matrix. Then, it uses current population to 
adjust transfers.  
This method avoids gaps in the risk adjustment fund, and maintains the relation between risk 
factors (standardized expenditures), but if only age and gender are used, the difference between 
ex-ante and ex-post model is not very important.  
In an ex-ante system, an ISAPRE receives a premium subsidy for its enrolees of a given age and 
gender group determined in the beginning of the period that will not change during the period, 
regardless of the ISAPRE‟s expenditures. In an ex-post system, the premium subsidy is 
determined at the end of the period as the average per capita expenditures for all enrolees in the 
age and gender group of all ISAPREs for that period. Most age and gender groups are insured in 
many ISAPREs, so the average expenditures do not depend on the expenditures of a particular 
ISAPRE. So, if an ISAPRE increases the expenditures to a particular group, it will not have a 
significant impact on the national average or on the premium subsidy. However, in health status 
models it does make a significant difference whether the data on diagnoses is current or past. 
With age it is almost irrelevant. 
2.3.6 Cell models and regression models 
The international literature about risk adjustment models includes two methods: actuarial or 
regression. The cell (or actuarial) method uses cells to represent a predefined risk group. Average 
expenses are calculated per person within the risk group. The group averages are normalized 
relative to the overall average to obtain a risk factor table. Chile currently uses the cell method in 
the ISAPREs‟ risk adjustment system. 
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The regression method estimates the expected individual or group expenses based on a choice of 
relevant variables for the risk adjustment. The estimated parameters are standardized and then 
represent the weight of each variable in each risk group. 
The regression model, in general terms, is as follows: 
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The cell method is more commonly used; both Germany and Switzerland use it (Buchner and 
Wasem, 2003; Beck et al., 2003). On the other hand, the regression method is used in the USA, 
Netherlands and Belgium. Belgium used a regression model with aggregated variables and not 
individual variables, but in 2004, they applied inpatient diagnostic information in an individual 
regression model (DxCG).  
Models that have been in operation for more than 10 years, like the ones previously mentioned, 
are currently considering switching from the cell model to a regression model. Regression models 
allow more variables in comparison to the cell model. For example, we can include more 
socioeconomic and health status variables. Both the Netherlands and Germany (since 2007) have 
had this experience (Prinzel and van Vliet, 2007; van de Ven et al., 2007). 
In models that use only demographic adjusters there is no significant difference between using 
the cell or the regression method to compute risk factors.
23
 This is true because demographic 
adjusters have such a low explanatory power (see above). 
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 Especially if the regression includes an interaction term between age and gender. 
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There is considerable difference between regression models and cell models when health status 
variables are included. In fact, the econometric specification becomes more important. The 
Medicare risk adjustment system and the systems in the Netherlands and Israel use a regression 
approach rather than the enumeration of costs for each medical category (like each Explicit 
Health Guarantee or GES category in Chile) by assumed treatment. This regression approach, 
while harder to explain, can do a better job at capturing correlations and treatment overlaps of 
different conditions. The Chilean cell methodology implicitly assumes that all treatments are 
independent for each GES and that there are no interactions or overlapping treatment costs. For 
example, the fact that some patients might have their hypertension and diabetes evaluated and 
treated at the same time is not considered. Consistent with the risk adjustment international 
experience, it would be desirable for Chile to eventually move to a system using a much richer 
set of adjusters including medical conditions. 
2.3.7 Conventional and optimal risk adjustment 
Finally, the literature on risk adjustment has widely recognized that risk adjustment payment 
formulas should take an active role in creating optimal incentives. This is characterized by the 
difference between “conventional risk adjustment” (paying the expected cost of each enrolee) and 
“optimal risk adjustment” (paying an amount for each enrolee that creates incentives for optimal 
enrolment and treatment decisions). As discussed earlier, in every system, the presence of private 
information means that health plans can try to take actions to select or attract the most profitable 
enrolees and avoid the unprofitable. These actions can include: premium setting; benefit design; 
selective marketing; dumping, exclusions for pre-existing conditions; and service level distortions 
so to attract healthy and profitable enrolees. Some of these actions can be restricted through 
regulation, but some cannot. It is useful to think of the risk adjustment cost weights as prices that 
can be increased or decreased, as desired, to create optimal incentives for the plans (Glazer and 
McGuire, 2000; Ma, 2003; Ellis, 2007).
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The following table summarizes the relevant issues abovementioned and those which follow. 
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 Chile could use “conventional risk adjustment” techniques and complement it with a payment system that rewards health 
insurers for enrolling relatively high cost individuals. 
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Table 4: Relevant issues of risk adjustment models: International experience and the Chilean inter-ISAPRE model 
Country Subsidy 
System 
Consumer’s solidarity 
contribution 
Risk Adjusters Prospective or 
Retrospective 
model 
Calculation 
mechanism 
Acceptable Costs and/or 
Benefits package 
N° of Risk-bearing 
sickness funds or 
insurances 
Mandatory risk 
sharing system 
Germany Internal Income-related 
community premium 
and Income-related 
premium contribution 
Demographic, socioeconomic 
and morbidity risk adjusters: 
income, sex, age, invalidity 
pension, sickness allowances, 
DMPs  
Ex-post Cell actuary 
model 
Physicians’ services, hospital 
care, prescription drugs, 
physiotherapy, dental care, 
restricted home health care, 
psychiatric care, sick leave 
payments 
275 Yes, but 
voluntary 
complementar
y high cost 
pool for outlier 
risk sharing 
(since 2002) 
Belgium External Per capita flat rate 
community premium 
and Income-related 
premium contribution 
Demographic, socioeconomic: 
sex, age, urbanization, 
disability, income, 
employment status, mortality, 
family composition, social 
status, preferential 
reimbursement (lower co-
payments), diagnosis of 
invalidity, eligibility of social 
exemption, chronic illness 
(until 2006) 
Ex-ante Aggregated 
regression model 
Physicians’ services, hospital 
care, prescription drugs, 
physiotherapy (restricted), 
dental care (restricted), home 
health care, psychiatric care 
(restricted by co-payments), 
sick leave payments 
6 No 
Netherlands External Per capita flat rate 
community premium 
and income-related 
premium contribution 
Since 2004, health status, 
demographic and 
socioeconomic: morbidity with 
pharmacy-based cost groups, 
Diagnostic Cost Group 
(DCGs), sex, age, being self-
employed (yes/no) 
Ex-ante Individual 
regression model 
PCGs and DCGs 
Physicians’ services, hospital 
care, prescription drugs, 
physiotherapy (restricted), 
dental care (restricted) 
33 Yes, outlier 
risk sharing 
and 
proportional 
risk-sharing 
Israel External Per capita flat rate 
community premium 
and zero premium 
contribution 
Demographic (age only) Ex-ante Cell actuary 
model 
Physicians’ services, hospital 
care, prescription drugs, 
physiotherapy (restricted), 
dental care (restricted), home 
health care (restricted), 
psychiatric care (restricted) 
4 Yes, condition-
specific risk-
sharing (5 
severe 
diseases) 
 33 
Table 4: Relevant issues of risk adjustment models: International experience and the Chilean inter-ISAPRE model 
Switzerland Internal Per capita flat rate 
community premium 
and income-related 
premium contribution 
Demographic (sex, age, 
region) 
Ex-post Cell actuary 
model 
Physicians’ services, hospital 
care, prescription drugs, 
physiotherapy, home health 
care, nursing home care, 
psychiatric care (restricted) 
93 No 
U.S.A.-
Medicare 
External Per capita county rate Health status and 
demographic (morbidity with 
Diagnostic Cost Group 
(DCGs), including sex, age, 
region) 
Ex-ante Individual 
regression model 
DxCG 
Long-term nursing care, dental 
care, glasses, headphones and 
a large number  of medicines 
are restricted 
 No 
U.S.A.-
Medicaid 
External  Health status and 
demographic (Ambulatory 
Cost Group ACG, CDPS and 
others, including sex and age) 
Ex-ante Individual 
regression model 
ACG 
It changes according to state in 
U.S.A. 
 No 
U.S.A.-
Minnesota 
External  Health status and 
demographic (ACG including 
sex and age) 
Ex-ante Individual 
regression model 
ACG 
  No 
U.S.A.-
Massachuset
ts, 
Washington 
state 
External  Health status and 
demographic (DCGs including 
sex and age) 
Ex-ante Individual 
regression model 
DxCG 
  No 
Chile-inter-
ISAPRE 
SCF 
Internal Per capita flat rate 
community premium 
and income related 
premium contribution 
Demographic risk adjusters: 
sex and age only 
Principally ex-
ante 
Cell actuary 
model 
Limited by condition-specific 
health package for 25 
(beginning 2005), 40 (beginning 
2006) and 56 in 2007, diseases 
GES (3% to 5% percent of total 
ISAPRE expenditures)25 
14, but only 8 in the 
risk adjustment 
system (2008) 
No, there are 2 
separate 
systems for 
catastrophic 
health 
problems 
Source: Author’s analysis from: van de Ven et al., 2007; van de Ven et al., 2001; Ellis, 2002; Wasem, 2005; Pope et al, 2000; and Superintendence of Health of Chile for Inter-ISAPRE risk adjustment 
fund, 2006 and 2007. 
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 The total health expenditure of the ISAPRE system (with copayments) was US$ 1,458 million in 2005, and estimated expenditures (by the Superintendence of Health) of the 40 
health problems was  US$ 44 million 
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2.4. Acceptable costs  
The acceptable costs to be compensated are those that society, by means of some institutional 
mechanism, has determined must be universally covered. This is essentially a normative decision. 
But, in practice, premium subsidies for different groups, in a risk adjustment context, are derived 
from observed costs of these groups, and it is obvious that it would not make sense to simply 
equate normative expenditure to actual costs. The definition of acceptable costs includes 
important demand factors, morbidity, preference variables, demand prices, income, provider 
characteristics, supply prices, etc. (Schokkaert et al., 2006). These explanatory variables are 
partitioned into two groups: one containing the variables for which individuals cannot be held 
responsible and which should be included in the definition of acceptable costs (call these C-
variables), the other containing the variables for which individuals and insurers are held 
responsible because they reflect differences in subjective tastes or differences in efficiency (call 
these R-variables). This partition necessarily reflects ethical and political considerations of the 
particular country (Schokkaert et al., 2006). Therefore, acceptable costs imply the distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate risk adjusters and the difficult ethical trade-offs between 
equity and cost-effectiveness. 
 
2.5. Benefits package 
The decision about what to include in a basic benefits package is a priority setting question in the 
health care sector. Different countries have made different decisions in this regard (van de Ven et 
al., 2003; van de Ven et al., 2007). Typically, dental care, physiotherapy and psychiatric care are 
examples of health care problems that are included in the benefits package by some countries and 
excluded by others. 
In general, excluding health problems or health interventions from the benefits package used in 
the determination of the risk adjusted premiums creates incentives for risk selection. If insurers 
do not receive reimbursement for expenditures on items excluded from coverage, there is clearly 
no reason to include them in the risk adjustment formula. 
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A benefits package may be determined using different methods. For example, the UK has a 
national health system −National Health Service (NHS) − and the benefits package is determined 
by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) (state-run) with the participation of the 
different actors.  
Switzerland and Germany have social health insurance systems, with some differences. Germany 
defines its benefits package based on corporate relations of the autonomous agents of the state, 
while Switzerland‟s state institutions dictate the benefits package without a significant 
participation of other agents (Greβ et al., 2004). 
European health benefits packages are very comprehensive and inclusive. In general, the 
discussion centres on the exclusion of some specific treatments (associated with plastic surgery, 
for example), or the inclusion of new treatments (for example, new procedures developed with 
new technology or pharmaceuticals). 
Finally, the health care market and individual private insurance market in the USA determine 
their benefits packages based on the market −consumer decisions and their payment capacity. 
This criterion, although common in USA‟s private sector, is not considered acceptable in Europe 
(Greβ, 2004) or in Medicare‟s risk adjustment system in USA, in both cases for equity reasons. 
In Chile, the acceptable costs are those in its benefits package, the “Explicit Guarantees in 
Health” (Garantías Explícitas de Salud  GES). Chile used a combination of criteria to select the 
health problems to include in GES. The criteria included cost-effectiveness, health needs of the 
population and response capacity of the public providers‟ network (Health Reform Commission, 
MINSAL, 2003). Furthermore, health problems were introduced in stages: in July 2005, 25 
“health problems” (diseases) were selected; and later, in July 2006, the GES was expanded to 
include 15 new health problems.  Finally in July 2007, a total of 56 health problems were 
included. 
2.6. Extreme or catastrophic costs 
An important issue that a model needs to consider is extreme or catastrophic costs. As mentioned 
above, demographic variables can only predict a very small percentage of the variance of the 
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individual health care costs. In fact, models that only use demographic variables do not 
satisfactorily predict high cost events, although high cost events may represent a high proportion 
of total expenditures. 
Several systems define a special scheme to compensate for these extreme health care costs and to 
reinforce the incentives of mitigation of risk selection.  These models are known in the literature 
as “risk-sharing” systems (van Barneveld et al., 2001). They can be designed for specific health 
conditions or acceptable predefined costs, where the diagnoses and even the treatment algorithms 
are previously determined. These can be constructed as threshold costs systems, also known as 
“outlier risk sharing,” that are more commonly used to address more unpredictable events, i.e., 
accidents. For example, the Netherlands uses outlier risk sharing for high costs, while Israel uses 
risk sharing for specific health conditions (van de Ven et al., 2001). In 2002, Germany introduced 
mandatory risk sharing for high costs (Wasem, 2005), because the Social Health Insurance 
System had an important risk selection problem even with the existing risk adjustment (Buchner 
and Wasem, 2001). 
In practice, these systems may predefine a list of catastrophic diseases, or simply, define an 
expenditure threshold for health events. As such, if a health event is considered catastrophic, it 
requires a different type of financing. For example, catastrophic costs may be partially recovered 
with financing from reserves within the risk adjustment fund. This mechanism is known as 
proportional risk sharing. 
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Table 5: Risk sharing models 
Risk sharing Model Main characteristic of the model Some European Countries 
Proportional risk sharing A plan is reimbursed for a certain fraction of all actual costs of all 
members 
Belgium, Netherlands 
Outlier risk sharing Health plans are (partially) reimbursed for the expenditures of all 
members above a certain threshold 
Germany, Netherlands 
Risk sharing for high costs Plans are reimbursed for the expenditures of a small, fixed 
fraction of the members who were actually the costliest 
 
Risk sharing for high risks Plans are reimbursed for the expenditures of a small, fixed 
fraction of their members that the plans themselves have 
designated for risk sharing in advance 
 
Condition-specific risk sharing Covers some severe diseases and a small percent of overall 
expenditures 
Israel 
Source: Author’s analysis from van Barneveld et al., 2001; van de Ven et al., 2001; and Wasem et al., 2005. 
In Chile, both FONASA and ISAPREs have implemented complementary systems to deal with 
catastrophic or high costs. FONASA has a system similar to risk sharing for high risks, while 
ISAPREs have a system similar to risk sharing for high costs 
ISAPREs have a network of catastrophic and emergency care. The scheme‟s goal is to re-insure 
high co-payments for the costs of emergency services. The fund was created with a US$1 
increase in all premiums (per beneficiary per month). Participation in this system is voluntary. In 
fact, most, but not all, ISAPREs participate in this scheme. Furthermore, the scheme is not 
regulated and it functions within each ISAPRE, hence there is no risk pooling
26
 between 
ISAPREs. The private sector‟s catastrophic system does not appear to have prevented risk 
selection, nor has it had the desired effect on premium prices. On the contrary, it has increased 
premium prices. Also, from a regulation viewpoint and according to the European experience, 
high risk insurances should assume greater liability of individuals‟ health expenditures but this 
has not occurred in the Chilean private sector. Insurers‟ financial liability has not increased 
despite the existence of the catastrophic disease insurance. 
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 We understand that pooling of funds describes the accumulation of prepaid health care resources to cover financial risks that 
exceed an individual‟s or an intermediary‟s ability to pay (Busse et al., 2007) 
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FONASA has a program of complex interventions that lists the interventions defined as 
catastrophically costly that are covered by FONASA. For any intervention, providers must first 
be accredited. FONASA then establishes a maximum fee for the procedures based on average 
prices. This determines the global budget, which also defines the maximum allowable 
expenditure. Providers then bid to deliver these interventions financed by the program at prices 
less than or equal to the prices set by FONASA. 
The following table shows some of the key characteristics of these two systems in Chile. 
Table 6: Catastrophic systems in FONASA and ISAPREs 
 FONASA ISAPREs 
Potential Beneficiaries 8 million of people 2.5 million of people 
Catastrophic insurance definition Cardiac surgery, neurosurgery, kidney and liver 
transplants, non-surgical cancer treatment, 
scoliosis, severe burns, palatine care and 
immunosuppressive drugs 
Events for which co-payments are between 
$1-2 million. Exclusions: AIDS, infertility, 
psychiatric and dental care 
Premium Not identified Initially about $700 (US$1) per month per 
beneficiary. Currently not identified 
Total expenses per year $16.623 million (US$ 23.7 million)  $4.725 million (US$ 6.7 million) 
Direct beneficiaries 13,756 (0.14%) 1,500 (0.07%) 
Threshold None Yes, $1 million (US$ 2,000) accumulated in 
one year 
Source: Adapted from “A proposition for designing pool of “outliers” in the Solidarity Compensation Fund”, MINSAL-Chile. Vargas, Angulo, 
Sánchez, Cid and Wiyuker, March 2003. 
The Health Reform in Chile also includes an expenditure ceiling for each contributor (and his 
family) to avoid a health event from becoming a financial catastrophe for the families. In fact, 
there is a fixed co-payment of 20% for the interventions in GES, with a ceiling. Table 7 
summarizes the expenditure ceilings. For ISAPREs, the co-payment ceiling is 21 times the 
premium contribution, which is approximately US$ 3,268 on average. 
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Table 7: Additional financial coverage (only GES Health Problems) 
 1 health event 2 or more health events 
ISAPREs 21 times the premium contribution 31 times the premium contribution 
FONASA 29 times the premium contribution 43 times the premium contribution 
Yearly ceiling (average) US$ 3,268 US$ 4,848 
Source: Author analysis. 
In sum, in order to have a risk sharing system that avoids risk selection, the system must include 
risk pooling. In the case of Chile, this risk pooling should be across FONASA and ISAPREs, or 
at least between ISAPREs. 
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III. MAIN PROBLEMS IN THE CHILEAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
The Chilean health insurance system has risk selection as one of its main problems. Risk 
selection, unavoidably, translates into an inefficient health care system, which is detrimental to 
social welfare and a wasteful use of resources. It is considered as advantageous to the health care 
system as a whole, and an achievement to social welfare, that insurance companies enforce 
competition for “financial” efficiency and, specially, for health care service quality in the 
framework of a social security system. In this context, the following issues are the more 
important problems in the Chilean health care system. 
This chapter reviews the problems of the Chilean health sector. As mentioned above, we show 
that the Chilean health care system works with high degrees of inefficiency and inequity. We 
show the inequities in the system by analysing the expenditures per groups of individuals, the 
existence of a segmented market and the population distribution in ISAPREs versus FONASA.  
 
1. Inequity in the financing and expenditures 
1.1. Health national accounts  
The health care national accounts are summarized in Table 8. In Chile, total health care 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP is 7.6%, with ISAPREs and FONASA accounting for 5.5% 
of this amount (FONASA, 2001). Private sector expenditures (ISAPREs) cover less than 20% of 
the population, and account for 2.6% of GDP, whereas the public sector (FONASA) covers 67% 
of the population and accounts for 2.9% of GDP. ISAPREs‟ expenditure per capita is almost 
three times that of FONASA. In 2000 the per capita expenditure in FONASA was US$ 201, 
while in ISAPREs it was US$ 557.
27
 
In a national accounts context, FONASA‟s and ISAPREs‟ main sources of revenues are: the 
income-related premium contributions (7%), central government contributions from the Treasury 
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 These numbers include profits within the ISAPRE system. 
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and out-of-pocket contributions. ISAPREs receive the mandatory and voluntary premium 
contributions. FONASA receives government subsidies for the poor, while ISAPREs receive 
small subsidies for maternity leave payments. Finally, out-of-pocket expenditures account for co-
payments and drug expenditures. 
ISAPREs finance their overall expenditures through individuals‟ mandatory and voluntary 
contributions (66%) and with out-of-pocket contributions (33%). FONASA finances its 
expenditures as follows: 42% from the government transfers, 36% from individuals‟ 
contributions and 22% from out-of pocket contributions −including co-payments. Government 
contributions to FONASA represent 1.65% of GDP, of which 1.23% corresponds to FONASA 
and the rest to other public goods (including 0.28% allocated to ISAPREs), which represents 49% 
of the health sector‟s total financing. 
In sum, the Chilean health care system‟s financing depends largely on individuals‟ contributions 
and co-payments.  
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Table 8: Total expenditures and financing in Chile, 2000 (US dollars, 2000) 
 Contributions Fiscal Financing Out-of-pocket exp. Total %GDP 
FONASA      
Health Services 548,021,583 809,137,738 192,955,927 1,550,115,248 2.35% 
Sickness allowances 126,768,876   126,768,876 0.19% 
Pharmaceutical expenses   222,394,706 222,394,706 0.34% 
Administration 21,769,575   21,769,575 0.03% 
Subtotal FONASA 696,560,034 809,137,738 415,350,632 1,921,048,404 2.91% 
ISAPREs      
Health Services 720,526,297 16,160,858 350,834,672 1,087,521,827 1.65% 
Sickness allowances 18,409,932   18,409,932 0.28% 
Pharmaceutical expenses   212,692,952 212,692,952 0.32% 
Administration 216,906,475 4,917,231  221,823,706 0.34% 
Subtotal ISAPREs 1,121,532,095 21,078,089 563,527,625 1,706,137,808 2.59% 
Subtotal ISAPREs + FONASA 1,818,092,128 830,215,827 978,878,257 3,627,186,212 5.50% 
OTHERS      
Public goods  278,920,165  278,920,165 0.42% 
Mutual System 321,839,422  3,532,514 325,371,935 0.49% 
Army 79,304,324 31,609,276 15,771,461 12,668,506 0.19% 
Other (without insurance)  1,571,558 640,801,145 642,372,704 0.97% 
Subtotal OTHERS 401,143,745 312,100,999 660,105,120 137,334,986 2.08% 
TOTAL CHILE 2,219,235,873 1,142,316,826 1,638,983,376 5,000,536,076 7.58% 
% GPD 3.36% 1.73% 2.48% 7.58%   
Source: Calculated by the author from Estudio de Cuentas Nacionales. FONASA, 2000. 
1.2. Financial implications of the regulatory framework of ISAPREs 
ISAPRES have individual income and risk-related premiums offered through an array of health 
plans.
28
 Since July 2005 when the reform took place, ISAPREs set their premiums in two parts: 
one based on GES and the other based on the complementary plan. The GES part is set by each 
ISAPRE for all its beneficiaries. The complementary plan part represents the larger proportion of 
the total premium and of the benefits. It is important to note that as GES continues to include 
more health problems in its package this proportion will decrease. 
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 In the Chilean private insurance market there are approximately 40,000 different health plans currently in use, of which about 
10,000 are commercialized (Source: Superintendence of Health, December 2004). 
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The full premium is a base price multiplied by a risk factor based on sex and age groups. These 
risk factors are supposed to represent the expected costs. The Superintendence regulates the 
structure and ratios as follows: there are 36 sex and age groups, and the ratio between the lowest 
and highest factor cannot be greater than 11 for men and greater than 9 for women. Given that 
insurance contracts have a one-year duration, each ISAPRE determines its base price annually. 
The Superintendence regulates the price increase rate by setting a price range of plus or minus 
30% of the average price. 
Notice that after a year, the price for an individual changes based on the change in the base price 
and in the sex and age group risk factor. For example, in the last base price increase announced in 
July 2008, the real increase was 8% but some individuals‟ prices could vary as much as 25% for 
those individuals who move on to the next age group (recall that risk factors are increasing in 
age).  
The public sector works like a pool or a “pay as you go” system with a single implicit plan and 
redistribution of resources. Nevertheless, given the characteristics of the population who use the 
public sector, solidarity is built from people of average and low income towards the poorer 
population and from healthy individuals to sick (Bitrán et al., 1996; Sanhueza, 2000). Therefore, 
in FONASA poor and middle income individuals‟ contributions generate a pooled fund. There is 
no pooling or redistribution between the private and public sectors, except for the indirect 
subsidies that come from the income tax collection. 
1.3. Expenditures per capita 
Given the previous information, it is not surprising that the health financing distribution in Chile, 
between the public and the private sector, is inequitable −assuming equal need for health for 
every person, regardless of his or her health insurance affiliation. If we assume that the poor have 
more health needs, the inequity is even greater (there is a long standing empirical analysis of this 
finding in many countries (World Bank, 1993)).  
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Figure 6: Expenditure per capita, total expenditures 
distribution, and total income, FONASA and ISAPRE, 
2003 
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In 2003, 59% of the total contributions received by FONASA and ISAPREs went to the private 
sector and only 41% to FONASA. FONASA finances the rest of its expenditures with additional 
fiscal transfers. It should not come as a surprise that if benefits were measured monetarily, these 
would also show great differences across sectors. Health expenditures per capita are more than 
double in the private system, without considering the high administration costs in ISAPREs. In 
2003 the administration expenditure represented 14.4% of ISAPREs‟ operational income. 
Figure 7 shows the change in the health care expenditure gap between ISAPREs and FONASA 
(gap growth) between 1996 and 2005.
29
 The gap growth increased between 1996 and 2004, and 
then fell by 6 % in 2005, almost a decade after the last negative growth in 1996 (3%). Finally, in 
2007 it rose again by 9%. 
                                                          
29
 The gap is the difference in health care expenditure per beneficiary in ISAPREs relative to FONASA. 
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Figure 7: Growth of the per capita expenditures gap between ISAPREs and FONASA, 1996 - 2007 
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Source: Author’s calculations using information from the Statistical Bulletins FONASA and Superintendence of ISAPREs. 
Table 9 shows that total expenditure per capita grew faster in ISAPREs than in FONASA. 
Although ISAPREs‟ growth rate is driven by medical expenses, in the case of FONASA it is 
driven by sickness allowances. This is due to a rise in real wages of FONASA beneficiaries, and 
this is clearly external to the health care system. 
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Table 9: Per capita expenditure gap between ISAPREs and FONASA, 1995-2005, US dollars, 2005 
 Total expenditures per capita Health service expenditures per capita 
Sickness allowances 
expenditures per capita 
Year FONASA ISAPREs  FONASA ISAPREs  FONASA ISAPREs  
1995 215.86 326.75 155.47 181.49 8.93 44.88 
1996 234.16 348.26 172.09 197.31 10.43 50.56 
1997 242.69 369.99 181.97 216.22 11.70 58.14 
1998 257.44 405.15 189.45 241.45 13.92 62.88 
1999 264.45 441.62 190.55 265.19 15.01 66.86 
2000 256.19 475.16 182.30 306.73 15.53 75.10 
2001 290.14 512.72 209.22 344.13 17.28 77.56 
2002 280.14 537.65 215.98 367.13 18.11 79.93 
2003 290.39 574.05 224.18 391.14 18.13 80.64 
2004 306.27 608.54 234.60 406.47 18.69 80.87 
2005 317.57 631.16 244.19 406.55 22.07 88.46 
2005/1995 1.47 1.93 1.57 2.24 2.47 1.97 
Note: Does not include ISAPREs’ profits.  
Source: Author’s analysis using information from FONASA and Health Superintendence  
1.4. Financial situation of ISAPREs and FONASA 
This section presents ISAPREs‟ and FONASA‟s financial statements. With this information we 
assess the insurers‟ financial responsibility estimated as the expenditures made on affiliates and 
how these are financed. The financial responsibility is the extent to which an additional “peso” 
(or dollar, or euro) spent on a beneficiary by an insurer is reflected in its own financial results 
(van de Ven et al., 2001). 
Please note that the information presented in this subsection is not equivalent to that presented in 
the previous section in Table 8. For example, an important difference relates to co-payments: 
ISAPREs‟ financial statements do not have information on copayments, because these are not 
part of their income. The information on co-payments is therefore taken from providers‟ 
statements. Something similar occurs with FONASA in that the co-payments presented in this 
section do not represent total co-payments. Many co-payments are made directly to public 
hospitals and are registered as the regional health service‟s own income and not as part of 
FONASA‟s income. 
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1.4.1 Income and expenditures 
As seen in Table 10, FONASA‟s financial reports indicate that its financing sources include 
fiscal contributions (54% of their resources), beneficiaries‟ direct mandatory contributions of 7% 
of their payroll (35.5% of the total), co-payments made directly to FONASA (6%) and other 
operational income of the public health providers (4.6%). 
Table 10: FONASA’s financing sources, 2005, thousand of US dollars 2005 
Sources Thousand of US dollars % 
Fiscal expenditure (Treasury) 1,905,696 54.0% 
Premium contributions (7% of beneficiaries’ income) 1,252,980 35.5% 
Operation earnings 160,917 4.6% 
Co-payments 211,871 6.0% 
Total 3,531,464 100% 
Source: Statistical Annual, FONASA, 2005. 
In turn, the bulk of FONASA‟s expenditures are allocated largely to its own provider network 
(63%), i.e., to public health care providers, and in a much smaller proportion to the free choice 
mechanism (14%) (Table 11). The free choice mechanism is a demand subsidy that some 
FONASA beneficiaries have access to. It gives them the choice of seeking care at an affiliated 
private provider. 
Although FONASA beneficiaries cannot buy complementary plans in ISAPREs −affiliation is 
exclusive− they could use the free choice mechanism (MLE) to seek care with private providers. 
In fact, 95% of MLE goes to private providers. 
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Table 11: FONASA expenditures, 2005, in thousand of US dollars 2005 
Expenditures Thousand of US dollars % 
Institutional health care services (MAI) 2,221,614 62.9% 
Free choice health care services (MLE) 493,814 14.0% 
Administration expenditures 52,724 1.5% 
Sickness allowances 245,394 6.9% 
Health care for non-enrolled individuals 103,738 2.9% 
Public health programs 203,499 5.8% 
Expenditures of Public Health Sector Institutions 210,682 6.0% 
Total 3,531,464 100.0% 
Source: Statistical Annual, FONASA, 2005. 
Table 12 shows the financing sources of ISAPREs. Premiums represent almost 100% ISAPREs‟ 
income, and only 72.3% comes from the mandatory premium of 7% of beneficiaries‟ taxable 
revenue. The complementary premiums account for 25.6% of total income. These are the 
voluntary premiums with which the ISAPREs‟ beneficiaries finance their risk-related plans. 
Table 12: ISAPREs’ financing sources, 2005, in thousand of US dollars 2005 
Sources Thousand of US dollars % 
Mandatory premium contributions (7% of income) 1,213,572 72.3% 
Additional contributions 6 0.0% 
Voluntary premium contributions 429,369 25.6% 
Companies’ contributions 36,149 2.2% 
Total  1,679,096 100.0% 
Source: Statistical Bulletin Superintendence of Health, 2005. http://www.supersalud.cl 
ISAPREs spend 64.2% of their total expenditures on health care services. Subsidies for work 
disability (sickness allowances) represent an important portion of the expenditures because they 
are based on income and hence are higher in the private sector (14% of ISAPREs‟ expenditures 
and 6.9% of FONASA‟s expenditures). ISAPREs spend 14.5% on administration and sales, while 
FONASA only spends 1.5%. The final operational result (profit) in the ISAPRE system is 
approximately 6.8%. 
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Co-payments do not appear in ISAPREs‟ financial statements, since these are reported directly by 
private providers for all ISAPRE beneficiaries. Nevertheless we can estimate them as the 
expenditures reported by private providers minus the expenditures reported by ISAPREs. In 
2005, estimated co-payments were approximately US$ 476.5 million or 36% of the total 
expenditures of ISAPRE beneficiaries.
30
 
Table 13: ISAPREs’ expenditures, 2005, in thousand of US dollars 2005 
Expenditures Thousand of US dollars % 
Health care services 1,077,328 64.2% 
Sickness allowances 235,322 14.0% 
Other expenditures 7,777 0.5% 
Subtotal 1,320,427 78.6% 
Management expenditures 244,097 14.5% 
Net operating profit/loss 114,572 6.8% 
Total 1,679,096 100.0% 
Source: Adapted from Superintendence of Health. http://www.supersalud.cl 
1.5. Out-of-pocket expenditures in Chile: Inequity and impact on households 
In this section we assess the health care out-of-pocket expenditures. We use data from a 
household survey to measure out-of-pocket expenditures. 
We use the Family Budget Survey for Greater Santiago from the Chilean Statistical Institute 
(INE) that has data from August 1996 and July 1997. The survey includes household incomes 
and expenditures for a sample of 8,445 households. This sample is representative of Santiago‟s 
Metropolitan Area and it represents approximately 40% of the Chilean population. Expenditures 
are disaggregated at the product level. By aggregating health products we can compute household 
health expenditures. The ability to pay is measured as a household‟s expenditures, minus 
subsistence expenditures defined as the poverty line. Following WHO‟s methodology (Aguilar 
2006, WHO-Xu, 2005), households that spend over 40% of their available income –measured as 
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 This was calculated using the database of the Superintendence of Health. 
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income minus subsistence expenditures− on health care or drugs are considered to have 
catastrophic health expenditures. 
To establish utilization trends we run a regression using variables such as: proportion of children; 
proportion of elderly; urban or rural area; public or private services; income quintile; ethnicity; 
etc. Then we estimate a logistic regression for the probability of being at risk of catastrophic 
expenditures and impoverishment. In the logistic regression we use the same variables as above 
and other variables such as: occupation, gender, type of insurance, and self-medication.  When 
we include type of worker (dependent or independent), education, and household size, only two 
variables are statistically significant in the logistic regression: high income quintile and elderly 
individuals. 
About 2% of households show catastrophic expenses using the WHO parameters, and about 14% 
of households show expenses of over 10% of their available income. Households with higher 
incomes are those which have higher out-of-pocket expenditures in health, i.e., in the higher 
income groups, both in absolute and relative terms. 
Figure 8 shows the composition of out-of-pocket expenditures by income quintile. The most 
important group is purchases of medicines and drugs and it is larger among the poorest groups. 
The second most important expenditures are health care co-payments or health services 
expenditures. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of household out-of-pocket expenditure, by income quintiles 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Family Budget Survey for Greater Santiago INE 1997. 
Out-of-pocket expenditures depend on a household‟s income. The poor (households in the first 
income quintile) spend almost nothing on ambulatory care and on hospital health care services. 
Most of their expenditures are on pharmaceuticals. If we include expenditures on auxiliary health 
supplies (devices, prosthesis, eye glasses, etc.) both expenditures represent almost 90% of the 
out-of-pocket expense. 
The most important expenditure –pharmaceuticals− is clearly regressive, because the poorest 
households spend more on pharmaceuticals than non-poor households. On the other hand, with 
expenditures on doctor visits and dental care the opposite occurs. 
The first income quintile includes individuals in FONASA‟s groups A and B.  This quintile 
generally does not make co-payments, though they may spend on a doctor‟s visit outside 
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FONASA‟s provider network (which is free for them). FONASA‟s groups C and D affiliates may 
also be partially represented in the first quintile because if they have many dependents, the 
household income per capita falls. FONASA‟s groups C and D are the groups most likely to seek 
care outside FONASA‟s provider network, because they are the higher income groups in 
FONASA. 
Affiliates in groups A and B of FONASA have drug coverage in the Primary Health Care Level 
and hence should not need to incur in drug expenditures. Drug expenditures represent the 
purchase of low cost drugs for health problems that require simple treatments and antibiotics. 
They can be prescribed by private medical doctors −outside the public network− which are not 
covered by FONASA. In sum, they incur in drug expenditures when they seek drugs that are not 
covered, when the drugs are not available or when they choose to self-medicate. 
On the other hand, the fourth and fifth quintiles, in spite of the fact that they spend over half on 
pharmaceuticals (69% and 58%, respectively), the second most important out-of-pocket 
expenditure is doctor visits which represent 28% and 37%, respectively. 
The main expenditure of high income groups and the least important of the poorest groups are a 
reflection of the differences in their ability to pay, and also the differences in price levels between 
the suppliers used by each group. Regardless, these relationships do not reflect health needs by 
quintiles. It is of concern that the poorest quintiles allocate a smaller portion of their income to 
health care, simply because they cannot allocate any more, even when they most likely have 
greater health care needs. 
We compute the Gini coefficients for household income and health care expenditures.
31
 The Gini 
coefficient indicates how far the actual distribution is from a perfectly egalitarian distribution and 
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 The Gini coefficient was computed using the following formula (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000):  
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measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45 degree line, relative to the total area 
below the 45 degree line. The Gini coefficient lies between zero and one, where a value of zero is 
a perfectly egalitarian distribution, and one is maximum inequality. 
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Figure 9: Lorenz curves for income and income minus health expenditures, 1997 
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Source:  Elaborated by the author using information from the Family Budget Survey (INE, 1997). 
At 0.76, the Gini coefficient for out-of-pocket health care expenditure in Chile (in Santiago‟s 
Metropolitan Area, also known as Greater Santiago) is very high.  This means that the 
distribution of out-of-pocket health expenditure is very unequal. The richest quintile spends 
nearly 40 times more on health than the poorest quintile. In the case of overall consumption, the 
distribution of health expenditures concentrates excessively in the high-income quintiles,
32
 with 
the richest quintile consuming 11 times more than the poorest quintile.
33
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 The autonomous income Gini coefficient –computed using the CASEN (representative at the country level) in 1996− was 0.57 
and 0.56 for monetary income (defined as transfers) (MIDEPLAN, 2001). 
33
 The income surveys in Chile (CASEN) show that in the case of income this indicator has ranged between 13 (1992) and 15 
times (1998), in 1996, the year nearest to this survey, it was 14.6 times, and in 2003 it was 14.3 (MIDEPLAN, 2004). 
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Table 14: Gini coefficients for per capita household income and per capita household 
out-of-pocket health expenditures, Greater Santiago, 1997 
Type of Gini coefficient Value of Gini coefficient 
Gini of the per capita household income 0.55 
Gini of the per capita household income minus out-of-pocket health expenditure 0.56 
Gini of per capita out-of-pocket health expenditure 0.76 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Family Budget Survey (INE, 1997). 
A high Gini coefficient, as the one shown for out-of-pocket health expenditures, shows two 
things: first, that the out-of-pocket health expenditure is highly unequal; and second, that it is 
proportionally higher for higher income households.  After subtracting the out-of-pocket 
expenditures from the Gini of the income, the income Gini coefficient slightly increases from 
0.55 to 0.56.
34
 In sum, as ability to pay increases, the proportion of out-of-pocket health 
expenditure also increases; as such, higher income groups spend more on health beyond the 
income gap relative to other income quintiles. 
It is likely that higher income groups compensate for the health plan deficiencies relative to their 
expectations with direct health expenditures. On the other hand, poor income groups with their 
smaller level of absolute expenditure spend mostly on pharmaceuticals and other supplies. 
The low pharmaceutical, dental and psychiatric coverage of private health plans as well as the 
slow access to public services are also of importance here. Furthermore, the preferential use of 
free choice in comparison to the private sector‟s closed plans, and the differences in prices 
between the public and private sectors (and even within the private sector) may be responsible for 
the very high co-payments for individuals that use more exclusive providers. 
In sum, we show that there is inequality in health financing because of the high out-of-pocket 
expenditures in Chile. Because these expenditures (mainly on pharmaceuticals and health 
                                                          
34
 Health expenditure tends to follow the same regressiveness as household income in Chile. Nevertheless, we computed the Gini 
coefficient for total autonomous revenue and the Gini coefficient of the total autonomous revenue minus health expenditures. The 
first is 0.55, while the second 0.56. 
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services) have an important impact on a household‟s budget, authorities should consider 
including them as part of the entire insurance system‟s financial responsibility. 
1.6. Segmented health system 
Risk selection is expected to result in a segmented market whereby the low risk individuals pay a 
low premium and the high-risk pay a high premium or they are eliminated (van de Ven et al., 
2001). As such, we expect to find segmentation when some insurers are successful in attracting 
the low-risk consumers. 
As we can see in Table 15, the public sector (FONASA) in Chile has been responsible for 
insuring a large proportion of the population for many years, though there have been periods of 
high affiliation in ISAPREs which coincide with periods of high economic performance. For 
example, in 1997 26.1% of the population were ISAPRE beneficiaries, and GDP growth in that 
year was 6.6%. 
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Table 15: Distribution of the population by insurance system 1990 – 2007 
Year FONASA % ISAPREs % Other insurers % Total population 
Real GDP 
growth rate (%) 
1990 9,729,020 73.1 2,108,308 15.9 1,463,068 11.0 13,300,396 3.8% 
1991 9,414,162 69.5 2,566,144 18.9 1,563,320 11.5 13,543,626 7.9% 
1992 8,788,817 63.7 3,000,063 21.8 1,997,977 14.5 13,786,857 12.2% 
1993 8,537,786 60.9 3,431,543 24.5 2,060,762 14.7 14,030,091 7.0% 
1994 8,644,479 60.6 3,669,874 25.7 1,958,971 13.7 14,273,324 5.7% 
1995 8,637,022 59.6 3,763,649 26.0 2,094,551 14.4 14,495,222 10.5% 
1996 8,672,619 59.0 3,813,384 25.9 2,209,787 15.0 14,695,790 7.4% 
1997 8,753,407 58.8 3,882,572 26.1 2,260,383 15.2 14,896,362 6.6% 
1998 9,137,599 60.5 3,679,835 24.4 2,279,496 15.1 15,096,930 3.3% 
1999 9,403,455 61.5 3,323,373 21.7 2,570,671 16.8 15,297,499 -0.7% 
2000 10,157,686 65.6 3,092,195 20.0 2,234,851 14.4 15,484,732 4.5% 
2001 10,156,364 64.9 2,940,795 18.8 2,561,472 16.4 15,658,631 3.3% 
2002 10,327,218 65.2 2,828,228 17.9 2,677,085 16.9 15,832,531 2.2% 
2003 10,580,090 66.1 2,729,088 17.0 2,697,251 16.9 16,006,429 4.0% 
2004 10,910,702 67.4 2,678,432 16.6 2,591,194 16.0 16,180,328 6.0% 
2005 11,120,094 68.0 2,660,338 16.3 2,569,549 15.7 16,349,981 5.6% 
2006 11,479,384 69.5 2,684,554 16.3 2,351,436 14.2 16,515,374 4.6% 
2007 11,740,688 70.4 2,776,912 16.6 2,163,173 13.0 16,680,773 4.7% 
Source: FONASA, 2007. http://www.fonasa.cl 
FONASA covers 91.1% of the lower income population, in comparison to the 1.6% covered by 
ISAPREs (Table 16). Individuals in the richest quintile are more likely to be insured with an 
ISAPRE than with FONASA. In fact, 50% of ISAPREs‟ beneficiaries are in the highest income 
quintile, while in FONASA they only represent 9.3% of beneficiaries (CASEN 2006, 
MIDEPLAN, 2008). 
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Table 16:  Population distribution by insurer and income quintile 
Insurer 
Income Quintile 
I II III IV V 
FONASA 91.10 85.40 76.40 60.50 33.60 
ISAPREs 1.60 5.60 11.20 24.00 50.50 
None 5.90 6.30 7.30 8.30 9.20 
Army Forces 0.60 1.60 3.90 5.50 5.10 
Other System 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.40 
Unknown 0.60 1.00 1.10 1.40 1.20 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: MIDEPLAN, 2005. 
FONASA covers nearly 80% of the population over 65 years of age, while ISAPREs cover only 
7% (World Bank, 2000). This means that 9% of FONASA‟s beneficiaries are in this age group, 
while in ISAPREs it is only 2%. 
Table 17 shows how FONASA is the insurer of choice of high-risk and high-cost groups. For 
example, 93% of individuals who suffer from chronic renal failure are covered by FONASA. 
Both males and females over 65 years of age are also mainly covered by FONASA (77% and 
80%, respectively). These are all high-risk and high-cost groups. The same can be said of 
children under 1 year of age and women of fertile age. 
Table 17:  Some information on the segmented health care system in Chile 
Condition % of the beneficiaries in FONASA 
Chronic renal failure 93% 
Males over 65 years of age 77% 
Females over 65 years of age 80% 
Children under 1 year of age 70% 
Women of fertile age 76% 
Source: MIDEPLAN and MINSAL, 2005 
FONASA also has more young children (Table 18): 76% of the Chile‟s children between 0 to 4 
years of age are FONASA beneficiaries (CASEN 2003). Women also concentrate in FONASA. 
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Table 18: Population distribution by insurer and age group and sex, 2003 
Gender Insurer 
Age groups 
Total 00 – 04 5 – 19  20 – 39  40 – 54  55 – 69  70 + 
Male 
FONASA 75.6 74.6 62.0 65.7 74.4 83.6 69.5 
ISAPRE 16.9 16.1 19.7 18.6 13.1 5.5 17.0 
Other Systems 6.7 8.6 16.2 14.4 11.5 9.9 12.3 
Does not know 0.7 0.6 2.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.2 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Female 
FONASA 76.9 74.4 71.2 72.6 79.9 84.7 74.5 
ISAPRE 15.9 16.8 17.8 17.2 10.6 4.9 18.7 
Other Systems 6.6 8.1 9.8 9.4 8.8 9.2 8.9 
Does not know 0.7 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.9 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: CASEN 2003(MIDEPLAN, 2005). 
Individuals over 60 years of age mainly use the public health system (87% are FONASA 
beneficiaries) (MIDEPLAN, 2008 with CASEN survey, 2006).  Since 1996 there has been a 
sustained increase in beneficiaries over 60 years of age using the public health system (Figure 
10). In contrast, this age group has decreased in importance in the ISAPREs for the same period.  
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Figure 10: Population over 60 years of age by insurer 1990-2006 (%) 
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Source: MIDEPLAN, 2008. http://www.mideplan.cl 
 
2. Inefficiency: Risk selection 
ISAPREs have incentives to select individuals by risk and income. Most ISAPREs enrol healthy, 
young, and high income workers and make themselves unattractive to high cost patients. Less 
healthy people are left in the public system because ISAPREs cream skim the wealthy and 
healthy. Competition between ISAPREs and the resulting risk selection give rise to inefficiency 
and higher costs in the Chilean health system. 
The incentives to under-provide efficient preventive services, which help reduce the need for 
future expensive treatments, is the result of the predominance of the short term contracts (one 
year) favoured by competitive ISAPREs and consumers‟ imperfect information concerning 
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effectiveness of services. Risk selection of low-cost enrolees decreases insurers‟ incentives to 
minimize costs and also increases administrative costs. The risk selection efforts require sales and 
administrative efforts, which account for 15 percent of ISAPREs‟ expenses between 2000 and 
2007. 
The private sector setting gives incentives for risk selection. ISAPREs expend less effort on 
improving “efficiency”, and more on risk selection and “cream skimming” its portfolio. This 
goes against the health care social security logic and breaks pooling arrangements. Finally, 
efficient ISAPREs that do not select applicants may lose market share, resulting in a welfare loss 
to society and inefficiency. While a single ISAPRE can gain from selection, society as a whole 
loses. Selection produces no gains and the resources used for selection represent a welfare loss. 
Risk selection and adverse selection against FONASA are two related components. When the 
private sector selects based on risk, this may give rise to adverse selection of individuals against 
FONASA. Also, different regulations applying to each system facilitate both behaviours. 
Risk selection can be reflected in the composition of beneficiaries in terms of gender, age, 
income and risks that concentrate in FONASA. 
Adverse selection against FONASA occurs when ISAPRE beneficiaries need hospital or other 
costly care and they decide to switch to FONASA because FONASA provides them with greater 
financial coverage. In the data, an indication of this behaviour could be when there are higher 
rates of ambulatory care and lower rates of inpatient care in the private sector in comparison to 
the public sector. 
Adverse selection has been demonstrated empirically through various studies. Sapelli and Vial 
(2003) argue that there is adverse selection against FONASA because it does not have risk 
adjusted premiums, while ISAPREs do, which makes high risk individuals choose FONASA. 
The same phenomenon happens with regard to hospitalisation, even when considering 
individuals‟ self-selection effects (Sapelli and Vial, 2003). Sapelli and Vial (2003) show selection 
against ISAPREs for independent workers and against FONASA for dependent workers; and they 
show moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalisation. 
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We present new evidence that reinforces the hypothesis pointing to the presence of selection 
affecting FONASA, which causes individuals with higher than average expected health costs and 
those suffering severe illness to become join the public insurance system. 
2.1. Empirical evidence of risk selection in Chile 
We use a cell model to risk adjust hospital costs by sex and age, for both FONASA and 
ISAPREs. This is done by taking the community premium that represents all expenditures 
(FONASA‟s and ISAPREs‟) and adjusting it according to the hospital care expected costs of both 
sectors‟ beneficiaries in 2001. For FONASA the risk score is 1.04, while for ISAPREs it is only 
0.87. These numbers assume similar prices and services between FONASA and ISAPREs, so the 
difference reflects the higher utilization of high-risk individuals in FONASA. 
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to show that the ISAPREs cream skim their 
portfolio which allows them to have more homogeneous risks, generating lower expected costs 
than the national average. ISAPREs‟ costs are less concentrated compared to FONASA‟s and to 
the national level −which considers both FONASA and ISAPREs. In fact, assuming the same 
price vector, the expected costs of the private health insurance sector are lower than those for the 
public sector. 
Table 19 shows that the system‟s risk, measured as the expected cost adjusted by sex and age, has 
been decreasing slightly from 2000 to December 2006. 
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Table 19: ISAPREs and FONASA risk index, 2000-2006 
 Year 
Insurer 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Colmena 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.89 
Normédica 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.78 
ING 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.85 
VidaTres 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91 
MásVida 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.80 
Banmédica 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.84 
Sfera 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.75 
Consalud 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.84 
Fusat 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.97 1.00 
Ferrosalud 1.04 1.08 1.06 1.00 1.01 0.94 0.89 
ISAPREs 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.85 
FONASA 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.03 
Risk gap (FONASA/ISAPREs) 20.49% 19.69% 21.45% 18.90% 17.90% 20.80% 21.41% 
Source: Author’s calculations from standardized expenses of ISAPRE Systems 2005 in 36 age and sex risk groups for ISAPREs and FONASA 
beneficiaries. Expenses of ISAPRE System are taken from the Superintendence of Health. 
In fact, Figure 11 shows the indicator of the risk gap between ISAPREs and FONASA measured 
as the percentage of FONASA‟s risk over that of ISAPREs. We computed these gaps using a cell 
model to adjust for sex and age using the expected costs of the GES benefits package. This first 
considers an equivalent community premium which is then adjusted by the expected costs of 
GES by sex and age. Finally, the indicator is the ratio between FONASA‟s risk and ISAPREs‟ 
risk. 
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Figure 11: Risk gap between ISAPREs and FONASA, 2000-2006 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on standardized expenses of ISAPRE Systems 2005 in 36 age sex risk groups for ISAPREs and FONASA 
beneficiaries. Expenses of ISAPREs are taken from the Superintendence of Health  
The risk gap fluctuated between 21.5% and 18.5% during the 2000-2006 period. If we only 
compare 2000 to 2006, the gap increased only slightly. This means that FONASA‟s portfolio had 
a 21% higher risk than ISAPREs in December 2005. The figure also shows that the gap has two 
peaks, one in 2002 and the other in 2006. 
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Figure 12: Insurers’ demographic risk, 2000-2006 
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Source: Author’s calculations using standardized expenses of ISAPRE Systems 2005 in 36 age and sex risk groups of sex and age for ISAPREs and 
FONASA beneficiaries. Expenses of ISAPREs are taken from the Superintendence of Health 
The ISAPRE system has been lowering its risk level through risk selection, and thus increasing 
the risk gap with FONASA. Furthermore, even though the average risk of ISAPREs has 
decreased, the variance across ISAPREs has actually increased. 
The assumption that FONASA and ISAPREs have similar efficiency in health care provision 
could clearly be questioned. However, it is more likely that FONASA has high-risk individuals 
who require more health services than those in ISAPREs. Furthermore, we would have to argue 
that ISAPREs‟ health care management produces significant expenditure control results in 
comparison to the public sector. But there is no evidence of this being the case. In fact, there are 
very few HMO-like ISAPREs (ISAPRE Superintendence 2001). More recently, ISAPREs‟ 
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beneficiaries have only used 5% of health services in GES‟s health care network, showing a lack 
of promotion from the side of ISAPREs to use these services (Superintendence of Health, 2007). 
2.1.1 Risk selection and cost concentration 
We argue that the public sector has higher expected expenditures as a result of the selection 
process against higher risk individuals. We show the Lorenz curves of the private and public 
systems health expenditures, and how they relate to the risk selection process. 
 68 
Figure 13: Lorenz curves of hospitalisation expenditure: National versus ISAPRE 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from a sample of 5% of the discharges in 2001, ISAPRE and FONASA, with estimated costs by the author. 
These curves are constructed using a sample of 5% of the data at an individual level, representing 
36% of the country‟s overall hospital discharges. According to the cost of services provided to 
each individual, population percentiles are arranged from the lowest to the highest.
35
 
The more costs concentrate on fewer individuals, the greater the incentives to risk select. If most 
costs concentrate in fewer individuals, the curve is more distant from the 45 degree line and more 
convex. It is also likely that the curve is less convex when insurers prevent higher cost 
individuals from affiliating through risk selection. 
                                                          
35
 Valuation of services was carried out accordingly to the principles outlined in Chapter V. 
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The more convex curve in Figure 13 that corresponds to national costs shows that expenditures 
relative to the ISAPRE system are much more concentrated in fewer people at the national level. 
The Gini coefficient of health expenditures in this sample is 0.57 for Chile and 0.47 for 
ISAPREs. The Gini coefficient was computed using the following formula (Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer, 2000): 
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Table 20: Gini coefficient of inpatient expenditure, FONASA, 
ISAPRE and Chile 
Health Insurance System Gini Coefficient 
FONASA 0.59 
ISAPREs 0.47 
Chile 0.57 
Source: Author calculations using a 5% sample of ISAPRE and FONASA discharges from 
2001, with estimated costs by the author 
In the case of the national costs, 45% of health expenditures concentrate in the highest 10
th
 
percentile (more costly individuals). For ISAPREs the most costly individuals represent 35% of 
ISAPREs‟ expenditures. Finally, in FONASA high cost individuals are responsible for 70% of 
expenditures. 
The least costly individual concentrate 3.6% of national costs. In ISAPREs, 7.7% of expenditures 
are spent on the bottom tenth of costly individuals.  Also, national expenditures are more 
concentrated because individuals are high risk, whereas affiliates in ISAPREs are of low risk 
allowing a more even distribution of expenditure. 
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The increase in costs in both populations (the slope of the Lorenz curves) indicates that there 
could be incentives for ISAPREs to select among individuals requesting affiliation and those 
already affiliated. Private sector expenditures increase more rapidly in the lower percentiles (up 
to approximately the 25
th
 percentile) and in the last two percentiles in comparison to FONASA. 
At both the national level and within FONASA, expenditures increase faster in the higher 
percentiles (beginning at approximately the 95
th
percentile). This means that ISAPREs have more 
incentives to select their own affiliates from those brackets than to select individuals moving out 
of FONASA or eventually from outside the system. These conclusions are made ceteris paribus, 
i.e., holding constant the other variables that affect individuals‟ health expenditures, and 
assuming that the utilisation rates are the same in both sectors. 
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Figure 14: Lorenz curves of hospitalisation expenditures: FONASA versus ISAPREs 
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Source: Author’s calculations using a sample of 5% of ISAPRE and FONASA discharges in 2001, with estimated costs by the author. 
These facts show that the public sector is covering the system‟s higher cost individuals and also, 
that in the private sector there are risk selection processes which allow it to have a more 
homogeneous risk distribution and, that there are incentives to continue applying this selection. 
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Table 21: Hospitalisation costs concentration: ISAPREs and FONASA 
Percentage of individuals 
(from lower to higher expenditure) 
Percentage of accumulated expenditure 
FONASA ISAPREs 
0% 0.0% 0.0% 
5% 0.2% 0.4% 
10% 0.7% 1.2% 
15% 1.3% 2.3% 
20% 2.2% 3.7% 
25% 3.2% 5.5% 
30% 4.5% 7.9% 
35% 6.0% 10.7% 
40% 8.0% 13.8% 
45% 10.4% 17.3% 
50% 13.1% 21.0% 
55% 16.1% 24.8% 
60% 19.3% 28.7% 
65% 22.9% 32.9% 
70% 27.1% 37.2% 
75% 31.9% 41.9% 
80% 37.6% 47.1% 
85% 44.5% 53.5% 
90% 53.5% 61.6% 
95% 66.5% 73.0% 
100% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Author’s calculations from a sample of 5% of ISAPREs and FONASA discharges in 2001, with estimated 
costs by the author. 
2.1.2 Consumer mobility and risk selection 
In the context of risk selection, an important point is to identify and quantify the population who 
can freely switch between sectors. We review consumer mobility across ISAPREs, because the 
data available is better. 
Between 2001 and 2002, 10.2% of contributors moved from one ISAPRE to another.  During this 
same period, 11.8% of beneficiaries (contributors plus their dependents) moved from an ISAPRE 
to FONASA or to having no insurance (Superintendence of ISAPREs 2003). This means that 
approximately 40,000 beneficiaries switched systems or ISAPREs, which represented 3 to 4% of 
the ISAPRE population and only 0.31% of all beneficiaries (FONASA and ISAPREs). Hence, the 
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mobility was basically restricted if we compare it to international parameters, where, for 
example, in Germany it fluctuates between 3 and 4% (Buchner and Wasem, 2001). 
The data shows that those who switched to FONASA had lower income (about 50% lower on 
average) and were younger than average; these individuals pay lower contributions and have 
fewer dependents. First, in general, the younger population is generally more mobile. Second, the 
Asian crisis lowered wages and increased the risk of job loss, and because the co-payments in 
FONASA are significantly lower, these individuals prefer FONASA. 
Table 22 presents the data on consumer mobility between July 2005 and June 2006. The total 
mobility across ISAPREs in this period is 7.9%. The first three columns are the sex and age 
distribution of the population in ISAPREs. For example, 48.51% of the women in ISAPREs are 
between 0 and 39 years of age. The following three columns represent the distribution by sex and 
age of new contributors. The new contributors are those who affiliate to any ISAPRE who were 
not in an ISAPRE as of June 2005. The final three columns show the movement across ISAPREs. 
Any person that switched ISAPRE in this period is counted. The net mobility, i.e., the amount of 
people switching insurance in a year, is shown in percentages. 
Mobility between ISAPREs is limited by age and the existence of pre-existing disease in 
beneficiaries. Age is the first cause of non-mobility. For example, individuals over the age of 60 
(including both men and women) almost never switch ISAPREs. However, the new contributors 
under 39 years of age represent 82% of the new contributor population. 
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Table 22: ISAPREs contributors mobility by sex and age, July 2005 and June 2006 
 Total ISAPREs New contributors Mobility 
Age group Female Male Subtotal Female Male Subtotal Female Male Subtotal 
0 – 39 48.51% 51.05% 50.17% 80.53% 83.06% 82.22% 61.78% 63.28% 62.75% 
40 – 49 24.43% 24.72% 24.62% 12.51% 12.15% 12.27% 24.59% 25.50% 25.18% 
50 – 59 16.79% 15.04% 15.65% 4.85% 4.17% 4.39% 12.42% 10.00% 10.85% 
60 – 69 6.88% 6.57% 6.68% 1.39% 0.58% 0.85% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 
70 and more 3.40% 2.62% 2.89% 0.72% 0.04% 0.27% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 
Total (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Total (quantity) 434,942 823,270 1,258,212 49,658 99,148 148,806 35,056 64,597 99,653 
Source: Author’s analysis using information from the Research Department, Superintendence of Health, 2007 
In a third evaluation of mobility, we consider the following variables: 
1. Number of people who choose to leave an ISAPRE in a year, either due to free choice 
because they are seeking a better product for their money, or those who are expelled from 
the system. The latter cannot strictly be understood as mobility; however, it has been 
counted in the present exercise. The people opting out from ISAPREs are assumed to 
have migrated to FONASA. 
2. Two indicators are generated. First, the number of people opting out from ISAPREs over 
the total number of people who can choose a health insurer; that is, ISAPREs plus 
FONASA‟s beneficiaries, and excluding the indigent population. This indicator shows the 
overall mobility. The second indicator is only for the ISAPRE system and shows the 
population shifting across ISAPREs as a percentage of the overall ISAPRE beneficiaries 
for a one-year period. 
This analysis differs from the previous analyses because we do not consider FONASA group A 
beneficiaries (subsidized), who we assume cannot switch across systems. 
The results show that the overall mobility rates vary between 2.7% and 2.1% between 2004 and 
2006, with an average of 2.4% (Table 23). Mobility within the private system began at 3.4%, 
peaked at 5.4% in 2005 and fell back to 3.5% in 2006.  
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Table 23: Mobility in the Chilean Social Health Insurance System 
 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
ISAPREs beneficiaries 2,678,432 2,660,338 2,684,554 2,674,441 
FONASA beneficiaries* 7,048,671 7,301,326 7,539,984 7,296,660 
Total Beneficiaries 9,727,103 9,961,664 10,224,538 9,971,102 
People moving out of the ISAPRE system 146,069 120,732 116,020 127,607 
People switching between ISAPREs 90,807 144,965 94,801 110,191 
Total people switching 236,876 265,697 210,821 237,798 
% Mobility 2.4% 2.7% 2.1% 2.4% 
% ISAPRE Mobility 3.4% 5.4% 3.5% 4.1% 
* “A” beneficiaries and the indigent of FONASA are excluded  
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Superintendence of Health 
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IV. DEMOGRAPHIC RISK ADJUSTMENT MODELS FOR CHILE 
This section presents the cell −or actuarial− risk adjustment model. We begin by simulating a 
model similar to the one that has been applied in Chile since July 2005 with a Fund only for 
ISAPREs. Then, we simulate the Chilean Government‟s model proposed to the National 
Congress in 2003 (updated December 2006) with a Fund that includes FONASA. 
 
1. Private sector risk adjustment: Solidarity Compensation Fund between 
ISAPREs. 
This section presents the risk adjustment method applied to the Solidarity Compensation Fund 
only for ISAPREs between 2005 and 2007. In this methodology we consider all 56 GES health 
problems. We compute the value of the community premium (or solidarity contribution), the 
expected costs by age and sex risk groups of the Fund‟s beneficiary population and the premium 
subsidies for each risk group. 
The creation of a Fund between ISAPREs had the objective of sharing health risks across 
ISAPRE beneficiaries for the benefits included in the GES. The Fund compensates ISAPREs for 
the difference between the sum of the GES community premiums and the sum of the premium 
subsidies (based on age and sex groups). 
By law, the Fund does not apply to closed ISAPREs. These are the ISAPREs whose portfolio is 
mainly composed of workers and ex-workers of the company which originally formed the 
ISAPRE. Currently there are 6 closed ISAPREs. 
In this model, the Superintendence of Health is in charge of determining the premium subsidies. 
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Table 24: ISAPREs participating in the Fund 
ISAPRE’s full name ISAPRE’s short name 
Institución de Salud Previsional Fusat Ltda. Fusat 
Colmena Golden Cross S.A. Colmena 
Isapre Normédica S.A. Normédica 
ING Salud S.A. ING 
Isapre Vida Tres S.A. Vida Tres 
Ferrosalud S.A. Ferrosalud 
Isapre Masvida S.A. Masvida 
Isapre Banmédica S.A. Banmédica 
Isapre Consalud S.A. Consalud 
Source: Superintendence of Health, 2007. 
The expansion of the GES benefits package has had three stages. In July 2005 an initial 25 health 
problems were selected.  In July 2006, another 15 health problems were added to the package. 
Finally, in July 2007 the package added another 16 health problems, for a total of 56 health 
problems as initially promised with the reform. 
The Superintendence of Health risk adjusts twice a year. To date, five of these exercises have 
taken place. The first (for the period July 2005 to December 2005) and the second (for the period 
January 2006 to June 2006) exercises considered 25 health problems. The third (for the period 
July 2006 to December 2006) and fourth (for the period January 2007 to June 2007) included an 
additional 15 health problems, i.e., they considered a total of 40 health problems. The fifth risk 
adjustment exercise (for the period July 2007 and December 2007) included all 56 health 
problems. The methodology and results presented here refer to the compensation of all 56 health 
problems currently included in GES and it was estimated for one year: July 2007 to June 2008. 
1.1. Age groups 
The criteria to define the sex and age groups for risk adjustment between ISAPREs were 
established by law. The following rules are detailed in the law: 
1. The first age group begins from birth to under two years of age; 
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2. The next levels, from two years of age to under eighty years of age, cover a minimum of 
three years and a maximum of five years; 
3. The Superintendence determines the corresponding levels for those of eighty years of age 
or more. 
4. Every ten years the Superintendence reviews the maximum ratio between the lowest and 
highest factors in every table, differentiated by gender. (11 for male and 9 for female) 
5. In every age group, the factor that corresponds to a dependent will not be higher than the 
factor that corresponds to a contributor of the same sex. 
The Superintendence of Health also defined the following criteria: 
1. The Factor Table must be simple to facilitate transparency in plan offerings both for the 
insurers and for the insured. To this end the Table was limited to a predefined number of 
rows. 
2. The Factor Table must follow a health logic, such that the age groups are those used for 
health indicators and people‟s life cycle. 
3. There must be symmetry between GES and the Complementary Plan. For example, it 
is always possible for a GES user to not use the GES to get medical care for a GES 
pathology and instead to use the Complementary Plan. On the other hand, it is expected 
that in the long run the GES Plan should include most of the burden of disease. 
Furthermore, following from above and after a suggestion made by this author, 18 age groups 
were defined, conforming 36 risk cells or categories −hereon after denominated “risk groups”. 
Table 25 presents these risk groups. This age group structure complies with the above mentioned 
requirements. 
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Table 25: Generic risk age and sex risk groups 
 Sex 
Age range Males Females 
0  1 year of age   
2  4 years of age   
5  9 years of age   
10  14 years of age   
15  19 years of age   
20  24 years of age   
25  29 years of age   
30  34 years of age   
35  39 years of age   
40  44 years of age   
45  49 years of age   
50  54 years of age   
55  59 years of age   
60  64 years of age   
65  69 years of age   
70  74 years of age   
75  79 years of age   
80 years of age and older   
Source: Superintendence of Health. 
 
1.2. Estimating compensations 
In this section we determine the community premium and the subsidy premiums that ISAPREs 
receive for their beneficiaries from the Fund. 
1.2.1 The approved risk adjustment model 
As we pointed out in Chapter II, the Inter-ISAPREs risk adjustment model approved by the 
Chilean Congress is known in the international literature as an ex-ante system. It uses 
information of previous periods to estimate the subsidies for the community premium, reflected 
in the risk adjusted premiums (Wasem, 2003). Therefore, the payments are independent of the 
real costs of the period being compensated. 
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Notwithstanding, the model applied is combined with information about the beneficiary 
population at the moment of each adjustment period. Hence, the value of risk adjusted premiums 
is re-calculated with the purpose of avoiding break downs of the Fund, but the relative 
relationship between the risk factors is preserved (Cid et al, 2007). 
This type of model preserves the efficiency incentives, since the adjusted premiums are 
calculated based on the averages of all insurers and not of any one in particular. It also tends to be 
more equitable, because it compensates for the health risk of beneficiaries at the moment of 
adjustment. On the other hand, the premium subsidies do not vary significantly when readjusting 
for the beneficiary population, basically because the beneficiary composition maintains certain 
stability. 
1.2.2 Sources of information 
We use the reference costs for health services or groups of health services to determine the 
community premium. We use GES data to obtain the frequencies in ISAPREs of the 56 health 
problems prioritised. 
The reference costs per GES are published by MINSAL based on external cost studies 
(Universidad de Chile, 2006; MINSAL, 2007). These reference costs must be used by the Inter-
ISAPREs Fund, so we use them here as well. The study requested by MINSAL computes these 
reference costs as a weighted average of the public and private sector costs of providing health 
care services. 
To estimate the number of GES cases in the ISAPREs, we combined different sources of 
information. 
The treatment of GES health problems has a predefined structure.
36
 The health problem is 
separated into three stages: diagnostic, treatment, and follow-up. In each stage there is a list of 
                                                          
36
 Many of the GES conditions reflect the use of procedure information, not simply diagnoses. Similarly to DRG payments, the 
Chilean risk adjustment formula uses a combination of health status information (diagnoses) and treatment practice information 
(procedures). We only use the significant procedures. 
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health services. We then estimate the frequency of occurrence by age and sex groups within these 
stages.  
We use the existing estimates of the number of cases of each service or groups of services 
associated with the GES health problem, and for each risk group, that are based on the 
methodology in MINSAL‟s Decree.37 We complement this with the reference cost information by 
considering the type of health intervention, the value assigned to the services or groups of 
services and the co-payments stipulated by law. 
The Superintendence is in charge of estimating the frequencies.
38
  The Superintendence estimated 
the GES health problems‟ utilization frequencies for the ISAPRE system, disaggregated by 
groups of health problems. As such, there are estimates of the number of cases for the first 25 
health problems and the number of cases for the additional 15 health problems. For the remaining 
16 health problems we use two sources: for hospitalisations we use the Master files of Hospital 
Leaves and of Medical Services in the ISAPRE system of the year 2004 and 2005 
(Superintendence of Health); and for the majority of ambulatory care we use well-known rates of 
incidence and prevalence in the country, provided by MINSAL. 
We use the beneficiary population in the ISAPRE system in February 2007 to compute the 
community premium and the expected costs by age groups and sex. Finally, for the simulation of 
the annual compensations, i.e., the cumulative monthly payments, the last available month was 
used for all the months in the sample, that is, the beneficiary population from March 2007 to 
February 2008. 
                                                          
37
 To date, 3 decrees have been issued by MINSAL: N°170 for 25 problems of health (July 2005 to June 2006), N°228 increasing 
the number of health problems to 40 (July 2006 to June 2007) and N° 44 expanding the GES to include 56 health problems (July 
2007 to June 2010). 
38
 The author worked with the Superintendence to compute these estimations, jointly with clinical and statistics professionals. We 
include only the final results in this research. 
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1.2.3 Method and calculations of Inter-ISAPRE risk adjustment 
1.2.3.1 Determination of the community premium
39
 
The estimated annual costs for each GES health problem are shown in Table 26. 
Table 26: Estimated annual expenses of the 56 GES problems (US dollars Dec. 2007) 
# Health problem 
Expenditure per 
year (USD) 
Cases per 
year 
% of total 
expenditure 
% of total 
cases 
1 Terminal chronic renal insufficiency 3,514,232 382 5.46% 0.27% 
2 Surgically feasible congenitalcardiopathies in patients younger than 15 years old  2,446,243 339 3.80% 0.24% 
3 Cervical and uterine cancer  1,306,591 1,000 2.03% 0.71% 
4 Pain relief in advanced cancer  and palliative care  95,133 305 0.15% 0.22% 
5 Acute myocardial infarction 273,172 873 0.42% 0.62% 
6 Diabetes mellitus type 1  1,802,661 1,933 2.80% 1.38% 
7 Diabetes mellitus type 2  2,988,537 18,016 4.64% 12.83% 
8 Breast cancer in 15 year-old persons and older  3,842,467 1,688 5.96% 1.20% 
9 Spinal dysraphism  33,280 15 0.05% 0.01% 
10 Surgical treatment of scoliosis in patients younger than 25 years old  1,439,119 171 2.23% 0.12% 
11 Surgical treatment of cataract  1,611,544 1,653 2.50% 1.18% 
12 
Total hip endoprosthesis in 65 year-old persons and older with hip arthrosis and 
severe functional limitation  
1,039,810 196 1.61% 0.14% 
13 Labiopalatal fissure 73,692 37 0.11% 0.03% 
14 Cancer in patients younger than 15 years old  1,618,953 116 2.51% 0.08% 
15 Schizophrrenia  390,693 150 0.61% 0.11% 
16 Testicular cancer in 15 year-old persons and older  2,099,586 282 3.26% 0.20% 
17 Lymphomas in 15 year-old persons and older  1,617,934 226 2.51% 0.16% 
18 Acquired immune deficiency syndrome -  HIV/aids  4,720,613 607 7.33% 0.43% 
19 
Low acute respiratory infection, outpatient treatment, in children younger than 5 
years old 
53,491 11,286 0.08% 8.04% 
20 
Pneumonia acquired in community, outpatient treatment, in 65 year-old persons 
and older  
3,951 123 0.01% 0.09% 
21 Primary or essential arterial hypertension in 15 year-old persons and older  1,569,104 33,646 2.44% 23.96% 
22 Non refractive epilepsy in persons from 1 year old up to 15 year-olds  43,636 307 0.07% 0.22% 
23 Integral oral health for 6 year-old children  416,565 7,541 0.65% 5.37% 
24 Prematurity 184,579 427 0.29% 0.30% 
25 
Pulse generation and conduction disorders in 15 year-old persons and older 
requiring pacemaker 
1,359,417 382 2.11% 0.27% 
26 
Cholecystectomy preventing gallbladder cancer in symptomatic patients 
between 35 and 49 years old  
720,540 919 1.12% 0.65% 
27 Gastric cancer  1,131,113 139 1.76% 0.10% 
                                                          
39
 For details on this computation review the reference in footnote number 4. 
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Table 26: Estimated annual expenses of the 56 GES problems (US dollars Dec. 2007) 
# Health problem 
Expenditure per 
year (USD) 
Cases per 
year 
% of total 
expenditure 
% of total 
cases 
28 Prostate cancer in 15 year-old persons and older 3,783,478 909 5.87% 0.65% 
29 Refractive errors in 65 year-old persons and older 27,233 830 0.04% 0.59% 
30 Squint (strabismus)  in children younger than 9 years old  111,475 509 0.17% 0.36% 
31 Diabetic retinopathy 1  440,300 739 0.68% 0.53% 
32 Non-traumatic rhegmatogenous retinal detachment 179,493 153 0.28% 0.11% 
33 Hemophilia  613,715 77 0.95% 0.05% 
34 Depression in 15 year-old persons and older 5,071,355 28,771 7.87% 20.49% 
35 Surgical treatment of benign prostate hyperplasia in symptomatic persons  276,095 263 0.43% 0.19% 
36 Orthosis (or technical aids ) for 65 year-old persons and older  4,459 44 0.01% 0.03% 
37 Ischemic cerebrovascular accident in 15 year-old persons and older  463,730 490 0.72% 0.35% 
38 Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease of outpatient treatment  133,645 1,162 0.21% 0.83% 
39 Moderate and severe bronchial asthma in patients younger than 15 years old 427,230 4,135 0.66% 2.94% 
40 Respiratory distress syndrome in newborns  1,336,731 133 2.07% 0.09% 
41 
Medical treatment  in 55 year-old persons and older with light or moderate knee 
and/or hip arthrosis 
187,061 4,481 0.29% 3.19% 
42 Subarachnoid hemorrhage secondary to brain aneurysm rupture 1,202,647 433 1.87% 0.31% 
43 
Surgical treatment of primary tumors of the central nervous system in 15 year-
old persons and older  
1,354,587 894 2.10% 0.64% 
44 Surgical treatment of lumbar disk herniation (nucleus pulposus) 588,170 601 0.91% 0.43% 
45 Leukemia in 15 year-old persons and older  920,292 1,030 1.43% 0.73% 
46 Outpatient dental emergency  10,261 784 0.02% 0.56% 
47 Integral oral health in 60 year-old adults  489,184 1,367 0.76% 0.97% 
48 Severe polytraumatized patient  2,790,639 295 4.33% 0.21% 
49 Emergency care in severe or moderate cranio-encephalic traumatism 4,580,389 1,411 7.11% 1.00% 
50 Severe eye trauma 21,887 23 0.03% 0.02% 
51 Cystic fibrosis   77,443 8 0.12% 0.01% 
52 Rheumatoid arthritis  2,085,464 3,431 3.24% 2.44% 
53 
Drug and alcohol abusive consumption and dependence in persons younger 
than 20 years old 
199,838 1,284 0.31% 0.91% 
54 Labor analgesia 104,424 3,028 0.16% 2.16% 
55 Burned patients 398,335 40 0.62% 0.03% 
56 Bilateral hypoacusia in 65 year-old persons and older who require earphones  145,207 348 0.23% 0.25% 
 Total 64,421,422 140,432 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Prepared by the Research and Development Department, Superintendence of Health. 
Each one of these health problems are disaggregated into groups of health care services in the 
three stages mentioned above (diagnosis, treatment and follow up). For example, consider the 
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first health care problem: terminal chronic renal insufficiency. In this case the annual cost shown 
in Table 26 was computed based on Table 27 below. 
Table 27: Example of estimated annual expenses for the 56 GES problems (US dollars) 
Nº Health problem or program  
Health services or group of health 
services 
GES 
fee  
Co-
payment  
GES fee without 
co-payment  
Number of 
cases per year  
1.- 
TERMINAL CHRONIC RENAL 
INSUFFICIENCY   
Peritoneal dialysis in patients younger 
than 15 years old 
1,297 259 1,037 7 
Hemodialysis 994 199 795 3,516 
Simple Vascular Access (through FAV) for 
Hemodialysis 
646 129 517 32 
Complex Vascular Access (through FAV) 
for Hemodialysis 
1,217 243 974 6 
Implant of Temporary Catheter for 
Hemodialysis 
141 28 113 8 
Implant of Temporary Long term or 
Tunnelled Catheter for Hemodialysis 
789 158 631 1 
Endovenous Ferrum for patients in 
dialysis 
43 9 34 1.788 
Erythropoietine for patients in dialysis 
younger than 15 years old 
174 35 139 46 
Study of Pre-Transplant receptor 732 146 586 10 
Kidney Transplant  8,602 1,720 6,881 9 
Immunosuppression drug protocol 1 33 7 26 367 
Immunosuppression  drug protocol 2 493 99 394 321 
Immunosuppression drug protocol 3 1,254 251 1,003 413 
Source: Superintendence of Health http://www.supersalud.cl  
Once we have the number of annual cases per service or group of services for each of the 56 GES 
health problems, we multiply them by the reference cost, without considering any co-payment. 
We obtain the total expenditure of the 56 GES health problems adding the previous products, 
according to formula (3) below: 
 

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i
ii QRTTC
1
 (3) 
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So, first, Table 28 presents the beneficiary population of the ISAPREs participating in the Fund 
as of February 2007. 
Table 28: ISAPREs beneficiary population participating in the Fund 
by age and sex group 
Age group Males  Females  Total  
00-01 35,931 33,360 69,291 
02-04 62,612 59,231 121,843 
05-09 113,992 108,564 222,556 
10-14 115,990 109,597 225,587 
15-19 116,218 105,715 221,933 
20-24 127,999 90,124 218,123 
25-29 131,174 99,385 230,559 
30-34 137,888 114,900 252,788 
35-39 124,120 108,263 232,383 
40-44 112,647 104,491 217,138 
45-49 92,565 92,929 185,494 
50-54 70,829 75,962 146,791 
55-59 53,480 56,194 109,674 
60-64 36,296 36,225 72,521 
65-69 18,502 19,494 37,996 
70-74 10,599 11,547 22,146 
75-79 6,771 7,664 14,435 
80 + 4,502 6,523 11,025 
Total 1,372,115 1,240,168 2,612,283 
Source: Author’s calculations using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
Table 29 presents total costs. 
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Table 29: Summary of the Community Premium calculation for the 56 GES problems 
Item  Amount 
Expenditure on the 56 GES health problems per year (in US dollars)  64,421,422  
Number of ISAPREs beneficiaries (9 ISAPREs)  2,612,283  
Annual community premium (in US dollars)  24.66  
Monthly community premium (in US dollars)  2.06  
Source: Author’s calculations using information from the Superintendence of Health 
Furthermore, the Community Premium is defined as the contribution that every ISAPRE 
beneficiary gives the Fund; it is equivalent to the actuarial annual cost per capita of the 56 GES 
problems (formula (4)).  
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So, the Annual Community Premium is US$ 24.66, equivalent to a Monthly Community 
Premium of US$ 2.06
40
 (Table 29). 
Note that the estimation of the Community Premium assumes that all individuals diagnosed with 
a GES problem participate in the GES system through the ISAPREs‟ health provider network. 
This allows us to estimate potential demand. But, we know that some people prefer to use their 
complementary plan
41
 instead of GES, either because their preferred providers are not registered 
                                                          
40
 These figures contain decimals, for the reasons stated in the notes for Charts 4 and 5. Furthermore, the Community Premium is 
shown in Chilean current pesos, since the Fee established in the Decree is in said currency.  
41
 Here we divide ISAPREs‟ health plans into two parts: the GES benefits package and all other benefits included in the 
“complementary plan.” 
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in their plan or because they have a sufficiently high financial coverage so as to not need the GES 
financial protection. 
1.2.4 Risk factors or standardized expected costs 
Table 30 shows the estimates of total costs of the GES problems for each risk group. It shows the 
total expenditure by age and sex groups −considering 56 GES problems− and the magnitude of 
the contributions of every risk group. The total annual cost is US$ 64.4 million, where women 
represent 46% and men 54% of the total cost. The estimated annual per capita cost for each of the 
36 risk groups is the estimated costs divided by the beneficiary population. 
Table 30: Total estimated expenses for 56 GES problems by age groups 
Age groups Males Females Total 
00-01 1,500,393 1,722,461 3,222,854 
02-04 607,621 489,239 1,096,861 
05-09 1,323,502 920,001 2,243,503 
10-14 1,239,601 1,551,571 2,791,171 
15-19 1,122,654 1,100,194 2,222,848 
20-24 1,136,102 1,140,266 2,276,368 
25-29 1,505,985 1,278,385 2,784,370 
30-34 2,293,860 1,830,186 4,124,046 
35-39 2,337,102 2,199,061 4,536,163 
40-44 2,701,942 2,897,155 5,599,097 
45-49 2,664,726 3,180,876 5,845,603 
50-54 2,822,377 3,091,785 5,914,162 
55-59 3,045,723 2,727,152 5,772,876 
60-64 3,135,587 2,320,203 5,455,791 
65-69 2,334,667 1,584,247 3,918,914 
70-74 1,779,967 1,211,399 2,991,366 
75-79 1,366,048 840,568 2,206,616 
80 + 766,173 652,641 1,418,814 
Total 33,684,031 30,737,391 64,421,422 
Source: Author’s calculations using information from the Superintendence of Health 
The formula to compute the risk factors for each risk group is given by: 
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Notice that the risk factors are normalised by the average estimated costs for each risk group, 
because we divide the per capita costs of a risk group by the community premium. 
As we can see from formula (5), we need to know the specific frequency of each health service 
(benefit) by sex and age groups. We show how we obtain these frequencies through an example. 
Continuing the example of terminal chronic renal insufficiency, Table 31 presents the frequencies 
disaggregated by sex and age. There were a total of 367 cases between July 2005 and June 2006. 
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Table 31: Example of frequency of benefit by sex and age for one GES health problem  
Health condition: terminal chronic renal insufficiency − Target of population: All ISAPRE beneficiaries  
 
Cases of terminal chronic renal 
insufficiency Population Rate*10000 
Age groups Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
00-01 1 - 1 35,931 33,360 69,291 0.28 - 0.14 
02-04 - - - 62,612 59,231 121,843 - - - 
05-09 3 3 6 113,992 108,564 222,556 0.26 0.28 0.27 
10-14 2 3 5 115,990 109,597 225,587 0.17 0.27 0.22 
15-19 7 - 7 116,218 105,715 221,933 0.60 - 0.32 
20-24 7 6 13 127,999 90,124 218,123 0.55 0.67 0.60 
25-29 3 2 5 131,174 99,385 230,559 0.23 0.20 0.22 
30-34 7 4 11 137,888 114,900 252,788 0.51 0.35 0.44 
35-39 16 9 25 124,120 108,263 232,383 1.29 0.83 1.08 
40-44 18 11 29 112,647 104,491 217,138 1.60 1.05 1.34 
45-49 16 11 27 92,565 92,929 185,494 1.73 1.18 1.46 
50-54 26 19 45 70,829 75,962 146,791 3.67 2.50 3.07 
55-59 35 23 58 53,480 56,194 109,674 6.54 4.09 5.29 
60-64 30 17 47 36,296 36,225 72,521 8.27 4.69 6.48 
65-69 20 11 31 18,502 19,494 37,996 10.81 5.64 8.16 
70-74 19 8 27 10,599 11,547 22,146 17.93 6.93 12.19 
75-79 14 3 17 6,771 7,664 14,435 20.68 3.91 11.78 
80 + 11 2 13 4,502 6,523 11,025 24.43 3.07 11.79 
Total 235 132 367 1,372,115 1,240,168 2,612,283 1.71 1.06 1.40 
Source: Author’s calculations using information from the Superintendence of Health 
The table above counts number of cases of a specific health problem. We then restructure the 
table to show the number of cases of a specific health intervention –haemodialysis− by sex and 
age groups. 
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Table 32: Example of frequency by sex and age of one service for one GES Health 
problem: Haemodialysis in terminal chronic renal insufficiency 
Age groups Male Female Total 
00-01 9.2 - 9.2 
02-04 - - - 
05-09 27.1 27.3 54.4 
10-14 18.2 27.2 45.4 
15-19 66.4 - 66.4 
20-24 66.7 57.3 124.0 
25-29 29.5 19.1 48.5 
30-34 65.7 36.5 102.2 
35-39 152.2 83.4 235.6 
40-44 168.4 100.3 268.7 
45-49 153.4 103.0 256.4 
50-54 251.3 182.5 433.8 
55-59 333.7 218.7 552.5 
60-64 292.4 166.0 458.4 
65-69 196.9 107.2 304.1 
70-74 176.8 75.7 252.5 
75-79 139.7 29.6 169.3 
80 + 114.8 20.1 134.9 
Total 2,262.3 1,253.8 3,516.1 
Source: Author’s calculations using information from the Superintendence of Health 
So, the 367 individuals who presented the health problem (Table 31) used approximately 3,516.1 
haemodialysis in a year. This must then be added to the other services covered under this GES 
problem (Table 27) to obtain the total number of services as in Table 32 by sex and age groups. 
Once we have the frequencies by age and sex groups we can compute risk factors. Table 33 
below shows the normalised risk factors. 
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Table 33: Risk factors for the 56 GES problems (Average=1) 
Age groups Males Females 
00-01 1.6933 2.0937 
02-04 0.3935 0.3349 
05-09 0.4708 0.3436 
10-14 0.4334 0.5741 
15-19 0.3917 0.4220 
20-24 0.3599 0.5130 
25-29 0.4655 0.5216 
30-34 0.6746 0.6459 
35-39 0.7635 0.8237 
40-44 0.9726 1.1243 
45-49 1.1673 1.3880 
50-54 1.6158 1.6505 
55-59 2.3093 1.9679 
60-64 3.5031 2.5972 
65-69 5.1168 3.2954 
70-74 6.8098 4.2541 
75-79 8.1809 4.4474 
80 + 6.9010 4.0571 
Source: Author’s calculations using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
Risk groups having factors higher than 1 are those whose estimated costs are higher than the 
average; risk groups with factors lower than 1 are those whose estimated costs are below average.  
1.2.4.1 Premium subsidies 
We use formula (6) to compute premium subsidies, which is simply the product of the 
community premium and the corresponding risk factor (taken from Table 31).  
 
jj RFCPRAP *  (6) 
jRF
CP
jRAP
where
j
j
 grouprisk  offacot Risk :
premiumCommunity :
 grouprisk for  premium adjustedRisk :
:
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In this case, the weighted average risk factor of the portfolio is 1, since it refers to the risk 
distribution of February 2007. Table 34 shows the Premium Subsidies for February 2007 for the 
ISAPREs participating in the Fund. 
Table 34: Annual premium subsidies by risk groups (beneficiaries of 
February 2007) 
Age groups Males Females 
00-01 41.76 51.63 
02-04 9.70 8.26 
05-09 11.61 8.47 
10-14 10.69 14.16 
15-19 9.66 10.41 
20-24 8.88 12.65 
25-29 11.48 12.86 
30-34 16.64 15.93 
35-39 18.83 20.31 
40-44 23.99 27.73 
45-49 28.79 34.23 
50-54 39.85 40.70 
55-59 56.95 48.53 
60-64 86.39 64.05 
65-69 126.18 81.27 
70-74 167.94 104.91 
75-79 201.75 109.68 
80 + 170.19 100.05 
Source: Author’s calculations using information from the Superintendence of Health 
Figure 15 presents the risk factors by sex and age for individuals with ISAPREs. Notice that 
mainly those over 39 years of age have a risk factor greater than the average (greater than 1) and 
all age groups over 50 years of age are above the average. For women over 70 years of age the 
risk factor stabilizes, unlike the case of men whose risk factor keeps increasing until it becomes 
more than 8 times the average (the women‟s risk factor reaches only almost 4 times the average). 
Thus, the gender difference is significant for those above 65 years of age, where the expected 
costs are much higher for men. 
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Figure 15: ISAPREs risk factors for the 56 GES health problems (Average = 1) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
One might have expected significant gender differences in the women of fertile age (15-49 years 
of age), but the absence of childbirth and other related problems in the 56 GES health problems 
eliminates this expected difference. The same happens with the children under one year of age, 
despite the presence of congenital heart diseases and the problems of pre-adulthood. This 
happens because of the low frequency of these problems in the ISAPRE system relative to other 
problems included in the 56 GES health problems, when considering its ambulatory and hospital 
aspects. 
In sum, persons under 40 years of age contribute for adults over 60 years of age. This means that 
the Fund is fulfilling a basic rule of intergenerational solidarity in terms social security policy. 
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Since we computed risk factors with ex-ante information of the beneficiary population (February 
2007), it is natural that, if it is applied to a new population the Fund may become exposed. Note 
also that it is a requisite that the Fund be exact at all times, so that it is necessary to normalise the 
risk factor table to the risk of the current beneficiary population distribution. 
1.2.4.2 Determination of the compensations 
Compensations between the ISAPREs depend on two concepts: the financial power (FP) and the 
financial need (FN) of each ISAPRE with respect to the GES.
42
 
We compute financial power as: 
 ii BCPFP *  (7) 
iB
CP
iFP
where
i
i
  ISAPRE in iesbeneficiar of number Total:
premium Community:
  ISAPRE of Power Financial:
:
 
We compute financial need as: 
 


36
1
*
j
ijji bPSFN  (8) 
jib
jPS
iFN
where
i
j
i
 grouprisk  in   ISAPRE in iesbeneficiar of Number:
 grouprisk  for subsidy Premium:
  ISAPRE of Need Financial:
:
 
The difference between these two variables defines the compensations, in such a way that: 
If FPi > FNi, ISAPRE i pays a compensation to one or more ISAPREs; 
                                                          
42
 These concepts were taken from the German risk adjustment model (in Buchner and Wasem, 2003). 
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If FPi < FNi, ISAPRE i receives a compensation from one or more ISAPREs; and, 
If FPi = FNi, ISAPRE i does not pay or receive resources from the Fund. 
Thus, the net compensation of each ISAPRE is given by the following formula: 
 iii FNFPNC   (9) 
need Financial:
power Financial:
oncompensatiNet :
:
FN
FP
NC
where
 
Provided that: 
 0
1


n
i
iNC  (10) 
That is to say, the Fund empties (zero sum compensation). 
1.2.5 Summary of results 
1.2.5.1 Fund resources 
The Fund requires approximately US$ 64.4 million annually (Table 30). Men represent 52% of 
these resources and women represent 48%. 
1.2.5.2 Net compensations 
Net compensations −the resources actually redistributed within the ISAPRE system− sum US$ 
1.15 million a year (see Table 36 below). This is equivalent to 1.8% of total Fund resources. 
Each ISAPRE contributes in accordance with its financial power, and receives in accordance with 
its financial need.  
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1.2.5.3 Contributing and Recipient ISAPREs 
Transferred resources can be analysed by grouping ISAPREs as contributing or recipient 
ISAPREs. Contributing ISAPREs have smaller risks than the average and the sum of their 
contributions to the Fund are higher than the sum of their risk adjusted financial needs (FP > FN). 
Recipient ISAPREs have higher risks than average and their contributions to the Fund are lower 
than their risk adjusted financial needs (FP < FN). 
In general, the largest relative risk that recipient ISAPREs exhibit is due to a lesser proportion of 
children (resource contributors) and a bigger proportion of elders (resource recipients) in their 
respective beneficiaries‟ portfolios, in relation to the average population of the system (Figure 
15). 
Table 35: Relative risk of participating ISAPREs in the Solidarity Fund 
ISAPRE Relative risk score 
% Children 15 or 
less 
% Adults 60 or 
more 
Colmena 1.043 24.80% 7.00% 
Normédica 0.871 28.50% 2.80% 
ING Salud 0.987 24.60% 5.60% 
Vida Tres 1.096 24.30% 8.10% 
MasVida 0.878 28.30% 2.80% 
Banmédica 0.989 23.60% 6.30% 
Consalud 1.003 23.70% 6.00% 
Fusat 1.338 21.10% 13.70% 
Ferrosalud 1.054 23.50% 6.60% 
ISAPREs’ average 1.000 24.50% 6.10% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
For example, ISAPRE Colmena has above average relative risks because its beneficiary 
population includes an above average number of older adults. This makes it a recipient ISAPRE, 
i.e., it should receive compensatory resources. ISAPRE MasVida is another example: it has 
below average relative risks, because it has an above average proportion of children and a below 
average proportion of elderly. In this case, MasVida is a net contributor. 
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Table 36: Annual transfers between ISAPREs: contributors and recipients  
Contributing ISAPREs  Recipient ISAPREs 
ISAPRE US dollars %  ISAPRE US dollars % 
MasVida 655,641 57%  Colmena 409,242 36% 
Banmédica 174,672 15%  Fusat 339,181 29% 
ING Salud 162,544 14%  Vida tres 330,431 29% 
Normédica 159,437 14%  Consalud 43,778 4% 
    Ferrosalud 29,662 3% 
Total 1,152,294 100%  Total 1,152,294 100% 
Source: Author calculations 
In sum, the ISAPREs that contribute are: Normédica, ING Salud, MasVida and Banmédica; 
while the ISAPREs that receive these contributions are Colmena, Vida Tres, Fusat, Ferrosalud 
and Consalud. 
1.2.5.4 Benefited risk groups 
In general, the individuals who receive subsidies to their premiums through risk adjustment are 
those over 35 years of age, men over 30 and women over 35 with the exception of women aged 
40-44.  In terms of total amounts, the net distribution for women is 63% that of men. 
Men clearly contribute more than women but, after the adjustment, they turn out to be 
beneficiaries in a higher proportion than their own contributions relative to the case of women. 
The age group that make greater contributions is the 10 to 14 year old group, for both men and 
women. Those that receive more are70 to 74 year old men and women aged 65 to 69. 
Clearly, in this stage, the Fund shows intergenerational solidarity. 
1.2.6 Comments about this risk adjustment model 
This subsection presents the first estimation of the financial effects of the Fund in the ISAPRE 
system, for the selected year, with the available information and the methodology presented 
above. 
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The Fund is a regulatory tool for the private insurance sector to prevent risk selection. In the case 
presented here, we incorporate 56 GES problems, and the discrimination towards elderly people, 
whose expected costs are significantly higher than the average, is directly targeted. 
Out of the nine ISAPREs that participate in the risk adjustment system, four are contributors and 
the five are recipients, representing 35% and 65% of the beneficiaries, respectively. 
Out of the US$ 64.4 million that the Fund collected in 2007, only US$ 1.14 million, or 1.8%, was 
redistributed.  
Contributions are quite different (uneven), and do not correspond to the size of the portfolios nor 
to their proportion relative to the total beneficiaries. For example, Normédica contributes 14% 
and its portfolio is only 2.1% of the total pool of beneficiaries. ING contributes 14% of the 
transfers and its portfolio represents 22%. MasVida contributes 57% and its portfolio is 7.3%. 
This is the result of the risk differences across portfolios. 
It is clear that what influences these redistributions is the relative amount of children and elderly 
that each ISAPRE may have at the moment the compensation is made. 
If we analyse the Fund‟s redistribution in terms of risk groups, we have seen that, given the 56 
priorities, initially the Fund benefits mainly the elderly and among them a greater number of men 
than women. Notwithstanding, in the medium term this should change, if childbirth and 
pregnancy are included which would benefit women of fertile age as well as young children. 
Redistribution is quite moderate, at a rate of US$ 0.44 per average benefit per year, which 
represents 1.8% of the GES average premium and 0.076% of the operational income of the 
system. 
It is important to note that the incentives that come with risk adjustment depend on the amounts 
involved. As such, the effect the Fund and risk adjustment would have is directly related to the 
number and price of the problems incorporated in GES.  At the current time, its effects are 
moderate. These are estimates for the current portfolio, but the Superintendence expects the 
Fund‟s structure to allow for the portfolio to become more homogenous in time (Superintendence 
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of Health, 2007) with regards to the previous system and to the national population in such a way 
that the amount to compensate should diminish in relative terms in the same measure that the 
distribution of risks becomes more homogenous in the ISAPRE system.
43
 Nevertheless, this 
could be questioned. The experience in Germany and Switzerland is that they do not become 
homogenous – and as long as health status is not in the formula, those insurers who are most 
active in risk selection manage to keep a healthy membership (van de Ven et al., 2007). 
Risk adjustment introduces progressiveness and with the current model, there is redistribution 
towards the elderly and children under one, whose expected costs are significantly above average. 
The extent to which incentives work and generate desired effects depends on the amount of 
resources in the Fund. We use the prices established by law and published by MINSAL (which 
are a weighted average of the public and private sectors) to compute compensation amounts, 
since it is not the scope of this research to compute real costs.
44
 
Demographic adjustment transfers are made towards ISAPREs whose enrolees have relatively 
high income. This happens because some ISAPREs have specialized in older, healthy and high-
income individuals −for example, ISAPRE Colmena− and because of risk selection. Finally, the 
model‟s ability to predict costs should increase if it were a regression model with more variables 
including health status of the beneficiaries and observed costs of the health interventions. 
The most important problem of this system is that this fund cannot adequately correct the risk 
selection problems because it does not include FONASA. Basically ISAPREs can still select the 
good risks and send the bad risks to FONASA, which means that FONASA subsidizes the private 
system. 
Moreover, the effect of the Fund is still too limited and requires urgent changes in the model to 
avoid the unwanted effect of reallocating resources to ISAPREs with a large number of persons 
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 To the extent that the number of health problems included in GES increases, the incentives to homogenize risk will also 
increase.  
44
 In June 2006, when there were 25 health problems included in GES, the author estimated that the prices published by MINSAL 
were undervalued by approximately 50% relative to actual costs using the data from the Superintendence (Cid and Muñoz, 2007). 
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over 65 years of age who are still healthy and who are of high income (for example, ISAPREs 
Colmena and VidaTres) and also strengthen the incentives against risk selection. 
 
2. Demographic risk adjustment for public (FONASA) and private (ISAPREs) 
health systems 
This section describes the methodology behind the Government‟s original proposal presented to 
Congress. We simulate the operation of the Fund that distributes health risk adjusted premium 
subsidies based on the estimates of expected expenditure by sex and age using a cell model. We 
include FONASA and we use the estimated GES cost (US$ 93.56) as our community premium, 
but we maintain the risk factors used in the previous model. 
2.1. Method for demographic risk adjustment model including FONASA 
In this subsection we present the methodology to estimate the key values in the demographic risk 
adjustment model that includes FONASA. We begin with the relative per capita costs and then 
proceed with the solidarity contribution. We then obtain the premium subsidy and the total value 
of premium subsidies per insurer. From this exercise we can estimate the net transfers across 
main insurance systems (FONASA and ISAPRE). 
2.1.1 Methodology in previous studies of relative costs by sex and age groups 
In Vargas, Cid, et al., 2005, the formula to calculate relative costs by sex and age sums all 
hospitalisations and outpatient expenditures for all users by sex and age groups. They then divide 
by the total population of beneficiaries of FONASA and ISAPREs in each sex and age group. 
They estimate relative costs of the GES guaranteed benefits at the hospital level using the 41 
GES benefits that include hospital services and that are associated with over 400 International 
Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision (ICD-10) codes in the hospital discharge database for 
2001. They then associate these codes to unit costs of GES benefits calculated, specifying 41 
 101 
prices for hospitalisation per day and 33 prices for surgery associated to one GES hospitalisation 
episode. Total hospitalisation costs by sex and age groups are then grouped into 5-year periods.
45
 
The method in Vargas, Cid et al., 2005, considers only hospital care. We compute the risk 
adjustment considering ambulatory and hospital care costs of the 56 GES health problems. We 
use the estimated costs in the studies requested by the MINSAL (Bitrán et al., 2006; Universidad 
de Chile, 2007). 
The hospital day price is multiplied by the number of days of stay in the hospital and an amount 
for surgery expenditure was added per episode when appropriate. Expenditure per discharge was 
aggregated by age and sex group and divided by the total number of FONASA and ISAPRE 
beneficiaries, resulting in a per capita cost of GES guaranteed benefits by sex and age groups. 
We use a different methodology than the one presented above to compute premium subsidies by 
risk groups, because we need the relative costs that consider both the private and the public 
sector. In sum, we use the solidarity contribution computed by MINSAL in 2003 that considers 
both sectors and the risk factors of the 56 GES problems presented in section 1 of this chapter, 
which are the more recent values available for Chile. 
2.1.2 Solidarity contributions to the Fund 
Solidarity contributions or community premiums to the Fund are obtained by multiplying the 
universal GES premium contribution calculated by the Reform Commission for the public sector 
−approximately US$ 93.56 per capita − by the number of persons insured. In addition, the 
Government pays for universal premium of all FONASA indigent beneficiaries and a 
supplementary amount for those FONASA beneficiaries whose contribution are not enough to 
cover their own and their dependants‟ universal premium. The Government contribution is equal 
to US$ 93.56 per indigent. 
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 The more differentiated the risk groups, the fairer the system. However, greater differentiation makes the model more complex 
and estimates less stable. Therefore, a balance has to be reached between advantages and disadvantages. 
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Table 37: Solidarity contributions to the Fund (population and US dollars 2006) 
Insurer Gender 
Total premium 
contributions Beneficiaries 
FONASA 
Male 530,075,033 5,665,760 
Female 543,908,837 5,813,624 
Total 1,073,983,871 11,479,384 
ISAPREs 
Male 131,510,675 1,405,665 
Female 119,649,814 1,278,889 
Total 251,160,489 2,684,554 
Total 
Male 661,585,708 7,071,425 
Female 663,558,651 7,092,513 
Total 1,325,144,359 14,163,938 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
FONASA
46
 and ISAPREs pay solidarity contributions to the Fund. The Fund collects US$ 1.33 
billion, where 81% comes from FONASA and 19% from ISAPREs. 
2.1.3 Standardized expected costs and premium subsidies 
The value of the premium subsidy results from multiplying the value of the solidarity 
contribution by the values of the normalized expected costs by age and sex groups (table of risk 
factors). By multiplying the per capita value of the subsidized premiums by sex and age of the 
respective FONASA and ISAPRE beneficiary population, we get the total sum of subsidized 
premiums that each insurer receives, assuming that the Fund redistributes 100% of the solidarity 
contributions. 
2.2. Standardized expected costs 
The normalized expected costs or risk factors are derived from the per capita costs, by sex and 
age, of the benefits package that is standardized by transforming the average per capita cost to 1.  
Consistent with international results, the elderly tend to have more health needs than younger 
people. The same occurs when women of fertile age are compared to men in the same age group. 
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 FONASA‟s contributions include fiscal transfers. 
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The risk factors “favours” older people. Men over 40 and women over 45 are „more expensive‟ 
that the average person, but more so in the case of men. 
2.2.1 Premium subsidies 
The following table shows the amounts of the risk premiums subsidies for the 34 age and sex 
groups.
47
 
Table 38: Value of the premium subsidies 
Age groups 
 Subsidized premium 
for males 
 Subsidized premium 
for females  Mean  
 00 – 04  81.16 90.62 85.74 
 05 – 09  44.05 32.15 38.24 
 10 – 14  40.54 53.71 46.94 
 15 – 19  36.65 39.48 38.00 
 20 – 24  33.67 48.00 39.59 
 25 – 29  43.56 48.80 45.82 
 30 – 34  63.11 60.43 61.89 
 35 – 39  71.43 77.06 74.05 
 40 – 44  91.00 105.19 97.83 
 45 – 49  109.21 129.86 119.56 
 50 – 54  151.17 154.41 152.85 
 55 – 59  216.06 184.11 199.69 
 60 – 64  327.74 242.99 285.41 
 65 – 69  478.71 308.31 391.29 
 70 – 74  637.11 398.00 512.44 
 75 – 79  765.39 416.09 579.93 
 80+  645.64 379.57 488.22 
 Mean  93.13 94.03 93.56 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
2.2.2 Distribution of the total amount of premium subsidies 
The age and gender distribution between FONASA and ISAPREs is shown in the following 
table: 
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 For this simulation we group 0 −1 year of age in the 0 – 4 age group because FONASA‟s population information does not 
include that specific age group. 
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Table 39: ISAPRE and FONASA beneficiary population, 2006 (December) 
Age Groups 
FONASA ISAPRES 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
00 – 04 437,760 419,017 856,777 100,982 95,129 196,111 
05 – 09 480,386 447,895 928,281 117,298 111,776 229,074 
10 – 14 542,274 504,868 1,047,142 119,870 113,475 233,345 
15 – 19 509,485 458,267 967,752 120,433 109,955 230,388 
20 – 24 454,040 447,906 901,946 131,333 93,306 224,639 
25 – 29 412,147 416,480 828,627 131,452 100,414 231,866 
30 – 34 399,604 410,220 809,824 139,400 116,990 256,390 
35 – 39 425,684 431,415 857,099 124,970 110,471 235,441 
40 – 44 415,344 401,430 816,774 115,243 107,569 222,812 
45 – 49 342,639 348,682 691,321 94,576 95,667 190,243 
50 – 54 289,768 299,330 589,098 73,223 78,635 151,858 
55 – 59 232,272 244,911 477,183 56,154 58,575 114,729 
60 – 64 218,528 263,523 482,051 38,099 37,702 75,801 
65 – 69 185,370 225,457 410,827 19,175 20,335 39,510 
70 – 74 137,869 185,387 323,256 11,086 12,361 23,447 
75 – 79 97,079 146,070 243,149 7,203 8,584 15,787 
80+ 85,511 162,766 248,277 5,168 7,945 13,113 
Total 5,665,760 5,813,624 11,479,384 1,405,665 1,278,889 2,684,554 
Source: FONASA and Superintendence of Health 
The redistribution of the total amount of the Fund, in accordance with the present risks of 
beneficiary populations of each insurer, is as follows: 
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Table 40: Contribution to the Fund and distribution from the Fund to FONASA and 
ISAPREs beneficiaries (in US dollars 2006) 
Insurer Gender Resource distribution from the Fund 
FONASA 
Male 573,972,734 
Female 552,846,245 
Total 1,126,818,979 
ISAPREs 
Male 103,425,917 
Female 94,899,464 
Total 198,325,381 
Total 
Male 677,398,650 
Female 647,745,709 
Total 1,325,144,359 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Aggregate figures per institution show that the Fund reassigns 49% of the resources to women 
and 51% to men. 
Finally, by adding the monetary values by sex and age groups it is possible to identify the 
insurers that are net contributors to the Fund. If we compare the contribution with the financing 
and distribution of the Fund, we can see that in this simulation there is a net transfer of resources 
in favour of FONASA. Under the assumption that the sum of premium contributions of 
FONASA is US$ 1.07 billion, US$ 52.8 million is redistributed from the ISAPREs as a result of 
the greater risk index of the public institution. This transfer is equivalent to 4% of the Fund‟s 
resources.  
This compensation model benefits FONASA, although it is still less beneficial in comparison to 
the one that incorporates diagnoses in a DxCG regression model (see Chapter V). 
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V. DATA AND METHODS FOR DIAGNOSES-BASED RISK ADJUSTMENT 
1. Data for diagnoses-based risk adjustment in Chile 
This part of the study is developed mainly with the dataset of hospital expenditures for Chile in 
2001. The dataset has systematic and reliable information about the Chilean system since the 
1970s and it includes all the hospital care providers, including SNSS (public system provider–
NHS type), private clinics, mutual insurance hospitals and armed forces hospitals. The dataset 
covers beneficiaries of all the health insurance systems.  
Although the data has been collected since the 1970s, it was temporarily discontinued in the 
1980s, and later recovered in 1992 and 1996; from the year 2000 on it has been re-established, 
and the more recent datasets are for 2001, 2002 and 2003. But due to quality problems, we have 
selected the year 2001 for the main estimations and the year 2003 to run robustness tests. 
1.1. Year 2001 discharges dataset and GES benefits package 
The dataset has a total of 1,566,187 records (discharges). The dataset is made up of 38.5% men 
and 61.5% women, with patients ranging in age from 0 to 112.  The children under one year of 
age represent 6.7 % of the cases. Also, 1.4% of the records are not classified by insurance. Table 
41 presents the insurance type composition. 
Table 41: Hospital discharges distribution by affiliation of health 
Insurance system Number of discharges Discharges as percentage of the total 
FONASA 1,114,300 71.1% 
ISAPRE 245,553 15.7% 
None 62,884 4.0% 
Others 121,343 7.7% 
Without classification 22,107 1.4% 
Source: Author’s analysis from Discharges 2001 Data Set  http://www.minsal.cl 
The diagnoses are identified with the WHO‟s four-digit ICD-10 coding system and all 
expenditures can be attributed to 7,319 different codes. Ten codes represent 21.6% of the 
diagnoses and five codes represent 14.6%. There are 34.1% of discharges with surgery and 
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62.2% without surgery. The remaining 3.9% of the observations have missing values in the 
surgery variable. 
GES guarantees 42 health problems that add up to 441,214 discharges and correspond to 32.5% 
of FONASA and ISAPREs‟ expenditures. In this dataset three GES conditions, out of the 41 GES 
health problems that include services at the hospital level, cover most of the diagnoses and cases: 
accidents requiring Intensive Care Units (ICU) includes 101 diagnoses; emergency with life at 
risk includes 85 diagnoses; and all cancers in children under 15 years of age includes 84 
diagnoses (Frenz et al., 2003). 
From this list, most of the GES health problems are guaranteed to the entire population, with the 
following exceptions for treatments guaranteed only to certain age groups:
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 All cancers in children under 15, totalling 84 diagnoses (three-digits) 
 In all ages stomach cancer (2 diagnoses), biliary tract cancer (2 diagnoses), cancer of 
the uterus (5 diagnosis), breast cancer (2 diagnoses), testicular cancer (2 diagnoses), 
prostate cancer (1 diagnosis). 
 Cholecystotomy for women 40-years of age (4 diagnoses) 
 Lymphomas, tumours and cysts for those over 15 (7 diagnoses) 
 Leukaemia for those over 15 (6 diagnoses) 
 Tumours and cysts for those over 15 years of age(5 diagnoses) 
 Cataracts for those over 65 and under 2  (4 diagnoses) 
 Pneumonia in those over 65  (6 diagnoses) 
 Prosthesis for those over 65  (5 diagnoses) 
 Depression in women over 15  (2 diagnoses) 
 Drug and alcohol dependency for those between 15 and 19 years of age (2 diagnoses) 
 Strabismus for those under 9 (2 diagnoses) 
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 This information was elaborated by the Reform Commission of the Chilean MINSAL  
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1.2. Method for cost estimation in the discharges dataset 
The 2001 data of hospital discharges includes imputed expenditures of public and private 
providers in Chile. Every row of the dataset represents a discharge and it includes the 
identification of the Regional Health Service, the hospital code, the patient identifier (with ID− 
only 36%), number of the clinical record, demographic and provisional characteristics (sex, age, 
county of residence and type of insurance), the clinical diagnoses of hospitalisation registered at 
the end of the hospitalisation period in ICD-10 codes, days of hospitalisation, condition of 
discharge (live or dead dummy), clinical service, surgical intervention, etc. 
Unlike the previous chapters, here we use a regression model that requires data at the individual 
level. We use the dataset to compute the cost of each discharge and then aggregate per individual 
to estimate an individual‟s hospital care cost and diagnostic history in 2001. Because the 
discharge costs are not assigned directly by each hospital, we had to compute them ex-post based 
on several periodic FONASA and MINSAL cost studies for public sector hospitals. 
We imputed costs using the FONASA, Bitrán et al., 1996 method, although there are new studies 
and new costs that are being used especially for GES.  Therefore in this study, three 
complementary studies were used to impute costs of discharges for the 2001 dataset: FONASA, 
Bitrán et al., 1996, Reform Commission and MINSAL (2001 and 2003) and Rodríguez et al., 
2003. The following sections describe the methods used to assign costs. 
1.2.1 Method for cost estimations in all diagnoses except GES diagnoses
49
 
In our regression model, we represent all health problems because we want the best cost estimate 
that captures all the hospital morbidity. This means we consider risk adjustment for all health 
services −GES and non-GES− and this requires estimating costs for all health services. 
In Chile, FONASA uses two types of prices to transfer money to Health Services, which in turn 
distributes resources to hospitals: 
                                                          
49
 Ministerio de Salud & FONASA, “Equidad en el Financiamiento del Seguro Público de Salud”, Informe Final, Volume 2 and 
Annex A of Volume 3. Authors: Bitrán R., Muñoz J., Navarrete M., Aguad P., Ubilla G. See Annex for details about this method. 
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One of them is the price of PAD “Pago Asociado a Diagnósticos” (Payments Associated with 
Diagnosis), which are 25 packaged costs (similar to DRGs
50
), differentiated into 3 classifications 
according to hospital complexity.  The other is the price of PPP “Pago Por Prestación” 
(Payments for service or fee-for-service payments), which are values of the task associated with 
health services not grouped into packages of resolution. At the hospital level the task PPP has 
values for the different services. 
Variables including the name of the hospital, clinical service inside the hospital, days of stay, 
type of bed, surgery (when performed) and diagnosis of discharge are used to calculate the costs 
for 2001, according to the PAD-PPP transfer prices.  
The first method has two procedures: 
a) Procedure 1: If the discharge diagnosis was included in 75 PADs (differentiated into three 
types of hospital categories: Type I; Type II; and Type III and IV), then it was assigned that 
value of the PAD. 25% of discharges fell into this category. 
b) Procedure 2: If the discharge diagnosis was not a PAD diagnoses, then the following 
procedure was used for compute cost: 
1. The cost composition of 75 PADs (25 packaged costs times three types of hospitals), was 
broken down into three components:  
- Examinations and procedures; 
- Surgical interventions; and 
- Bed days.  
2. We denoted the percentage of PADs costs corresponding to examinations and procedures 
as the “Expansion Factor of Examinations and Procedures” (EFEP). 
                                                          
50
 Each PAD has associated to a determined set of ICD-9 codes. To translate the codes to ICD-10, we used the crosswalk table of 
the German Institute of Medical Documentation and Information (DIMDI Germany at http://www.dimdi.de). 
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3. Then each discharge was matched to the most similar PAD using as criteria the most 
similar diagnosis of the PAD package, according to the medical criteria in FONASA, 
Bitrán et al., 1996. Then, we used the EFEP of the selected PAD to calculate the 
discharge cost following formula (11).  
4. The cost of the surgical intervention component was determined according to the surgical 
components of the task PADs or PPPs. We matched the discharge to the most similar 
surgical intervention or to several types of surgeries to obtain a representative cost. 
5. The bed day cost was based on the clinical service and severity level of each discharge, 
which was obtained from the task PADs and PPPs and from the FONASA 2002 costs 
study. 
6. Correction factors for teaching providers and distant areas were applied (these are fixed 
by law). 
7. Finally, we computed the total discharge cost based on the following formula: 
     SCEFEPBDCNBDTDC  1  (11) 
costSurgery :
procedures and nsexaminatio ofFactor Expansion :
severity and service clinicalby cost day  Bed:
days bed ofNumber :
cost discharge Total:
:
SC
EFEP
BDC
NBD
TDC
where
 
1.2.2 Method for cost estimation for GES diagnoses
51
 
This method incorporates the cost calculations of the health problems considered in the GES 
Plan. Rodriguez et al., 2003, separate the MINSAL‟s GES calculations (MINSAL, 2002) to 
identify the different levels of care: ambulatory and hospital. They calculate a daily value for 
                                                          
51
 Rodríguez et al., 2003, Comisión de Reforma 2001, Comisión de Reforma –MINSAL 2003. 
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every GES diagnosis, only for the hospital level. It is necessary to note that the GES costs were 
based on the FONASA-PADs when possible, but they also incorporate ambulatory primary and 
secondary care that the PADs do not address. 
The decision on the cost range used to obtain a value for GES Package‟s health provisions and 
packages used various criteria based on the public sector‟s current operational costs, such as 
human resources, equipment maintenance and infrastructure (MINSAL, 2002). All of these 
services are represented in FONASA‟s classification for both GES modalities, that is, the 
Institutional Health Care Modality (MAI) and the Free Choice Health Care Modality (MLE), 
both governed under the following rules: 
1. When estimates for demand coverage52 expansions are below 20% of the present 
coverage, the MAI tariff was used. We assume that an increase public demand does not 
require and increase in the installed capacity and that these prices reflect the public 
sector‟s production structure and capacity. 25% of the hospital plan expenditure is based 
on this criterion. 
2. When estimated coverage expansions are over 20% of present coverage, or present supply 
restrictions come into consideration, a 30% increased MAI was used. About 49% of 
GES‟s hospital expenditure is based on this criterion. 
3. For new programs, without packages currently in use, the FONASA free choice (MLE) 
tariff was utilized for each individual provision. About 25% of the Plan‟s overall cost is 
based on this criterion. 
4. Complementing the preceding criteria, we considered two special cases for estimated 
coverage expansions: when it represented of 20% of demand and when there were supply 
restrictions. In the first case, we used a weighted average of MAI and MLE to calculate 
                                                          
52
 The GES‟s total cost was computed as the sum of total health care services provided (used as a proxy for demand) multiplied 
by their respective average cost. GES‟s total cost was estimated at approximately $550 billion pesos. When comparing estimated 
demand with actual demand coverage for GES‟s 56 problems, some gaps called “coverage expansions” are observed. 
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the price, while in the second case we used market prices. These two cases only represent 
1% of GES‟s hospital care costs. 
5. Basic coverage was estimated based on the public sector‟s per capita expenditure (this 
method is not relevant to this study). 
We impute these costs to the 2001 discharges dataset using the following procedure. MINSAL 
produced a list of ICD-10 codes associated with GES, including around 6200 four-digit codes. 
Subsequently, it produced a second version of the ICD-10 codes associated to the guaranteed 
GES at a hospital level using the hospital discharge database corresponding to the year 2001, 
which includes more than 400 ICD-10 three-digit codes. 
Then, the Reform Commission estimated unit costs of GES diseases by disaggregating services 
by service level: inpatient, outpatient and primary health provisions. These estimates were 
derived as a first attempt to estimate the total cost of the GES‟s 56 diseases and conditions using 
a „normative‟ methodology. In this methodology, average protocols for a disease are identified 
and then multiplied by the unit costs, and the total annual cost per patient was computed.  This 
allows us to identify the hospital bed day cost for 41 GES‟s diseases. 
We take these bed day prices and multiply them by the number of days of stay in a hospital.  An 
amount for surgery expenditure was added per episode whenever appropriate. The formula we 
used is as follows: 
   diagdiage SCBDCNBDTDC   (12) 
0  toequal isit  otherwise surgery, is  
e when therdiagnosis  with theaccordancein  episodeper   valuesum-Lump:
days bed ofNumber :
level hospital at the problemshealth  AUGE 41  theof  
one  toassociated diagnosis discharge  with theaccordancein cost day  Bed:
cost diagnostic Total:
:
diag
diag
e
diag
SC
NBD
BDC
TDC
where
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We use both Bitrán and FONASA 1996 and MINSAL-GES‟s costs in this study. So, we use the 
methodology GES 2002 and 2003 when costing is related to GES‟s expenditure, and the Bitrán-
and FONASA 1996 methodology otherwise. 
Both methodologies are considered similar; while the GES methodology is more sophisticated, 
there are no other cost studies as comprehensive as the one for GES. 
1.3. Beneficiary populations 
These simulations use the 2001 beneficiary population. The beneficiary population in 2001 of 
each insurer is identified, broken down into sex and age groups, and organized in two large 
blocks: FONASA population and ISAPRE population (Table 42).  Over 10 million people are 
beneficiaries of the public sector and less than three million are beneficiaries of the private 
system. Beneficiaries from the Armed Forces and individuals without insurance have been 
excluded from this calculation. The number of men in ISAPREs is slightly higher than women, 
whilst women are more numerous than men in FONASA. There are more people over 65 years of 
age registered in FONASA than in ISAPREs. Finally, it is important to note the high coverage of 
ISAPREs during the more economically active years of the population −between 30 to 45 years 
of age (Table 15)− when they have higher expected income. These patterns have a direct effect 
on the differentiated risk factor between FONASA and ISAPREs. 
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Table 42: ISAPRE and FONASA beneficiary population, 2001 
 FONASA ISAPREs 
Age Groups Females Males Total Females Males Total 
00-4 451,459 465,191 916,650 126,862 135,343 262,205 
05-09 453,979 476,978 930,957 142,644 150,277 292,921 
10-14 446,943 468,918 915,861 139,123 144,884 284,007 
15-19 414,186 421,985 836,171 110,949 115,841 226,790 
20-24 388,936 385,481 774,417 102,913 121,726 224,639 
25-29 383,536 386,239 769,775 130,336 144,827 275,163 
30-34 387,399 389,328 776,726 137,583 145,284 282,867 
35-39 390,634 382,480 773,114 135,992 139,814 275,806 
40-44 346,867 343,999 690,865 118,821 114,629 233,450 
45-49 285,273 287,463 572,735 96,954 89,028 185,982 
50-54 239,617 232,332 471,949 74,379 70,649 145,028 
55-59 208,693 184,670 393,363 54,801 52,927 107,728 
60-64 167,133 140,886 308,019 31,882 31,838 63,720 
65-69 195,125 159,135 354,260 18,278 17,631 35,909 
70-74 163,259 121,994 285,253 12,181 10,899 23,080 
75-79 121,216 74,299 195,515 6,466 5,196 11,662 
80 + 128,050 64,005 192,055 6,358 3,480 9,838 
Total 5,172,304 4,985,383 10,157,686 1,446,522 1,494,273 2,940,795 
Source: FONASA and Superintendence of Health 
1.4. Getting data for diagnoses-based risk adjustment 
From the total discharges dataset in Chile for 2001 we developed a sub-sample dataset with 
541,969 specific individuals (with IDs)–discharges with age, gender, diagnoses, valid ID, 
hospital, clinical number, county of residence, etc. Information at the individual level is necessary 
for diagnoses-based risk adjustment.  
1.4.1 The Valid ID Data Subset  
The dataset with individual valid IDs has 567,320 discharges. It includes the following 
information: 
 Health Service: There are 28 Geographical Health Services in the Chilean Public 
Sector, each with a group of hospitals. 
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 Hospital: There are approximately 300 public hospitals and the 100 are private, Army, 
and other types of hospitals. 
 Hospital level: In Chile the hospitals are classified into four complexity levels. 
 Number of discharges: Discharge correlative numbers by hospital. 
 Number of Clinical Record by patient: by hospital. 
 ID, Sex and Age 
 Patient‟s insurance affiliation: FONASA, ISAPRE, Armed Forces, without insurance 
(i.e., none), other 
 FONASA classification of the patient income group: A (without or lowest income); B; 
C or D (highest income) 
 Patient‟s county of residence 
 Date in 
 Date out 
 Days of stays 
 Diagnoses (ICD-10): 4 and 3 digit codes 
 Hospital‟s clinical service (specialized services, for example, neonatology, 
gynaecology) 
 Condition of discharge: dead or alive 
 Surgery: yes or no 
The following variables were calculated: 
 Cost of bed per day 
 Cost of PAD 
 Cost of surgery 
 Total cost 
 GES: yes or no 
We enter this dataset into the DxCG Software. Table 43 shows some statistics that compare the 
complete discharges dataset with the Valid ID dataset. 
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Table 43: Comparison of complete dataset and valid ID dataset (Chilean discharges 
2001) 
  Total Dataset Valid ID Dataset  
Total Discharges 1,566,187 567,320 
(% of national discharges) (100.00%) (36.20%) 
Total Hospitals 394 291 
(% of the Chilean Hospitals) 99.50% 73.50% 
Discharges in Public Hospitals 1,156,777 397,404 
(% of total discharges) (73.90%) (70.10%) 
Discharges by Insurance System     
FONASA Discharges  1,114,300 381,762 
(% of total discharges) (71.10%) (67.30%) 
ISAPRE Discharges  245,553 91,384 
(% of total discharges) (15.70%) (16.10%) 
Discharges by Gender     
Male Discharges 603,492 211,965 
(% of total discharges) (38.50%) (37.40%) 
Female Discharges 962,695 355,355 
(% of total discharges) (61.50%) (62.60%) 
Male into FONASA discharges 412,268 137,653 
(% of FONASA discharges) (37.00%) (36.10%) 
Female into FONASA discharges 702,032 244,109 
(% of FONASA discharges) (63.00%) (63.90%) 
Male into ISAPRE discharges 92,009 30,304 
(% of ISAPRE discharges) (37.50%) (33.20%) 
Female into ISAPRE discharges 153,544 61,080 
(% of ISAPRE discharges) (62.50%) (66.80%) 
Discharges and Age   
Mean age 35.8 37.0 
(Stand. Dev.)  (24.40) (23.90) 
Mean age FONASA discharges 35.4 35.2 
(Stand. Dev.) (25.20) (24.70) 
Mean age ISAPRE discharges 32.8 35.9 
(Stand. Dev.) (20.30) (18.60) 
Discharges in age group 0 – 1 year 140,133 41,065 
(% of all discharges) (8.90%) (7.20%) 
Discharges in age group 25 – 34 years 
(% of all discharges) 
268,674 99,735 
(17.10%) (17.60%) 
Discharges in 65 and more years 258,204 97,429 
(% of all discharges) (16.50%) (17.20%) 
Days of stay     
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Table 43: Comparison of complete dataset and valid ID dataset (Chilean discharges 
2001) 
  Total Dataset Valid ID Dataset  
Mean days of stay 5.5 5.5 
(Stand. Dev.) (10.60) (10.20) 
FONASA Discharges 6.0 5.8 
(Stand. Dev.) (11.30) (10.70) 
ISAPRE Discharges 3.3 3.4 
(Stand. Dev.) (5.70) (6.20) 
Source: Author’s calculations using hospitalisation data set 
 
1.4.2 Cost comparison 
After gathering the data with valid IDs, we compare its costs with those for the complete dataset. 
We use t tests to determine if average costs and costs variances were equivalent between the two 
groups, that is, of overall expenditures of both FONASA and ISAPREs beneficiaries.  
Table 44: General comparison of mean costs (US dollars 2002) 
Group Case origin N Mean costs Standard deviation 
Total cost Males+ 
Total data set 461,712 468 831 
Valid ID Sample 149,811 484 819 
Total cost Females* 
Total data set 794,327 344 598 
Valid ID Sample 278,920 343 586 
Total cost*** 
Total data set 1,256,039 389 695 
Valid ID Sample 428,731 393 680 
*Non significant difference of means to 10%,  
** Non significant difference of means to 5%;  
*** Non significant difference of means to 1%;  
+ Significant difference of means 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Total mean costs are not different at a 1% level of significance, nor are costs for women different 
at a 10% level of significance. However, total average costs for men are significantly different. 
Table 45 shows the average costs by age group. Here we can see that there are significant 
differences in the averages in the 0-4, 5-9 and 10-14 age groups. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that 
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average costs for all other age groups are the same cannot be rejected at statistically significant 
levels. 
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Table 45: Comparison of mean costs by age groups 
Age group Dataset N Average costs Standard deviation 
00-04 + Complete data set 171,989 399.36 877.83 
 Valid ID sample 52,195 425.23 849.56 
05-09 + Complete data set 59,468 368.50 564.28 
 Valid ID sample 19,415 388.14 600.49 
10-14 + Complete data set 50,464 407.05 602.55 
 Valid ID sample 16,516 432.14 681.61 
15-19 * Complete data set 87,691 279.69 536.00 
 Valid ID sample 29,598 281.24 559.33 
20-24 *** Complete data set 104,683 259.61 505.56 
 Valid ID sample 37,164 250.68 430.07 
25-29 *** Complete data set 112,680 270.94 478.76 
 Valid ID sample 41,284 264.12 430.68 
30-34 * Complete data set 106,813 297.62 514.70 
 Valid ID sample 39,372 295.23 548.56 
35-39 ** Complete data set 91,886 336.80 546.71 
 Valid ID sample 32,965 330.51 527.20 
40-44 *** Complete data set 67,172 406.96 729.85 
 Valid ID sample 23,449 395.52 561.81 
45-49 * Complete data set 54,490 450.15 733.95 
 Valid ID sample 18,506 451.13 735.51 
50-54 * Complete data set 51,739 483.13 804.05 
 Valid ID sample 17,777 480.37 739.39 
55-59 ** Complete data set 48,838 509.74 805.97 
 Valid ID sample 17,058 523.25 835.84 
60-64 * Complete data set 49,067 522.76 867.91 
 Valid ID sample 17,106 528.20 819.86 
65-69 * Complete data set 49,589 540.75 858.71 
 Valid ID sample 17,565 549.25 884.39 
70-74 * Complete data set 53,002 537.57 767.61 
 Valid ID sample 18,745 546.99 770.13 
75-79 *** Complete data set 41,054 530.44 775.06 
 Valid ID sample 14,277 556.76 847.49 
80 + *** Complete data set 55,414 513.79 767.23 
 Valid ID sample 15,739 538.29 818.34 
*Non significant difference of means to 10%,  
** Non significant difference of means to 5%;  
*** Non significant difference of means to 1%;  
+ Significant difference of means 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 46 shows results for men by age group. The null hypothesis that the mean costs are the 
same across datasets cannot be rejected. This gives support to the premise that average costs are 
the same (except in the age group 0-4 years), although at different levels of statistical 
significance. Many of these tests comprising 10 groups reject the hypothesis of equal averages at 
10%; two reject at 5%; and four at 1% significance. 
 121 
Table 46: Comparison of mean costs by age group − Males 
Age group Dataset N Average costs Standard deviation 
00-04 + Complete data set 98,637 395.32 872.24 
 Valid ID sample 30,595 420.80 847.75 
05-09 *** Complete data set 35,259 365.40 553.90 
 Valid ID sample 11,694 377.97 568.91 
10-14 ** Complete data set 28,265 417.26 607.97 
 Valid ID sample 9,296 432.59 687.33 
15-19 *** Complete data set 19,098 434.48 829.75 
 Valid ID sample 5,923 464.06 930.62 
20-24 ** Complete data set 17,491 454.02 944.09 
 Valid ID sample 5,666 462.09 776.91 
25-29 * Complete data set 18,410 458.19 938.75 
 Valid ID sample 5,837 479.54 833.44 
30-34 *** Complete data set 20,314 459.21 842.47 
 Valid ID sample 6,744 497.47 1,021.84 
35-39 * Complete data set 21,798 465.24 825.17 
 Valid ID sample 6,986 475.27 782.53 
40-44 * Complete data set 21,544 491.47 919.22 
 Valid ID sample 7,012 484.14 700.85 
45-49 * Complete data set 20,035 505.64 881.89 
 Valid ID sample 6,586 509.22 870.65 
50-54 * Complete data set 21,409 535.51 882.71 
 Valid ID sample 7,374 531.84 761.87 
55-59 * Complete data set 22,643 554.97 858.23 
 Valid ID sample 7,878 567.74 873.14 
60-64 * Complete data set 23,612 557.81 956.24 
 Valid ID sample 8,233 559.65 882.77 
65-69 * Complete data set 24,911 567.91 876.55 
 Valid ID sample 8,747 575.43 894.91 
70-74 * Complete data set 26,253 553.33 772.82 
 Valid ID sample 9,098 561.68 787.23 
75-79 * Complete data set 19,376 536.24 782.01 
 Valid ID sample 6,559 554.94 862.42 
80 + *** Complete data set 22,657 488.52 704.64 
 Valid ID sample 5,583 514.41 761.95 
* No significant difference of means to 10%,  
** No significant difference of means to 5%;  
*** No significant difference of means to 1%;  
+ Significant difference of means 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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In most age groups for women we cannot reject the null hypothesis that their mean costs are 
equal at a significant statistical level. In fact, we cannot reject the null at a 10% level for seven of 
them, at the 5% level for three and three at 1%. However, there are four groups, whose average 
costs are not the same, including the three groups between 0 and 14 years of age and the 20 and 
24 years of age group. Table 44 shows that total cost for men was significantly different, but not 
for women. 
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Table 47: Comparison of mean costs by age group – Females 
Age group Dataset N Average costs Standard deviation 
00-04 + Complete data set 73,352 404.78 885.28 
 Valid ID sample 21,600 431.50 852.10 
05-09 + Complete data set 24,209 373.03 579.04 
 Valid ID sample 7,721 403.54 645.11 
10-14 + Complete data set 22,199 394.06 595.34 
 Valid ID sample 7,220 431.57 674.22 
15-19 * Complete data set 68,593 236.59 408.74 
 Valid ID sample 23,675 235.50 405.01 
20-24 + Complete data set 87,192 220.61 344.93 
 Valid ID sample 31,498 212.65 316.52 
25-29 *** Complete data set 94,270 234.37 306.10 
 Valid ID sample 35,447 228.64 304.57 
30-34 *** Complete data set 86,499 259.67 391.00 
 Valid ID sample 32,628 253.43 370.31 
35-39 ** Complete data set 70,088 296.86 416.36 
 Valid ID sample 25,979 291.59 425.30 
40-44 ** Complete data set 45,628 367.06 616.67 
 Valid ID sample 16,437 357.71 485.77 
45-49 * Complete data set 34,455 417.88 629.97 
 Valid ID sample 11,920 419.03 646.69 
50-54 * Complete data set 30,330 446.15 741.33 
 Valid ID sample 10,403 443.89 720.84 
55-59 * Complete data set 26,195 470.65 755.74 
 Valid ID sample 9,180 485.06 800.53 
60-64 * Complete data set 25,455 490.25 775.65 
 Valid ID sample 8,873 499.01 755.70 
65-69 * Complete data set 24,678 513.33 839.44 
 Valid ID sample 8,818 523.28 873.11 
70-74 * Complete data set 26,749 522.11 762.16 
 Valid ID sample 9,647 533.13 79.63 
75-79 *** Complete data set 21,678 525.26 768.78 
 Valid ID sample 7,718 558.30 834.65 
80 + ** Complete data set 32,757 531.27 807.24 
 Valid ID sample 10,156 551.42 847.50 
*No significant difference of means to 10%,  
** No significant difference of means to 5%;  
*** No significant difference of means to 1%;  
+ Significant difference of means 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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In sum, what these tests indicate is that we have a reasonably representative dataset of the total 
universe, with overall average costs which are significantly similar. We use the Valid ID dataset 
to apply diagnosis risk adjustment, but we remain aware that there are some problems regarding 
the representativeness in the three age groups from 0 to 14 years of age, particularly for women, 
although women‟s overall mean is more reliable. Also, tests for men‟s age groups are better but 
not strong enough to show that men‟s overall mean costs are the same across datasets. 
1.4.2.1 Some data examination 
We present some descriptive statistics of the valid ID dataset. The following figures provide a 
general overview of the results using the methodologies presented above. 
Figure 16 show discharges by age and sex groups. It shows that there is a high use among 
newborns, in particular, men, and high use among women of fertile age. Men over 45 years of 
age show higher usage than women in this age range. 
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We can make the same observations if we consider total costs (Figure 17) instead of utilization. 
The only exception is that although women over 45 use less hospital care than men, their total 
costs are either similar or higher than those for men. 
Figure 16: Hospital discharges by age and gender (%) 
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Figure 18 refers to the average cost of hospital discharges by age and gender. Because women 
represent more cases, when we divide by the number of cases, the relation is inverted slightly for 
women of fertile age, relative to the previous figure. 
Figure 17: Total costs by age and gender 
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2. Risk adjustment methods and morbidity  
There are different models that use health status in risk adjustment. The most widely known 
classification systems are the Ambulatory Care Group (ACG) developed at Johns Hopkins 
University by Wiener and others (Weiner et al., 1991; Weiner et al., 2000) and the Diagnostic 
Cost Group (DCG) family of models developed at Boston University and Health Economics 
Research by Ash, Ellis and Pope (Ellis et al., 1996; Pope et al., 1998). 
Table 48 shows that there are different risk adjustment models, which may differ due to: 
Figure 18: Mean costs by age and gender 
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Source: Author’s analysis. 
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 original goal, i.e., models that are meant to answer a specific question; 
 adjustment variables, which may not be costs, i.e., hospitalisation stay or mortality, 
etc. 
 type of patients and their morbidity 
Table 48: Selected risk adjustment models 
Acronym Name and Source of 
Risk Adjuster 
Risk of What? Pertinent Populations Role of Diagnosis 
ACGs Ambulatory Care 
Groups; The Johns 
Hopkins University 
Resources consumption over the 
course of time based morbidity profile; 
risk of high cost; disease makers 
All persons within a 
general population 
Diagnoses from all 
patient encounters 
(inpatient and 
outpatient) used to 
assign persons to 1 of 
32 ADGs 
APACHE Acute Physiology and 
Chronic Health. Cerner 
Corp., Kansas City. 
There are several risks, for example: 
In-hospital mortality or In-hospital 
mortality and Multiple risk equations 
(hospital and ICU mortality and LOS, 
risk of active treatment, days on 
mechanical ventilation). 
Adult in ICUs Calculates APACHE 
score independent of 
diagnosis, using several 
categories 
APR-DRGs All Patient Refined 
Diagnosis Related 
Groups. 3M Health 
Information Systems. 
There are 2 versions: resources use 
and in-hospital mortality 
All hospitalised patients Subclasses within 
DRGs based largely on 
secondary diagnoses 
CDPS 
    
 
 
    
   MedicaidRx 
Chronic Illness and 
Disability Payment 
System. University of 
California San Diego. 
 
Prescription drug-based 
model 
Total expenditures over the next year 
(prospective model) or present year 
(concurrent model) 
 
 
Total expenditures over the next year 
for typical benefit package of an acute 
care HMO 
Medicaid recipients; 
another version for 
Medicare beneficiaries 
 
 
Medicaid recipients 
Assignments based on 
patterns of outpatient 
and inpatient diagnoses 
 
 
Diagnoses are proxied 
by prescription drugs 
CSI Comprehensive 
Severity Index. 
International Severity 
Information Systems, 
Salt Lake City. 
Physiologic complexity comprising the 
extent and interactions of patients´ 
diseases presented to medical 
personnel 
Separate components for: 
adult inpatients; pediatric 
inpatients; adult 
outpatients; pediatric 
outpatients, long-term 
care; hospice care and 
rehabilitation care 
Each diagnosis 
generates specific 
criteria used to calculate 
diagnosis-specific 
severity for each 
disease present; overall 
scores consider severity 
of all diagnoses 
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Table 48: Selected risk adjustment models 
Acronym Name and Source of 
Risk Adjuster 
Risk of What? Pertinent Populations Role of Diagnosis 
DCG/HCC 
   
 
 
 
 
RxGroups 
   
 
 
 
PIP-DCGs 
Diagnostic Cost 
Groups/Hierarchical 
Condition Category; 
DxCG, Inc., Boston 
 
 
Prescription drug-based 
model 
 
 
 
Principal Inpatient 
Diagnostic Cost 
Groups; DxCG and 
CMS 
Total expenditures over the next year 
(prospective model) or present year 
(concurrent model); several options, 
including truncation costs and 
excluding pharmacy costs. 
Total expenditures (medical and 
pharmacy) over the next year 
(prospective model) or nonpharamacy 
expenditures this year (concurrent 
model) 
Total Medicare expenditures over the 
next year 
All persons within a 
general population 
(including versions for 
Medicare, Medicaid and 
commercially insured) 
 
All persons in a general 
commercial (privately 
insured age < 65) 
population 
 
Medicare managed care 
enrolees 
Assignment based on 
patterns of outpatient 
and inpatient diagnoses 
 
 
 
Inpatient diagnoses 
using DCG/HCC 
classification in one 
version 
 
 
For most persons, uses 
principal diagnosis only 
from acute care 
hospitalisations 
DRGs Diagnosis Related 
Groups; CMS and 3M 
Health Information 
Systems, Willingford, 
CT 
Total charges or LOS All hospitalised patients Groups medical cases 
by diagnosis 
DS 
  Clinical 
  Coded 
Staging 
   
 
Scale 
Disease Staging; The 
MEDSTAT Group, Ann 
Arbor, MI; part of 
Thomson Corp. 
 
Clinical version and Coded  
 
 
Staging version: complexity, etiology, 
and extent of organ system 
involvement 
Scale version: definition depends on 
individual scale: total charges/costs, 
LOS, and in-hospital mortality 
All patients with one or 
more of 600+diseases 
covering all clinical 
conditions (Clinical) 
All patients (Coded 
Staging) 
 
All hospitalised patients 
(Scale) 
Clinical criteria within 
diagnosis categories 
 
 
Diagnosis specific 
MedisGroups Atlas 3.7; Cardinal 
Health-Clinical 
Information 
Management; 
Marlborough, MA 
Admission-based mortality risk, midstay 
mortality risk, admission-based LOS, 
LOS outlier status, others 
All hospitalised patients Diagnosis specific 
NSQIP National Surgical 
Quality Improvement 
Program; Department of 
Veterans Affairs, 
Washington, DC 
Death within 30 days of major surgery; 
postoperative complications within 30 
days of major surgery 
Veterans undergoing 
major surgery in eight 
surgical specialities 
Diagnoses important as 
comorbid conditions 
PRISM Pediatric Risk of 
Mortality Score 
PICU mortality Patients in PICUs Includes diagnosis in 
calculating mortality risk 
Source: Iezzoni, 2003. Chapter 2: Getting Started and Defining Terms in “Risk Adjustment for Measuring Health Care Outcomes” 
The starting point of a diagnoses-based risk adjustment model is the idea that certain diagnoses 
are good predictors of health expenditure. The general recommendation is to adapt and try 
 130 
different models that have already been used elsewhere, especially the ones that incorporate 
multi-morbidity as predictors. For us, the Diagnostic Cost Groups (DxCG) family of models are 
the more interesting models, because they were applied before and they use inpatient data 
(Medicare-USA, Germany). Furthermore, these models have been previously applied in contexts 
similar to the one in Chile. These DxCG models have been further developed in Europe (van 
Vliet and van de Ven, 1993; Lamers and van Vliet, 1996; IGES, Lauterbach, Wasem et al., 2004; 
and Behrend et al., 2004, for Germany). 
We believe that it is clear that the best approaches, and generally the more applicable ones, are 
those that use morbidity to predict expected costs. 
There are three key assessments with these type of models: the first in 2002, sponsored by the US 
Society of Actuaries (Cumming and Cameron, 2002), the second in a 2004 study by 
IGES/Lauterbach/Wasem to assess 6 models with a representative dataset of 2 million insured in 
all sickness funds in Germany, and the third for the Netherlands by Rotterdam University 
(Lammers et al., 2003). These studies used models based on morbidity from the DxCG family. 
We chose the model for our research based on those studies, and used the simplest one to apply 
to the Chilean case. In sum, we selected a concurrent demographic model incorporating a simple 
binary indicator for hospitalisation and a concurrent DxCG/HCC model. 
2.1. Advantages and disadvantages of inpatient information 
For the Chilean health care system, we only have inpatient information at the individual level. 
Paying adjusted per capita premiums based only on 1.6 million hospitalisations are representative 
of the 1 million individuals involved in these hospitalisations with diagnoses, but not of the 
remaining 12 million beneficiaries that do not have diagnoses (Wasem, 2001). Besides it is 
necessary to work on a representative subset of this dataset provided that only 36% of it contains 
valid ID of individuals. Other possible problems with the dataset are: limited information 
extension; costs have been imputed using external methods based on normative studies; and 
possible codification mistakes due to lack of knowledge and preparation of the responsible staff 
in Chile. 
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Inpatient admission for a short stay can represent significant expenditures for a health plan, 
particularly for a patient who may not really need this type of care. For example, the patient could 
have easily been scheduled for ambulatory level care (Pope et al., 2000). On the other hand, 
insurance companies may have an incentive to under-provide medical care, especially expensive 
services such as hospitalisation.  
The advantages of inpatient-based risk adjustment are: inpatient diagnoses are obtained more 
easily and inexpensively; inpatient diagnoses are likely to be more accurate and are easier to audit 
and to verify by the sponsor; and there is also a proxy for severity of illness. It seems reasonable 
to begin the transition to risk adjustment payments by focusing on the most severely ill and 
expensive enrolees, who are most likely to be hospitalised (Pope et al., 2000). 
2.2. The PIPDCG model for Medicare and DxCG/HCC Models 
The Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group for Medicare risk adjustment (PIPDCG model) 
was developed by Ash et al., 1989; Ellis and Ash, 1995; Ellis et al., 1996; Pope, 1999; and after 
by Pope et al., 2000. It is a very interesting model for our purposes because the data set used for 
the model is similar to the Chilean data set and showed that diagnoses-based risk adjustment with 
inpatient data was possible. 
The PIPDCG model was developed with data of Medicare inpatient services to fairly compensate 
health plans for the expected costs associated with the disease burden of their enrolees, using a 
5% sample from the years 1995 and 1996. This was a prospective model in that diagnoses from 
hospitalisations in the base year (1995) were used to predict 1996 Medicare expenditures.  
First, the PIPDCG model classifies ICD, 9
th
 revision (ICD-9) codes to 172 PIPDCG groups. 
Seventy-five groups were excluded because they had minor diagnoses (transitory, non-specific). 
Deductibles and co-payments were excluded. Diagnoses for short hospital stays (less than 2 days 
in this case the elderly) were also excluded. 
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All the diagnoses included create incentives for relatively healthy people that are admitted for 
minor diagnoses to obtain higher payment, but the model captures these costs in other factors 
such as sex and gender. 
Using 24 age/sex cells, Medicare status interacted with sex and age cells (for socio-economic 
level), working-age (not included in the regression) status and 16 PIPDCG diagnostic categories 
assigned from prior-year principal hospital diagnosis, they estimated the incremental effects of 
these variables in Medicare expenditure in a linear multiple regression model.  
Risk factors were obtained dividing the regression coefficients by mean expenditures. These 
factors were added to the beneficiary demographic risk factor to determine the total relative risk 
factor. Finally, the capitated payment is the product of a county rate, determined by the 
beneficiary‟s residence, and the risk factor obtained. 
They review the predictability and assess the prediction power and the stability of the risk 
adjustment model.  The authors concluded that PIPDCG model is far more powerful than the 
demographic factors model used previously. It is more equitable and generates more accurate 
capitated payments. 
Whereas early versions of the PIPDCG model and the other DCG models only used a single 
condition that predicted the highest subsequent costs, recently revised DCG models seek to 
capture the cumulative cost effect of multiple conditions. Multiple condition DCG models use the 
DCG/HCC classification system that identifies and describes the important subset of costly 
patients with complex problems. 
This model uses the full range of diagnoses and the multiple-condition generated during all “face 
to face encounters with clinicians” (Ash et al., 2000) and compares the ability of DCG/HCC 
models to predict resources in three different samples: privately insured, Medicaid and Medicare. 
This classification system groups diagnoses into clinically homogeneous groups and it can 
identify groups of patients with higher and lower expected resource use.  It uses the ICD-9 
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) or ICD-10 diagnosis codes from hospital claims. 
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This classification system was designed to be used at both the group and individual levels. It can 
identify the clinical conditions that drive observed relative risk scores. DCG models form groups 
of persons based on diagnoses present in a given year that are similar to expected annual costs. 
Comorbidity diagnoses form the basis of severity differentiation within the models. 
Inpatient DCG models predict the costs using only ICD codes from inpatient admissions. Every 
valid ICD diagnosis is used to classify individuals and depending on the specific model being 
used, not all conditions are used to predict resource use.  
Generally, each ICD code maps to one, and only one, DxGroup. For a few diagnoses, when 
treatment costs for pediatric and adult manifestations are substantially different, there are separate 
DxGroups for pediatric and adult members. Individuals with several diagnostic codes will 
generally map to several DxGroups. 
The classification and demographic information is used to predict expenditures at the individual 
level using linear, additive formulas obtained from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to 
combine the expenses associated with diagnostic groupings (HCCs), age/sex cohorts and other 
demographic factors like type of insurance and other variables. Each diagnostic category, age/sex 
cohort and demographic category contributes to the cost weight in the final prediction. 
This model has been studied and/or used for Medicare payments to HMOs, Medicaid payments 
and to predict total covered charges in commercial populations
53
 in the USA, the Netherlands, 
Germany, England and Spain. 
We use the DCG software to run a concurrent model with this study‟s sample. We describe the 
procedures in the next section. 
 
                                                          
53
 Commercial population refers to any beneficiary that is not in a social health program (for example, Medicare or Medicaid). 
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3. Diagnostic groups in DxCG/HCC models for Chile 
The Diagnostic Cost Group Hierarchical Condition Category payment models (DxCG/HCC) 
summarize the health care problems and predict the health care costs of populations. These 
models use diagnoses generated by patients‟ encounters with medical care (in our case, inpatients 
encounters), using the patients‟ demographic and diagnostic profiles to predict costs. Here we 
describe the logical structure of these models. 
The original DCG models are prospective, that is, they use baseline information, or year 1, to 
infer the level of need for health care in year 2. Medical conditions detected in year 1 are used to 
organize people into groups with similar levels of future health care need. 
There are later DCG models that were developed to estimate expected concurrent expenses, that 
is, expenses that occur in the same year as the diagnoses used to characterize the population. Both 
models can be used to determine a health-based payment, but concurrent models may be 
particularly useful for provider profiling and monitoring, because knowing all the medical 
problems being treated during a period of time is particularly relevant to estimate the level of 
resources used to treat them. However, prospective models that predict future costs are more 
appropriate to estimate payments to managed care organizations that assume financial risks. 
However, due to the data problems in Chile, we use retrospective or concurrent models only 
applied to the relevant population in Chile to explain and compare with a demographic model. 
These models reflect a concern that payments should have appropriate incentives for health care 
plans, insurers and health care providers. 
The DCG model was designed to use the more than 15,000 diagnostic codes from the ICD-9-CM. 
Currently the DCG model uses the new ICD-10. The Chilean data is in ICD-10 so we were able 
to use last version of the software (DxCG 6.1). 
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Figure 19: Example of DCG/HCC Classification 
IC D-9-C M
250.7 T ype II D iabetes , Not S tated As  C ontrolled with 
P eripheral C irculatory Disorder
DxG roup
16.03 T ype II diabetes  with peripheral circulatory 
disorders
C ondition C ategory
16 Diabetes  with Neurologic or P eripheral 
C irculatory Manifestation
Aggregated C ondition 
C ategory
04 Diabetes
 
Source: DxCG Inc. 
Each DCG/HCC model uses the same HCCs for prediction, all of which are based on diagnostic 
codes, rather than procedures. DCG summarizes a person‟s health from his or her HCCs and 
estimates expected costs based in these profiles. But not all HCCs are, or should be, used to 
compute payments, because there could be variations in coding practices like international coding 
proliferation, inconsistent coding of less serious or vague conditions, and other reasons including 
a policy decision. 
The model groups ICD codes into 781 categories called “DxGroups” which are the building 
blocks of DCG/HCC models. Hence, each ICD code maps to a unique DxGroup, and each 
DxGroup encompasses diagnostic codes that describe very similar medical problems.  
 136 
Figure 20: DCG/HCC classification and ICD code 
IC D-10
(n = 10,500)
DxG roup
(n = 781)
P IP -DC G
C linical C lass ification
DC G /HC C
C linical C lass ification
(n = 184 C C s )
PIP: Principal Inpatient-Based on 
inpatient Dx only Single-
condition model
HCC: Hierarchical Condition 
Category based on All-
encounter Dx Multiple-
condition model
AC C s
(n = 30)
 
Source: DxCG Inc. 
The model addresses the problem of multiple diagnoses per beneficiary by introducing a 
hierarchy (184 HCCs) that identifies only the single most predictive diagnosis of higher future 
expenditures and ignores all other diagnoses, using the DCG sorting algorithm. HCCs are groups 
of DxGroups that are clinically related and imply similar resource use.  The DCG algorithm 
represents a person's health status with his or her HCCs, and the econometric model uses these 
HCCs to estimate expected costs. 
The DCG/HCC models incorporate disease hierarchy structures. Disease Hierarchies are made up 
of two or more hierarchical condition categories, or HCCs, the collection of 184 clinical elements 
that make up the granular units used when applying model weights. A Simple Hierarchy is 
straight-line arrangement where each HCC supersedes the HCC below it in the hierarchy; in other 
words, elements of a Simple Hierarchy closer to the top are associated with increasing severity of 
the clinical disease process. Complex Hierarchies are a collection of single HCCs and/or Simple 
Hierarchies that more completely describe a disease or a subunit of a disease. Relations between 
 137 
HCCs in a Complex Hierarchy may be subordinate or peer. Figure 21 presents the heart disorder 
hierarchy as an example of Complex Hierarchies. 
Figure 21: Example: Heart disorder hierarchy 
HCC080
Congestive
Heart Failure
HCC089
Hypertensive
Heart and Renal 
Disease or
Encephalopath
y
HCC090
Hypertensive
Heart Disease
HCC091
Hypertension
HCC081
Acute
Myocardial
Infarction
HCC085
Heart
Infection/Inflam
mation, Except
Rheumatic
HCC082
Unstable
Angina and
Other Acute
Ischemic Heart
Disease
HCC083
Angina 
Pectoris/Old
Myocardial
Infarction
HCC084
Coronary
Atherosclerosis
/Other Chronic
Ischemic Heart
Disease
HCC094
Other and
Unspecified
Heart Disease
HCC086
Valvular and
Rheumatic
Heart Disease
HCC088
Other
Congenital
Heart/Circulator
y Disease
HCC087
Major
Congenital
Cardiac/Circula
tory Defect
HCC092
Specified Heart
Arrhythmias
HCC093
Other Heart
Rhythm and
Conduction
Disorders
HEART
 
Source: Analytic Guide Release 6.1. DxCG Risk Adjustment Software 
In this example a broad range of HCCs in the Heart Disorder hierarchy (numbers 80,81,85,89,92) 
disqualify a person from being classified into less clinically serious and less specific HCCs, such 
as numbers 82-84, 86-88, 90, 91, 93 and 94. 
The model selects diagnoses for inclusion because including all diagnoses in the risk adjustment 
model create incentives for even relatively healthy people to be admitted for minor diagnoses to 
obtain higher payments. The model excludes diagnoses that may be minor, transitory or non 
specific and other events with diagnosis are excluded by the sorting algorithm. Because the 
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model is fully hierarchical and assigns beneficiaries to a single diagnostic category within a given 
hierarchy, readmission for the same lower future cost diagnoses does not affect the model‟s 
resource allocation results. Although incentives for hospitalisation are inherent in any inpatient-
based risk adjustment model, the model does not reward multiple hospitalisations within the same 
hierarchy. 
The central feature of the model is that it computes each beneficiary‟s relative risk factor. A 
beneficiary whose expenditures are predicted to equal national average has a relative risk factor 
of 1.00. Risk factors greater than 1.00 indicate above-average expected costliness, and factors 
below 1.00 indicate lower-than-average expected costs. 
First, the model computes a demographic factor, then it selects the corresponding DCG risk 
factor and finally it sums the demographic and DCG factors to obtain a relative risk score.  
3.1. Method of estimation for DxCG model in Chile 
Table 49 shows the parameters and options selected in the DxCG Inc. software to process the 
data for the regression analysis. 
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Table 49: Software parameters and options used 
DxCG, Inc.  
REPORT PARAMETERS AND USER OPTIONS  
  
SYSTEM PARAMETERS:  
DxCG Release: 6.1.1 
Operating environment: Stand-alone Version, WIN32 
DxCG software serial number: 50204 
Maximum licensed population size:   750,000 
  
INPUT FILES:   
Main DxCG person-level file:     testdata1\dxcgout9.txt 
DxCG summary file:    Not output by Stand-alone version 
Population group:   Commercial 
Model variant: Inpatient, DCG/HCC 
Model purpose: Explanation 
Model outcome: Medical Expenses Excluding Pharmacy Spending 
Level of clinical detail available: ACCs, CCs and DxGroups 
Hierarchies imposed:            No 
Over age 64 included: Yes 
Number of people in main DxCG file: 185,825 
  
OPTIONS:  
Model year: Concurrent 
Year description: Calendar 2001 
Weighting: Weighted by Eligible Months 
Expenditure average for Year 1: 212 
Expenditure average for Year 2: Not used 
Abbreviation of model dimensions: Inpatient/Concurrent/Comm/Expl/MedOnly 
Group variable used:                 Not used by Stand-alone version 
Format used with group variable: Not used by Stand-alone version 
Group variable name: Age, sex, insurer 
Source: DxCG 6.1 software. 
Given the dataset for Chile, we can use a concurrent (or retrospective) model. A concurrent 
application involves using claims data from a period of time, to predict medical claims costs for 
that same period. The risk weight reflects an estimate of the marginal cost for a given medical 
condition relative to the base cost for individuals with no medical conditions.  
To run a concurrent model, we take the following steps: 
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1) Assign the medical condition categories in the valid ID data set (hospital discharges in 2001). 
This is done using the DxCG software which selects HCC/DCG conditions; 
2) Include in the matrix of the output file from the DxCG software the FONASA and ISAPRE 
beneficiaries who were not hospitalised and those hospitalised who did no have valid ID in 
2001; 
3) Run a linear regression to recalibrate risk weights (coefficients with Chilean data); 
a) The data was randomly split into two disjointed datasets of approximately equal size: one 
is the calibration subset and the other the validation subset.  
b) We use the calibration subset to recalibrate risk weights. Then we used the validation 
subset to estimate the measure of predictive accuracy. From one calibration model the 
recalibrated risk weights were obtained and measures of predictive accuracy were derived 
by computing recalibrated risk weights to assign expenditures for each member in the 
validation data set.  
4) Analyse the predictive accuracy of the model by comparing the score of each member or 
member groups to the actual expenditure. 
a) We use the validation subset to compare the predicted expenditures of each member or 
groups of members to the actual expenditures (see Cumming and Cameron, 2004). 
We use OLS regression results
54
 to combine the expenses associated with diagnostic groupings 
(HCCs) by age/ sex cohorts. 
   i
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0  (13) 
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 We use SPSS V.13 and Clementine V.9 software to run the OLS regressions. The program automatically selects which 
dummies to exclude from the analysis. 
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The number of age/gender group entries was recalibrated from DxCG software.  For all three 
models, there were 34 age/gender groupings, 17 for females and 17 for males.  The groupings for 
both sexes are as follows: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-
54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79 and 80 and older. 
 
3.2. Measures of predictive performance 
We measure predictive performance at the individual level using individual adjusted R-squared 
(adjusted-R
2
) and the mean absolute prediction error (MAPE). We assess predictive performance 
at the group level using predictive ratios (PR) of expenditure quintiles. 
Individual adjusted-R
2
 is used to estimate model fit and describes the percentage of the individual 
variance in actual expenditures that is explained by the model. The formula for adjusted-R
2
 is: 
        i ii ii aaaaR
222 ˆ1  (14) 
sample in the people ofnumber   theis  and 1 
esexpenditur actual ofMean :
person for  eexpenditur Predicted:ˆ
 person for  eexpenditur Actual:
:
n,...,ni
a
ia
ia
where
i
i

 
MAPE is defined as the mean of the absolute difference between actual and predicted 
expenditures across all individuals and is calculated as follow: 
 142 
 
n
aa
MAPE i
ii 

ˆ
 (15) 
sample in the people ofnumber   theis  and 1 
model) regression (from person for  eexpenditur Predicted:ˆ
 person for  eexpenditur Actual:
:
n,...,ni
ia
ia
where
i
i

 
Predictive ratio (PR) of expenditure quintile is a group measure and can be calculated as the ratio 
or the aggregated predicted expenditure for a given group of beneficiaries, over the aggregated 
actual expenditure for the same group of people. The formula is: 
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VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF THE DIAGNOSES-
BASED MODEL FOR CHILE 
In this chapter we analyse the regression model described at the end of the previous chapter with 
the data described in chapter IV. We present the results of the concurrent simulation of a risk 
adjustment model. 
 
1. Descriptive statistics 
The population composition was about 50.5% female, with a mean age of 33 years and a standard 
deviation of 21 years.  Approximately 8.5% of those insured were age 65 and older. All of those 
insured had at least 12 months of health insurance coverage (Table 50).
55
 
                                                          
55
 This was assumed because of problems identifying the variables. Each individual remains in the first observed insurance 
scheme he or she appeared in during the year, and in which he/she remained throughout the rest of the year as a beneficiary. 
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Table 50: Demographics and inpatient expenditure  
  Concurrent Application 
N  13,098,480  
Year  2001 
   
% female 50.5% 
Age   
 Mean 33 
 SD 21 
 % age under 20 35.6% 
 % age 20 - 44 38.8% 
 % age 45 - 64 17.2% 
 % age over 64 8.50% 
   
Year Expenditure (US dollars Dec 2002)  
 Mean 8.89  
 Standard deviation 156.51  
 Coefficient of variation  17.61  
   
% with non-zero expenditure 1.42% 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Annual inpatient health care expenditure in this sample is US$ 8.89 per capita and US$ 626.65 
per inpatient, with coefficient of variation roughly 17.6 times larger than the mean. Only 1.42% 
of the population has hospitalisation costs and had valid IDs, from a total hospital expenditure of 
US$ 74.39 million, which represents 35% of the estimated total hospitalisation costs.  
A total of 185,824 patient/diagnosis pairs for 13 million beneficiaries in 2001 were submitted to 
the grouping software, with a unique principal diagnosis code per hospitalised individual. 
The per capita estimated observed costs by sex and age groups for these 185,824 patients are 
shown in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22: Per-capita observed (estimated) expenditure of the sample for DxCG Risk adjustment model 
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Source: Author 
About 16% of the hospitalised beneficiaries are age 65 and older and 23.4% are age 60 and older. 
About 25% of the hospitalised beneficiaries are children and 46% are males (Table 51). 
Table 51: Inpatients: children, males and the elderly, 2001 
Group Number % 
Children (under 15 years of age) 46,836  25.2% 
Males 85,353  45.9% 
Elderly (60 years of age and above) 43,498  23.4% 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
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2. Analysis by diagnosis  
A key output of the DxCG software is the diagnosis categories or groupings for the data 
provided. We analyse these results in this section. 
First we consider the cases dropped. Approximately 810 of every 10,000 cases submitted were 
incompatible with age or gender or were identified as numerically invalid. Another 15,063 or 
8.1% of the hospitalisations were assigned “No HCC,” 397 or 0.2% of the hospitalisations were 
“Not valid” and 14,666 or 7.9% of the hospitalisations were “No Diagnoses”. All beneficiaries 
who were ever hospitalised are assigned to at least one HCC, if they had a valid diagnosis code. 
Hospitalisations are primarily attributable to gastrointestinal conditions (Aggregated Condition 
Category (ACC) 07 with 40,324 patients, 19.4% of total cases), lung conditions (ACC19 with 
28,045 patients, 13.5% of total cases), musculoskeletal and connective tissue (ACC08, 12,172, 
patients, 5.8% of total cases), benign/in situ/uncertain neoplasm (ACC03, 11,653 patients, 5.6% 
of total cases) and heart conditions (ACC16, with 11,113 patients, 5.3% of total cases). 
The most frequent HCCs are “other gastrointestinal disorders” (HCC036) representing 10.2% of 
hospitalisations; “appendicitis” (HCC035) accounting for 5.2%; “other neoplasms” (HCC013, 
4.9% of hospitalisations); “other musculoskeletal and connective tissue disorders” (HCC043, 
accounting for 3.6% of hospitalisations) and “gallbladder and biliary tract disorders” (HCC030) 
accounting for 3.2% of hospitalisations. 
A number of HCC categories rarely occur in the dataset and 14 HCC categories have no 
observations in 2001; 8 of the 170 categories with observations have frequencies of less than 10 
cases. 
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Table 52: Frequency of aggregated condition categories 
Aggregated Condition Category (ACC)       Total Percentage 
    All People  185,825  
01: Infectious and Parasitic  6,466 3.1% 
02: Malignant Neoplasm    10,446 5.0% 
03: Benign/In Situ/Uncertain Neoplasm    11,653 5.6% 
04: Diabetes  4,434 2.1% 
05: Nutritional and Metabolic 2,253 1.1% 
06: Liver 9,608 4.6% 
07: Gastrointestinal 40,324 19.4% 
08: Musculoskeletal and Connective Tissue 12,172 5.8% 
09: Hematological 1,830 0.9% 
10: Cognitive Disorders 696 0.3% 
11: Substance Abuse 1,624 0.8% 
12: Mental 3,239 1.6% 
13: Developmental Disability 238 0.1% 
14: Neurological 3,975 1.9% 
15: Cardio-Respiratory Arrest 1,096 0.5% 
16: Heart 11,113 5.3% 
17: Cerebro-Vascular 3,790 1.8% 
18: Vascular 5,877 2.8% 
19: Lung 28,045 13.5% 
20: Eyes 7,533 3.6% 
21: Ears, Nose and Throat 12,421 6.0% 
22: Urinary System 4,033 1.9% 
23: Genital System 1,730 0.8% 
24: Pregnancy-Related 3,682 1.8% 
25: Skin and Subcutaneous 5,731 2.8% 
26: Injury, Poisoning, Complications 4,443 2.1% 
27: Symptoms, Signs and Ill-Defined Conditions 3,287 1.6% 
28: Neonates 2,232 1.1% 
29: Transplants, Openings, Other V-Codes 213 0.1% 
30: Screening / History 4,176 2.0% 
Total 208,360 100.0% 
Source: DxCG 5.1 Software using national discharges from the Chile data subset, 2001 
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3. Predictive performance 
3.1. Individual level predictive performance 
Table 53 summarises the predictive performance of the risk assessment models and the 
DCG/HCC model with recalibrated weights as measured by the R
2
 and MAPE statistics, using 
this concurrent approach. 
The demographic model that adjusts only by age and gender has the lowest predictive power. The 
demographic model that combines hospitalisation performs substantially better than the previous 
model, but not as well as the diagnoses model. In fact, there are substantial increases in predictive 
performance when we differentiate those who were hospitalised. 
Table 53: Summary of individual level predictive performance 
 Concurrent application  
N population insurances system 13,098,480   
N sample from HOSP (Expend>0) 185,824   
   
Mean Expenditure (US dollars Dec. 2002) 8.89  
   
Risk Adjustment Model R2 adj [%] MAPE [US dollars] 
   
Age*Gender 2.6  16.46 
Age*Gender*HOSP 21.5  7.44 
Age*Gender *DCG/HCCs (Reparameterised) 36.1  6.06 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
Based on adjusted-R
2
, the demographic model explains only 2.6% of the variance in total actual 
expenditure. Incorporating a binary variable for hospitalisation increases the adjusted-R
2
 value to 
21.5%. However, with an adjusted-R
2
 of over 36.1%, the predictive performance of the 
reparametrised DCG/HCC model shows a 68% improvement in comparison to the demographic 
model with hospitalisation and performs 14 times better relative to the demographic model. 
We use the MAPE indicator to compare all three models. MAPE provides similar rankings of the 
models‟ predictive performance as the adjusted-R2. Keeping in mind that we want the smallest 
MAPE possible from a model, the MAPE ranges from US$ 16.46 in the age and sex model to 
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US$ 7.44 when we include hospitalisation, and reaches US$ 6.06 when we include diagnoses to 
the demographic model. Comparing the last two models we have a 23% increase in costs 
generated by the diagnoses model relative to the demographic hospitalisation model. And when 
we compare with the demographic model to the diagnoses model, the latter is 2.7 times better. 
3.2. Group level predictive performance 
In this subsection we analyse the predictive performance of the models by expenditure quintiles. 
The relative rankings of the models remain unchanged when comparing their concurrent 
predictive performances for groups of beneficiaries with relatively high, medium and low 
expenditure. 
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Table 54: Summary of group level predictive accuracy for actual expenditure quintiles 
Risk Adjustment Model Concurrent application 
  Actual Mean [US dollars Dec. 2003]  PR  
Quintile 1 60.26  
Age*Gender  64.40 
Age*Gender*Hosp  10.39 
Age*Gender*DCG/HCCs  7.01 
   
Quintile 2 211.37  
Age*Gender  0.29 
Age*Gender*Hosp  2.96 
Age*Gender*DCG/HCCs  2.06 
   
Quintile 3 362.42  
Age*Gender  0.17 
Age*Gender*Hosp  1.73 
Age*Gender*DCG/HCCs  1.39 
   
Quintile 4 610.95  
Age*Gender  0.14 
Age*Gender*Hosp  1.03 
Age*Gender*DCG/HCCs  1.05 
   
Quintile 5 1,907.14  
Age*Gender  0.04 
Age*Gender*Hosp  0.33 
Age*Gender*DCG/HCCs   0.54 
Note: Mean expenditure is calculated using rows with actual expenditure >0 only. 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
The demographic model clearly is overpaying for the lower expenditure quintile and underpaying 
for the rest of the expenditure quintiles. The demographic model with the binary variable for 
hospitalisation and the diagnosis-based model are overpaying for the low expenditure quintile (10 
and 7 times, respectively) and, underpaying for the high expenditure quintiles (0.33 and 0.54 
respectively). In comparison, the DxCG/HCCs model performs better; though the DxCG/HCCs 
model still overpays the low-expenditure beneficiaries and underpays high-expenditure 
beneficiaries. 
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In conclusion, age/gender based models are easy to develop and use but inadequate because they 
consider only a few relevant patient characteristics. In fact, in our sample it explains only a small 
part of variation in individual resource use, with adjusted-R
2
= 0.026, i.e., 2.6% of variation. 
When this model is used for payments, it favours selection and causes access problems. 
The diagnoses-based model incorporates many differences in expected costs concurrently. It 
explains more of the observed variation in health spending across individuals. In our sample this 
model results in an adjusted-R
2
 of 0.361, i.e., it explains 36.1% of variation. 
Incorporating the binary variable for hospitalisation into the demographic model achieved an 
adjusted-R
2
 of 21.5%. 
3.3. Variables’ statistical performance 
Table 55 shows the coefficients and t tests of all the models‟ variables. 
Table 55: Coefficients and statistical significance, Age*Gender*DCG/HCCs Model 
Variable 
Non-standardised 
coefficients  
Standardised 
coefficients   
B Standard error  Beta t 
Significance 
level 
(Constant)  -0.35 0.12  -2.91 0.03 
 SEX  -0.14 0.07 0.00 -1.99 0.05 
 HCC002  871.71 4.14 0.05 210.59 0.00 
 HCC003  1,236.13 4.81 0.06 256.80 0.00 
 HCC004  1,666.35 4.35 0.08 382.79 0.00 
 HCC005  1,327.30 20.27 0.01 65.49 0.00 
 HCC006  285.53 1.94 0.03 147.50 0.00 
 HCC007  2,539.18 3.77 0.15 673.65 0.00 
 HCC008  900.96 2.49 0.08 361.84 0.00 
 HCC009  1,437.51 3.36 0.10 428.07 0.00 
 HCC010  739.66 1.90 0.09 388.43 0.00 
 HCC011  426.45 5.67 0.02 75.16 0.00 
 HCC012  492.85 3.40 0.03 145.03 0.00 
 HCC013  415.11 1.20 0.08 345.25 0.00 
 HCC014  233.73 3.92 0.01 59.63 0.00 
 HCC015  477.24 11.14 0.01 42.85 0.00 
 HCC016  868.02 3.22 0.06 269.98 0.00 
 HCC017  1,047.57 4.24 0.05 247.27 0.00 
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Variable 
Non-standardised 
coefficients  
Standardised 
coefficients   
B Standard error  Beta t 
Significance 
level 
 HCC018  681.26 12.89 0.01 52.84 0.00 
 HCC019  344.12 2.70 0.03 127.66 0.00 
 HCC021  8,581.83 14.91 0.13 575.60 0.00 
 HCC022  469.22 6.59 0.02 71.16 0.00 
 HCC023  334.96 12.70 0.01 26.38 0.00 
 HCC024  322.77 2.93 0.02 110.02 0.00 
 HCC025  71.74 4.84 0.00 14.82 0.00 
 HCC026  228.31 3.94 0.01 57.92 0.00 
 HCC027  67.01 17.39 0.00 3.85 0.00 
 HCC028  1,016.41 7.00 0.03 145.23 0.00 
 HCC029  163.80 4.17 0.01 39.25 0.00 
 HCC030  537.26 1.47 0.08 365.37 0.00 
 HCC031  1,462.80 2.78 0.12 525.98 0.00 
 HCC032  912.65 9.63 0.02 94.78 0.00 
 HCC033  10.56 7.72 0.00 1.37 0.17 
 HCC034  854.24 1.80 0.11 474.97 0.00 
 HCC035  923.37 1.15 0.18 800.11 0.00 
 HCC036  442.84 0.83 0.12 535.52 0.00 
 HCC037  750.69 5.11 0.03 146.86 0.00 
 HCC038  579.69 4.86 0.03 119.20 0.00 
 HCC039  836.43 2.58 0.07 324.11 0.00 
 HCC041  440.42 4.32 0.02 101.88 0.00 
 HCC042  252.85 11.28 0.00 22.41 0.00 
 HCC043  297.72 1.38 0.05 215.44 0.00 
 HCC044  829.71 8.00 0.02 103.68 0.00 
 HCC045  1,294.58 15.95 0.02 81.14 0.00 
 HCC046  288.83 6.06 0.01 47.66 0.00 
 HCC047  322.84 3.61 0.02 89.35 0.00 
 HCC048  630.42 11.18 0.01 56.38 0.00 
 HCC049  759.93 6.45 0.03 117.91 0.00 
 HCC050  580.07 8.36 0.02 69.42 0.00 
 HCC051  250.08 5.60 0.01 44.63 0.00 
 HCC052  728.44 3.87 0.04 188.04 0.00 
 HCC053  225.27 9.40 0.01 23.96 0.00 
 HCC054  1,377.55 4.86 0.06 283.21 0.00 
 HCC055  735.52 5.36 0.03 137.13 0.00 
 HCC056  628.27 12.31 0.01 51.05 0.00 
 HCC057  556.89 7.70 0.02 72.31 0.00 
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Variable 
Non-standardised 
coefficients  
Standardised 
coefficients   
B Standard error  Beta t 
Significance 
level 
 HCC058  380.43 3.82 0.02 99.57 0.00 
 HCC059  317.78 7.72 0.01 41.17 0.00 
 HCC060  226.92 5.17 0.01 43.91 0.00 
 HCC061  903.61 41.04 0.00 22.02 0.00 
 HCC062  444.73 86.89 0.00 5.12 0.00 
 HCC063  473.79 16.30 0.01 29.07 0.00 
 HCC064  614.16 11.02 0.01 55.71 0.00 
 HCC065  508.21 17.76 0.01 28.61 0.00 
 HCC066  2,045.04 122.99 0.00 16.63 0.00 
 HCC067  1,440.89 15.92 0.02 90.54 0.00 
 HCC068  953.49 10.15 0.02 93.96 0.00 
 HCC069  492.55 8.72 0.01 56.47 0.00 
 HCC070  1,386.57 22.08 0.01 62.80 0.00 
 HCC071  674.83 7.13 0.02 94.69 0.00 
 HCC072  337.66 28.97 0.00 11.65 0.00 
 HCC073  941.77 34.10 0.01 27.62 0.00 
 HCC074  266.15 3.14 0.02 84.64 0.00 
 HCC075  931.73 13.59 0.02 68.55 0.00 
 HCC076  212.08 3.05 0.02 69.55 0.00 
 HCC077  1,049.49 32.89 0.01 31.91 0.00 
 HCC078  853.24 4.62 0.04 184.56 0.00 
 HCC079  1,000.98 6.36 0.03 157.32 0.00 
 HCC080  578.60 2.27 0.06 254.83 0.00 
 HCC082  791.95 2.75 0.06 288.03 0.00 
 HCC083  440.94 3.07 0.03 143.61 0.00 
 HCC084  895.28 3.19 0.06 280.79 0.00 
 HCC085  1,470.79 9.19 0.04 160.04 0.00 
 HCC086  1,445.41 4.45 0.07 324.95 0.00 
 HCC087  52.75 11.75 0.00 4.49 0.00 
 HCC088  344.81 8.86 0.01 38.91 0.00 
 HCC089  983.05 9.99 0.02 98.37 0.00 
 HCC090  584.37 5.27 0.02 110.82 0.00 
 HCC091  589.12 17.21 0.01 34.22 0.00 
 HCC092  637.05 4.55 0.03 140.10 0.00 
 HCC093  756.02 4.81 0.03 157.08 0.00 
 HCC094  1,056.97 4.57 0.05 231.29 0.00 
 HCC095  733.74 3.56 0.05 206.32 0.00 
 HCC097  414.70 3.92 0.02 105.87 0.00 
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Variable 
Non-standardised 
coefficients  
Standardised 
coefficients   
B Standard error  Beta t 
Significance 
level 
 HCC098  594.39 3.95 0.03 150.65 0.00 
 HCC099  488.75 7.08 0.02 69.04 0.00 
 HCC100  513.90 13.25 0.01 38.79 0.00 
 HCC101  415.63 8.73 0.01 47.58 0.00 
 HCC102  88.88 61.51 0.00 1.44 0.15 
 HCC103  593.57 11.84 0.01 50.15 0.00 
 HCC104  844.77 4.56 0.04 185.19 0.00 
 HCC105  574.43 3.45 0.04 166.32 0.00 
 HCC106  418.22 1.95 0.05 214.01 0.00 
 HCC107  1,342.12 18.12 0.02 74.06 0.00 
 HCC108  472.74 2.35 0.04 200.97 0.00 
 HCC109  307.89 2.26 0.03 136.49 0.00 
 HCC110  1,031.39 3.57 0.06 288.71 0.00 
 HCC111  463.78 5.84 0.02 79.36 0.00 
 HCC112  416.96 2.67 0.03 156.39 0.00 
 HCC113  420.29 1.00 0.10 419.28 0.00 
 HCC114  1,322.85 6.58 0.04 200.98 0.00 
 HCC115  478.37 1.73 0.06 277.27 0.00 
 HCC116  220.42 70.94 0.00 3.11 0.00 
 HCC117  429.58 7.50 0.01 57.29 0.00 
 HCC118  344.24 5.01 0.02 68.71 0.00 
 HCC120  474.35 18.32 0.01 25.89 0.00 
 HCC121  320.58 13.92 0.01 23.02 0.00 
 HCC122  329.91 4.69 0.02 70.29 0.00 
 HCC123  600.37 2.02 0.07 296.65 0.00 
 HCC124  338.91 2.50 0.03 135.40 0.00 
 HCC125  176.29 7.28 0.01 24.20 0.00 
 HCC126  266.88 22.82 0.00 11.69 0.00 
 HCC127  229.61 1.12 0.05 204.71 0.00 
 HCC128  19.87 28.35 0.00 0.70 0.48 
 HCC130  65.24 10.80 0.00 6.04 0.00 
 HCC131  934.98 3.40 0.06 274.81 0.00 
 HCC132  839.06 6.00 0.03 139.80 0.00 
 HCC133  1,049.78 4.63 0.05 226.53 0.00 
 HCC134  -11.32 26.83 0.00 -0.42 0.67 
 HCC135  267.25 3.36 0.02 79.62 0.00 
 HCC136  426.59 7.35 0.01 58.04 0.00 
 HCC137  -173.55 18.93 0.00 -9.17 0.00 
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Variable 
Non-standardised 
coefficients  
Standardised 
coefficients   
B Standard error  Beta t 
Significance 
level 
 HCC138  102.46 4.43 0.01 23.15 0.00 
 HCC139  3.69 5.22 0.00 0.71 0.48 
 HCC140  98.08 6.30 0.00 15.58 0.00 
 HCC141  300.02 14.65 0.00 20.47 0.00 
 HCC142  71.07 5.38 0.00 13.21 0.00 
 HCC143  10.94 4.48 0.00 2.44 0.01 
 HCC144  -18.87 4.51 0.00 -4.19 0.00 
 HCC145  -19.07 3.14 0.00 -6.08 0.00 
 HCC146  -6.87 6.37 0.00 -1.08 0.28 
 HCC147  107.38 5.26 0.00 20.43 0.00 
 HCC149  822.14 12.06 0.02 68.16 0.00 
 HCC151  -9.08 21.09 0.00 -0.43 0.67 
 HCC152  279.85 2.79 0.02 100.42 0.00 
 HCC153  185.17 2.03 0.02 91.24 0.00 
 HCC155  -10.58 5.00 0.00 -2.12 0.03 
 HCC156  -210.20 41.09 0.00 -5.12 0.00 
 HCC157  249.57 17.80 0.00 14.02 0.00 
 HCC158  164.99 6.71 0.01 24.59 0.00 
 HCC159  80.74 6.57 0.00 12.29 0.00 
 HCC160  23.96 9.06 0.00 2.64 0.01 
 HCC161  -156.03 27.53 0.00 -5.67 0.00 
 HCC162  12.39 3.06 0.00 4.04 0.00 
 HCC163  9.63 6.27 0.00 1.54 0.12 
 HCC164  355.31 6.28 0.01 56.54 0.00 
 HCC165  179.74 4.71 0.01 38.20 0.00 
 HCC166  3.55 3.11 0.00 1.14 0.25 
 HCC167  106.07 2.98 0.01 35.64 0.00 
 HCC170  256.61 4.07 0.02 63.11 0.00 
 HCC171  59.53 3.36 0.00 17.71 0.00 
 HCC172  1,096.71 123.05 0.00 8.91 0.00 
 HCC174  -137.88 29.87 0.00 -4.62 0.00 
 HCC175  -234.36 43.70 0.00 -5.36 0.00 
 HCC176  429.25 9.38 0.01 45.78 0.00 
 HCC177  547.24 31.76 0.00 17.23 0.00 
 HCC179  -48.22 4.10 0.00 -11.76 0.00 
 HCC180  19.00 9.39 0.00 2.02 0.04 
 HCC181  413.03 3.70 0.03 111.71 0.00 
 HCC182  560.02 10.34 0.01 54.18 0.00 
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Variable 
Non-standardised 
coefficients  
Standardised 
coefficients   
B Standard error  Beta t 
Significance 
level 
 HCC183  126.05 2.79 0.01 45.12 0.00 
 HCC184  -60.60 15.93 0.00 -3.80 0.00 
 AGE  0.13 0.01 0.00 16.10 0.00 
 Dependent variable: EXPEND1      
Note: Age/sex cohorts were excluded. 
Source: Author’s regression using SPSS.  
Only 17 of the 170 HCCs diagnoses being considered are not statistically significant or are 
negative. Usually it is necessary to recalibrate the model when there are negative coefficients. 
This recalibration consists simply of eliminating those variables with negative coefficients. But, 
our analysis focuses on models‟ predictive performance and does not dwell on the statistical 
significance of the included variables. The specification of each model was forced; potential 
negative parameter estimates were not set to 0. This follows from Behrend et al., 2004. 
Furthermore, the more significant or important HCC diagnoses to predict costs are Appendicitis 
(HCC035), Metastatic Cancer and Acute Leukemia (HCC007), Protein-Calorie Malnutrition 
(HCC021) Intestinal Obstruction/Perforation and Other Gastrointestinal Disorder (HCC031 and 
HCC036) and Viral and Unspecified Pneumonia, Pleurisy (HCC113).  
3.4. Redistribution comparison 
Table 56 shows the aggregated predictive ratios for ISAPREs and FONASA. The PRs show a 
high aggregated level of predictiveness, with a 6% overestimation among ISAPREs and only a 
1% underestimation for FONASA. 
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Table 56: Comparison of actual versus predicted expenditures, in US 
dollars 2002 
  Average expenditures annualised  
Group Observations Actual Predicted Predictive Ratio 
All enrolees 13,098,481  8.887   8.887  1.00 
FONASA 10,157,686  9.651   9.527  0.99 
ISAPREs 2,940,795  6.821   7.248  1.06 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Table 57 shows the sum of risks by type of insurance using the DxCG model. FONASA‟s risk is 
359% higher than that of ISAPREs. The average risk factor per insured beneficiary is 33% higher 
in FONASA, which means a FONASA beneficiary is 33% riskier than an ISAPRE beneficiary. 
In the demographic cell model this difference is only 20%. The additional 13% may be the 
morbidity differences between ISAPREs and FONASA, which is an indication that ISAPREs 
cover a healthier population. 
Table 57: FONASA’s and ISAPREs’ risk factors, 2001 
Insurer 
Sum of risk factors 
diagnoses model 
Average of risk factor 
by insured – 
Diagnoses model 
Average of risk factor 
by insured – 
Sex and age model    
(Cell model) 
FONASA 10,869,444 1.07 1.04 
ISAPREs 2,368,577 0.81 0.87 
% of difference 359% 33% 20% 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
If we assume a per capita community premium equivalent to US$ 93.56 or Ch$50,000 in 2006 
(as in Chapter IV, point 4.2), and we redistribute resources based on the predicted expenditures of 
Table 57, the resulting redistribution is shown in Table 58. This resource redistribution resulting 
from the diagnoses based risk adjustment model is greater than the one of the demographic cell 
model studied in Chapter IV. In fact, ISAPREs compensate FONASA with US$ 55.87 million. 
This represents 4.6% of the Fund‟s resources and 75% of the ISAPRE system‟s total profit in 
2006. 
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Table 58: Estimation of aggregated redistribution from ISAPRE to FONASA with diagnoses-based risk 
adjustment model, US dollars 2006 
 FONASA ISAPREs Total Mean 
Population 2006 10,157,686 2,940,795 13,780,432  
Community premium 93.56 93.56  93.56 
Total Resources 950,328,949 275,133,787 1,225,462,736  
Premium subsidy 100.11 75.35  93.56 
Adjusted total amount 1,006,200,108 219,262,628 1,225,462,736  
Redistribution from ISAPREs to FONASA 55,871,160 -55,871,160 0  
Source: Author’s calculations 
The diagnoses-based model we propose captures a great part of the morbidity of health, unlike 
the models restricted to the GES health problems from Chapter IV. If we include in our 
simulation the total expenditure on health care services for both FONASA and ISAPREs and not 
only for GES health problems, the redistribution from the ISAPREs to FONASA could be as high 
as US$ 162.79 million. This would be equivalent to 30% of the public expenditure on primary 
health care in 2006, 9.4% of ISAPREs‟ operation income and double its profit in 2006.  
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VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
We analyse the most important economic and financial aspects of the health care system in Chile 
and propose a model that solves the efficiency, equity and lack of solidarity problems that we 
currently see in the system. 
Similar international experience, especially in Europe, focused on the risk selection concern, the 
removal of beneficiaries, and the inequities that these concerns generate. Europe has taken strong 
steps towards finding solutions to these problems, beginning with a systematic diagnosis of the 
situation.  This work attempts to replicate those efforts in terms of the use of tools and relevant 
concepts for the Chilean case. 
In a competitive health insurance market, without proper regulation, the risk premium is high for 
the elderly, the sick, women of fertile age, and large families.  The risk premium is low for the 
young, single, and small families. This is what we currently see in the case of ISAPREs in Chile. 
Furthermore, Chile has significant inequities in the health financing between the public and 
private sectors, and between the high and low income quintiles. The institutional arrangement 
separates financing of the public insurer FONASA (which includes funds from treasury and 
contributions made by the low-income population) and the individual ISAPREs (which includes 
contributions from the 20% highest income population). On the other hand, the high co-payments 
and out-of-pocket expenditures of the population weaken the necessary financial responsibility of 
insurers. The beneficiaries‟ expenditures should be reflected in the financial performance of the 
insurance companies and not in the financial performance of the individuals or public institutions. 
Making insurance mandatory and having income-based premiums are the typical mechanisms 
countries implement to promote solidarity in the health system. It promotes premiums that are 
independent of the health status of individuals, of the number of family members, their income 
and of the risk of falling ill. Initially, this is the fundamental technical reason for the way 
premiums are set in Chile, as is the case in many other countries with a social security system.  
When the premium is restricted because it is based on income, to avoid regressiveness in the 
mandatory contribution to social security, it gives rise to risk selection incentives. The elements 
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that give incentives to risk select are reinforced under weak regulation. In fact, in the Chilean 
case there are high inequities in financing, a large selection problem and a segmented health 
system, all of which remain even with the current reform. 
In Chile, as in other countries, risk selection generates many types of inefficiencies. First, 
ISAPREs do not have the incentive to respond adequately to the needs of high risk affiliates, 
possibly giving rise to a treatment quality problem, for example, for the chronically ill. Second, 
ISAPREs‟ success in attracting low-risk individuals generates a segmented market, where low 
premiums are charged to low-risk individuals and high premiums are charged to high-risk 
individuals, and no private health insurance plan is designed for income levels below a certain 
threshold. This generates a solidarity problem for the social security system. Furthermore, 
important groups of people are affected by ISAPREs‟ cream skimming practices. For example, 
individuals who cannot afford ISAPREs‟ high premiums end up switching to FONASA where 
they pay the lowest premium possible (7% of their income) for reasonable coverage. The net 
effect of this for FONASA is a financial deficit that has to be covered with resources from 
contributors or the Government, which leads to an equity problem. In the previous example, the 
resources available decrease for the group of beneficiaries who were in the system before the 
entry of a high-risk individual, who have, up to that point, contributed their premiums to the 
private system. 
In this context, selection is more profitable for ISAPREs than improving efficiency in the 
production of health care services. In the short term, insurance companies prefer to invest their 
available resources in improving risk selection and not in reducing costs, and so they do not 
invest in improving efficiency in the provision of care. Hence, it could be the case that the more 
efficient insurance companies which implement less risk selection run the risk of losing market 
share relative to those insurance companies that are less efficient. Although a single ISAPRE may 
gain from selection, it is still a loss for society and hence a total welfare loss.  This is also an 
example of how selection could work against efficiency.  
One way to reduce risk selection is to create premium cross-subsidies from low-risk groups to 
high-risk groups (van de Ven et al, 2001). This model would make solidarity subsidies effective, 
without hindering the competition within the ISAPRE system. This may be done through a risk 
adjustment model that uses the available information to estimate expected health costs for an 
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individual or group, based on utilization and observed costs during a fixed period of time, to 
establish the subsidy for the high-risk group. Risk adjustment is expected to neutralize incentives 
for risk selection to the extent that insurers become indifferent to who becomes a beneficiary. 
These policies could be implemented in Chile, and because FONASA is a large public insurer 
that coexists with private insurers, including it in the risk adjustment model differentiates Chile 
from the international experience. It is important to keep in mind this particularity when adapting 
the model to the Chilean case, and to ensure the financing of at least those individuals who are 
not able to pay for insurance elsewhere. 
In general, there are a set of other policies that could accompany risk adjustment models. An 
important one is open enrolment which would play a complementary role to risk adjustment. In 
practice, only FONASA has open enrolment, which is only sustainable through the supply 
subsidy given by the Government to the public health sector. Without open enrolment in the 
private health insurance sector, risk adjustment becomes even more necessary. 
Therefore, besides risk adjustment, a minimum regulatory framework is necessary with a 
minimum set of regulations: open enrolment, minimum contract duration (5 years, for example), 
guaranteed contract renovation and no risk re-evaluation at the conclusion of the first contract. 
In sum, in a scenario with many market failures, as is the case with the health care sector, there is 
a trade off between equity and efficiency, which is a key challenge faced by governments and 
technical regulatory institutions. The redistribution of risks −from the young to the elderly, and 
from the healthy to the sick− may improve both of the relevant concepts of health policy − equity 
and efficiency.  We can conclude that the better the quality of risk adjustment, the lower the trade 
off between equity and efficiency. 
To reach the level of sophistication required by the proposed adjustment models based on 
diagnoses, we explore the available datasets and use the only existing individual dataset 
available: hospital discharges at the national level. At the same time, and taking advantage of the 
good quality of the dataset, we estimate costs for each discharge and impute them into the 
dataset, following previous studies. Due to ID problems, however, only 36% of the cases were 
verified. After performing the relevant tests to interpret the level of representation of this sample, 
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we conclude that it is sufficient. Because we had access to information for only one year (2001), 
the study was limited to a concurrent model. 
We review various risk adjustment models for the private and public sector, considering that 
FONASA is expected to subsidize the poor. This study reviews the model implemented in the 
reform and its limited impact. The originally proposed compensation fund −which was rejected in 
Congress− included solidarity between both sectors, but was also limited to the reduced basic 
package in GES. Given this, we go beyond the simple cells-model and present a regression model 
that in the first stage uses demographic adjustment and then incorporates morbidity. Our results 
show that the model incorporating morbidity is far superior to the previous alternatives. When the 
effects of redistribution are simulated on the financing of health services, redistribution towards 
FONASA is highest to one of the actuarial demographic models. But the model recognizes the 
current and expected morbidity based on diagnoses of the public insurance, which has been the 
recipient of the “bad risks” from the ISAPRE system for many years. 
We argue that the more refined the adjusters, the more accurate the predictions of medical 
expenditure, hence decreasing the selection incentives. 
We compare the two concurrent risk adjustment regression models: the demographic model that 
predicts costs based only on sex and age; and the diagnosis-based model, which incorporates 
health conditions grouped as the Hierarchical Condition Category of the Diagnosis Cost Group 
Classification System (DxCG/HCC). We compare them based on their ability to predict the 
current health care costs. 
A concurrent application uses claims data from a period of time to project medical claim costs for 
that same period. The risk weight reflects an estimate of the marginal cost for a given medical 
condition relative to the base cost for individuals with no medical conditions.  
To predict expenditures at the individual level, we use linear formulas obtained from an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression to combine the expenses associated with diagnostic groupings 
(HCCs) and age/sex cohorts. 
We measure the individual level predictive performance using individual adjusted- R
2
 and the 
mean absolute prediction error (MAPE). We assess the group level predictive performance using 
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predictive ratios (PR) of expenditure quintiles. The adjusted-R
2
 measures the model‟s fit and 
describes the percentage of the individual variance in actual expenditure explained by the model. 
MAPE is the mean of the difference between actual and predicted expenditures for all 
individuals. The predictive ratio of expenditure quintiles is a group measure calculated as the 
ratio or the aggregated predicted expenditure for a given group of beneficiaries, over the 
aggregated actual expenditure for the same group of people.  
Based on adjusted-R
2
, the demographic model explains only 2.6% of the variance in total actual 
expenditure. When we include a dummy for hospitalisation, we achieve an adjusted R
2
 of 21.5%. 
The third model uses morbidity and has an adjusted-R
2
of 36.1%; the predictive performance of 
this model represents a 68% of improvement over the demographic model with hospitalisation 
and performs 14 times better than the demographic model. 
For the same three models, MAPE provided equal ranking, where the recalibrated DxCG/HCC 
model (with morbidity) was US$ 6.06 in the best model, 23% more than the demographic model. 
The relative rankings of the models remained unchanged when their concurrent predictive 
performances for groups of enrolees with relatively high, medium and low expenditure were 
evaluated. The PR results for enrolees grouped by quintiles of actual expenditure shows that the 
demographic model is grossly underpaying the lowest expenditure quintile. The demographic 
model with a dummy variable for hospitalisation and the diagnosis based model overpay the 
lowest expenditure quintile and underpay the highest expenditure quintile. The recalibrated 
DxCG/HCCs model performs even better, though there is still overpayment for the lowest 
expenditure group of insured and underpayment for the high expenditure groups. 
In conclusion, the introduction of risk adjustment is necessary in Chile. An age/sex based risk 
adjustment model is inadequate because it considers too few relevant patient characteristics.  
Additionally, we show here that only a small part of the variation in individual resource use is 
explained. When the model is used for payment, it encourages favourable selection and causes 
access problems. Instead the diagnoses-based risk adjustment model can distinguish differences 
in expected costs concurrently and explain more and better the variation observed in health 
spending across individuals. Hence this model is proposed as the best alternative for Chile. 
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Regardless of the good results obtained, important problems remain that may limit its application 
in practice, assuming the political will to implement it. In strictly technical terms, the model 
requires improving the data available for the entire insurance system (FONASA and ISAPREs) at 
the individual level that registers systematically all patient health service utilization in the system 
at all service levels. On the other hand, the registry must be systematic so that it may be used in 
prospective models that have reportedly generated better incentives for efficiency. Also, special 
attention must be given to ambulatory care and drugs, to be able to estimate the ambulatory 
component of health care, which we were not able to include in this paper. 
While the political and institutional support is obtained to implement a complete and broad model 
such as the one proposed here, steps forward may be taken with complementary policies like 
open enrolment and risk-sharing for high risk and high cost individuals, without great difficulty. 
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APPENDIX: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ABOUT THE CHILEAN SOCIAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE SYSTEM 
Appendix Table 1: Public sector expenditure and GDP 
Year GDP Public Expenditure % of GDP 
Treasury 
Expenditure % of GDP 
2000 102.539 3.091 3,01% 1.484 1,45% 
2001 107.125 3.379 3,15% 1.585 1,48% 
2002 110.943 3.319 2,99% 1.487 1,34% 
2003 121.128 3.419 2,82% 1.603 1,32% 
2004 134.758 3.722 2,76% 1.852 1,37% 
2005 147.652 3.963 2,68% 1.929 1,31% 
2006 168.829 4.547 2,69% 2.284 1,35% 
2007 172.724 4.836 2,80% 2.560 1,48% 
2007/2000 1,68 1,56  1,72  
Source: Elaborated by the author using FONASA information. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Total revenues, FONASA and ISAPREs, 2000-2007 
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           US$4,305        US$4,576      US$4,537     US$4,785     US$5,108    US$5,435        US$5,674      US$5,917
 
Source: Elaborated by the author with information from the Superintendence of Health using an exchange rate of $534.43/USD. 
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Appendix Figure 2: Revenues in the public health sector, 2000-2007 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 3: Premium contributions, FONASA and ISAPREs, 2000-2006 
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             US$2,284      US$2,415       US$2,485     US$2,605    US$2,727      US$2,894       US$3,106   US$3,169
 
Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health 
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Appendix Figure 4: Total expenditure, FONASA and ISAPREs, 2000-2007 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 5:  Total expenditure in health care, FONASA and ISAPREs, 2000-2007 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 6: Total expenditure in sickness allowances, FONASA and ISAPREs, 2000-
2007 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 7: Growth of the gap of per capita expenditure between FONASA and 
ISAPREs, 2000-2007 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health 
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Appendix Figure 8: Growth of per capita expenditure of FONASA and ISAPREs, 2000–2007 
(base year 2000) 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 9: Growth of per capita expenditure of FONASA and ISAPREs versus growth 
of Chile’s GDP, 2000-2007 (base year 2000) 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health and the Central Bank  
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Appendix Figure 10: Population of Chile by health system, 2000-2007 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health 
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Appendix Figure 11: Beneficiaries of FONASA by income group (A poorest to D richest), 2000-
2007 
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Appendix Figure 12: ISAPREs’ beneficiaries by income group, 2000 - 2007 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 13: FONASA population, December 2007 
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Source: Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 14: ISAPREs population, December 2007 
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Source: Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 15: Percentage of beneficiaries FONASA and ISAPREs, by sex, December 2007 
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Source: Elaborated by the author using information from the Superintendence of Health. 
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Appendix Figure 16: Percentage of FONASA and ISAPREs beneficiaries, by age groups, 
December 2007 
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